Churchill, Roosevelt and India

Propaganda During World War II

Auriol Weigold

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Contents

List of Abbreviations

FO	Foreign Office
FRUS	Foreign Relations United States
GoI	Government of India
IO	India Office
IOL	India Office Library
MoI	Ministry of Information
NP	Nehru Papers
PD	Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons
PPF	President's Personal Files
PSF	President's Secretary's Files
RL	Roosevelt Library
TP (1)	Transfer of Power Documents, Vol. 1
TP (2)	Transfer of Power Documents, Vol. 2

Foreword

Predictably, the writing of modern Indian history evolves over succeeding academic generations. As India led the dissolution of the British Empire, there was a natural interest in how it all came about. The apparent rise and triumph of a nationalist cause was a good story in itself, but was also thought to have resonance for other jurisdictions in the imperial/colonial world and not necessarily in just the British one. As nation building led to a new post-colonial social and political order in India, historians turned their gaze to a myriad of other interests and movements ranging from the environment through gender studies and minority rights to sport. The Subaltern Studies school emphasis on "history from below" spearheaded much of this, to be challenged by the inevitable revisionists so that now there are even newer insights being promoted.

In many ways, of course, this is the practice of history, as G. R. Elton termed it so long ago, writ large: newer generations of scholars revisiting the past to make some sense of the present. The essence of history, in many respects, is to help any social entity understand how things got to be the way they are, what the preconditions were, who were the main players, and how did they proceed and with what results. That is as true of, say, Ramachandra Guha's new analysis of post-1947 India as it is of Boria Majumdar's insights into Indian cricket or of the many writings on politics, the economy, literature, film, or the Indian diaspora.

Placed in that context, this present book may be seen to highlight another major Indian role and one that has become paramount in the past decade, India in the global context.

For a long time in earlier periods, of course, India was seen in a global mercantilist light. Travellers and traders both before and after Ibn Batuttah combined a natural curiosity for the "Other" with concerns for commerce and political positioning in India over succeeding centuries. That, heightened with the coming of the British as they first cleared out as many other foreign powers, especially France, as possible to secure predominance, then after 1857 consolidated India as the key beachhead in Asia. In the globally strategic sense, that strand continued through the later 19th century amidst the "scramble for Africa" then into the 20th century and its two massive

global conflicts. In both world wars, India was a significant contributor of both people and strategic significance.

In all the historians' concern for nationalism growing into independence, however, it is fair to say that the global positioning of India became somewhat overlooked. While there was work done on the place of India in British policy, it was largely bilateral and largely on economic and/or constitutional shifts, the polarities say, of Dominion Status and the gold standard.

Auriol Weigold now reminds us, however, that India's place in the global context, especially in the later stages of Empire, was much more multidimensional than that. In particular, the Americans had a complex and often contradictory view of British India. That sprang from a heady mix of ideology, strategic concern, commercial interests, international strategies, and personality politics. At one end this might be seen in the long and prominent presence in India of American missionaries bent on cultural change, at the other, a gaggle of journalists who saw in Gandhi a massive story that in simple terms read like David *vs* Goliath. As America was drawn late into one war and earlier into the next, India and what Britain was doing there moved more and more centre stage, especially as America was also watching events in China. In turn, Britain became increasingly concerned about American attitudes toward its India policy, foreseeing possibly severe consequences both for the war effort and what might happen in a postwar global world.

It is tempting to see that as a nascent *globalisatio*n (a much abused word), but the temptation must be resisted. Rather, Auriol Weigold lays out an important and broadened understanding of two essential processes: how America became increasingly interested in and concerned about what Britain was doing in India, and how British authorities reacted to and dealt with that American interest. All that, of course, collided with an escalating nationalist movement, complicated warfare commitments on several far-flung fronts, sophisticated propaganda campaigns, and heightened media interests.

It is a fascinating story that provides the necessary counterbalance as well as a direct link to what was happening at the local level in India, where campaigns like the Quit India movement were being mobilised in the midst of tragic events like the Bengal famine. While it does not preordain a future world, it does highlight a clear predilection for "spin" in official circles on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as in India; a frequently large gap between what policy promised and actually delivered; a large gap between experiences at the mass and elite levels; how compromise was often crude horse-trading; and how personality could turn policy. For all those reasons, it is an important book.

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Preface

In 1942, British propaganda delivered in the United States against immediate self-government for India was efficiently and effectively organised—it was deliberate, not adventitious. The chief protagonists were Churchill and Roosevelt. Churchill's success in retaining control of government in India depended on convincing the President of the United States that there was no viable alternative.

This Prime Minister Churchill did in two ways. First, his propaganda organisation targeted pro-British groups in America with Britain's record in India, the complexities of Indian society, Britain's responsibilities to the minority groups, and the effort to find a way to give India a measure of self-government. Second, it discredited Indian nationalist leadership.

Convincing American public opinion and, through it, the President that the governing of India should remain in British hands also depended on the right mix of censorship and press freedom in India.

Britain's need to mount a propaganda campaign in the United States indicated its dual agenda: its war-related determination to maintain and increase American aid, and its longer term aim to retain control of its Empire.

The case for a propaganda campaign was made stronger by Roosevelt's constant pressure on Churchill from mid-1941 to reach a political settlement with India. Pressure was also brought to bear by the Indian National Congress Party as its price for war-related cooperation, by China, and by the Labour Party in Britain. Japan's success made strategists assess that India might be a target. Stable and cooperative government in India was as much in America's interest as in Britain's.

The idea that Roosevelt might intervene in India to secure a measure of self-government there constantly worried Churchill. This, in turn, drove the Foreign Office, the India Office, the Government of India, the Ministry of Information, and the British Embassy in Washington to develop propaganda based, first, on the last-minute reform offer to India and, second, on the elements of Gandhi's Quit India movement that could be presented as damaging to Allied war aims.

While the key sources used in this book are referred to in the Introduction, I would like to acknowledge gratefully the access I have had to

United States and British documents, to the papers of key players, and to the wealth of scholarly writing on Anglo-American relations, on aspects of the Indo–British relationship, on propaganda theory and practice, and on newspaper reports in 1942, each of which was vitally important in putting this small piece of the "end of Empire" story in place.

I also would like to express my appreciation to academic colleagues who read, advised, and encouraged me across the process of writing this book, in part developed from my doctoral studies. Routledge's interest in it provided the final impetus, but it still needed the painstaking checking and formatting work, done with dedication by my friend and colleague, Elaine Eccleston, for which I thank her. Many others at the University of Canberra have encouraged and assisted me. They know they have my thanks. Last and most important, my thanks, as ever, go to my husband and sons for their tolerance for and support of my absorbing interest in India, without which this book would not have been completed.

Auriol Weigold
University of Canberra
November 2007

Introduction

While few generalisations can be made about the effectiveness of propaganda, its use by Britain to disguise a conflict of interests with the United States in 1942 established its interest as a case study.

British propaganda objectives, to maintain anti-colonial America's support for its war effort and at the same time retain its Empire, highlights the divide between Britain's international interests and its imperial intentions.

India's interest as a subject in the use of propaganda lies therefore in its unsuccessful war-time bid for independence, a bid that, nonetheless, drove Prime Minister Churchill into a propaganda campaign to convince his ally, President Roosevelt, fighting a war for freedom, that the continued subjugation of the Indian people was appropriate.

Propaganda was generally, if reluctantly, accepted in Britain as an adjunct to military action. The British developed propaganda techniques during the First World War and re-embraced them during the 1930s, coordinated by the Ministry of Information at the outbreak of the Second World War.

Engaged in propaganda on home and war fronts and to Allied and neutral countries, British policy-makers comforted themselves in the belief that "their propaganda was publicity," that they had "resorted to such an un-English activity only in order to defend themselves. . . ."[1] The establishment of a British propaganda machine in America under Churchill's auspices in 1941 and its concentration on British–Indian interests from late that year, however, suggests that a primary target for its "friendly" propaganda was its ally, the United States.

Despite arguments about the value of propaganda, its use has a long and often disreputable history. Many modern studies tend to replace the word *propaganda* with less pejorative ones. Neutral terms, however, such as *communication*, *mass communication*, *persuasive communication*, or *publicity*, for example, do not adequately describe Britain's efforts to direct, not her own, but American public opinion toward a particular view of political events in India in 1942.

A useful definition of *propaganda,* carrying within it the notion of manipulation that is the essence of propaganda and inherent in this study, states that,

> Propaganda is the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.[2]

One important strand of Britain's propaganda was played out in the United States. The prize was the support of President Roosevelt and American public opinion for maintaining the status quo in India. Churchill and Roosevelt were the key protagonists.

Indian nationalist leaders challenged the propaganda campaign in America in the liberal media and primarily in a monthly pamphlet, "India Today," published by the India League of America. It was an important outlet for the countervailing, pro-independence arguments of Pandit Nehru, leader of the nationalist Indian Congress Party, and other Party members. The League also published occasional broadsheets in 1942, such as "India: Her position in a changing world," "Storm over India," and Nehru's "Can Indians get together?" Despite the presence on the League's advisory board of influential Americans, including Albert Einstein, Louis Fischer, and Henry Luce,[3] the publications were ineffectual in terms of shifting public opinion to an extent where the President had to take it into account in the decisions he made on intervention in India.

A general indication of swings in American public opinion about India, linked with media reporting, can be observed from mid-1940, when Britain's offer of limited political reform, known as the August Offer, was rejected by Mahatma Gandhi. The Offer restated the goal of Dominion Status, but maintained that no fundamental constitutional changes could be made during the war. It was condemned as inadequate as a carrot to gain unqualified Indian support for the war on the Allied side by American liberal journals, such as *Time, The Nation,* and *The New Republic,* and received limited support from traditionally pro-British newspapers, such as the *New York Times.*[4]

Support, however, swung away from the nationalist Indian Congress party when Gandhi started a civil disobedience campaign late that year and was jailed again by the Government of India. The *New York Times* regretted his imprisonment, but suggested that sympathy was all American could offer.[5] Support swung back toward the Congress Party in mid-1941, when Churchill made it clear that the third clause of the Atlantic Charter, which purported to respect the right of all people to choose their form of government, did not apply to India.[6] The position reversed again when a proposal offering limited political reform for India was delivered on the Churchill Government's behalf by Sir Stafford Cripps in New Delhi in March 1942. Since the start of the year, the British Embassy in Washington and British and Indian Government sources had released propaganda material to the American press, stating and restating Britain's historical links with its Indian Empire and its responsibilities toward it, in preparation for the reform announcement. Referring to Cripps' Offer, the *New York Times,*

in an editorial on March 12, noted that an apparently unconditional proposal for Indian self-rule had come from Britain. During the next month, that newspaper and others endeavoured to convince India to accept Cripps' Offer, reluctant to accept Britain's propaganda arguments also run by the press that Indian nationalists would turn it down.

Propaganda theory suggests that the greater the monopoly of an information source—in this case, newspapers—the greater the influence of the message.[7] British access to American newspapers, and hence the American public, was far greater than Indian access, and another advantage for Britain lay in the similarity between British and American values and intellectual environments, making each understandable to the other.

Leadership in India will be further discussed in Chapter 8. However, to canvass some of that discussion, it is worth noting that, in a cultural identity context, both Pandit Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi, leaders of the Indian nationalist Congress Party, were outsiders to the world of the broad Indian population and grass-root politics by virtue of their involvement in imperial ideas and networks, gained outside the subcontinent. In particular, Nehru's international connections set him apart from most other Indians.[8] His overseas network included Sir Stafford Cripps, his friend, whose offer of political reform for India was the backbone of the Churchill-inspired propaganda campaign predicting that it would fail and that there would not be immediate self-government there. Indeed Nehru said of himself that he was "a queer mixture of the East and the West, out of place everywhere, at home nowhere."[9] We are also reminded that in India's progression towards independence, nationalist leaders had to persuade, in addition to Britain and the United States, and more particularly Churchill and Roosevelt in the early 1940s, "the very diverse, deeply divided, and largely illiterate masses of the [Indian] people,"[10] that their unmet needs could be met in an independent India.

That Nehru carried the people with him remains a phenomenon, but a *New York Times* correspondent provided an insight. He had watched "the ragged crowds gaze at Nehru . . . hardly moving as they listened to him speak in a language that few of them could understand,"[11] but charismatically capturing their imagination. While Churchill made his antagonism toward Gandhi well known (labeling him, among other epithets, *a half-naked fakir*, Nehru was regarded as a threat to the imperial purpose and, mostly on law and order issues, spent more than 3,200 days imprisoned in British India.

The great war-time debate over India's political future, however, took place between Britain and the United States. Nehru's, Gandhi's, and India's voices were ignored or seldom heard, and the outcome of the nation's demand for self-government was slogged out between Churchill and Roosevelt after the negotiations over Cripps' Offer ended. One outcome of the propaganda campaign was the backlash against Britain in America following the repression of the Gandhi-inspired Quit India movement. What may

be seen as either a failure of Indian leadership or a unifying strategy in the face of another failure to achieve even a measure of self-government is discussed in Chapter 8, but the passage of Gandhi's Quit India resolution left the nationalist leaders imprisoned and prevented from communicating with the media, and public interest in India faded in the United States.

To achieve their desired outcome, retaining control of India, British propagandists had to re-infiltrate American opinion-making ranks from the start of the Second World War. Their task was difficult. America remained, after the start of the war, opposed to any overseas propaganda and suspicious of it when generated locally. Public fear of the manipulation of opinion, seen in the popularity of the "America First" movement, had not dissipated in the interwar years. It had been stimulated early by the publication in 1920 of George Creel's *How We Advertised America: The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public Information, 1917–1919.* As Director of the Committee on Public Information during the First World War, Creel had been commissioned to "sell the war to America," and his book evoked widespread concern about the powers of mass media to "sway public opinion . . . towards almost any view."[12] Indeed in *Liberty and the News,* also published in 1920, Walter Lippmann wrote,

> True opinions can prevail only if the facts to which they refer are known; if they are not known, false ideas are just as effective as true ones, if not a little more effective.[13]

British propaganda in America during the First World War had been very skilful. The deception admitted to by Creel and others drew Americans to the isolationist policies that fuelled their determination not to look outward to the renewed turmoil in Europe or to become embroiled in a European war again by creative propagandists.

Within academic communities, however, American social scientists were stimulated to develop theories to explain the effects of propaganda and communication more broadly in terms of "Magic Bullets" or the "Hypodermic Needle Theory" to explain the phenomenon of mass communication. Walter Lippmann's *Public Opinion,* first published in 1922, raised what became ongoing concerns about the influence of the media. In 1937, as the British propaganda machine was gearing up prior to the war, the first edition of *Public Opinion Quarterly* was published. Its Foreword claimed that, "for the first time in history, we are confronted nearly everywhere by mass opinion as the final determinant of political and economic action. . . ."[14] Such endorsement of the strength of public opinion and those who directed it was grist to Churchill's mill, convinced as he was of the power of propaganda "employed against enemy and friend alike when survival of an ideal was at stake."[15] In this case, the ideal was the maintenance of Britain's Indian Empire.

The Institute for Propaganda Analysis was funded and set up in New York, also in 1937, as a response to a strong and growing public concern in the United States about the growing tension in Europe and the desire not to see any repeat of the successful propaganda campaigns of the First World War. The Institute's 1939 publication, *The Fine Art of Propaganda,* provided a methodology for recognising and analysing propaganda, with a seven-point analytical measure. The editors, A. and E. Lee,[16] argued that propaganda analysis as an idea caught on so readily because it provided a perspective on current affairs much needed by the American public and a device to "see through" the propagandist's "tricks."[17]

Like all methods of analysing propaganda, the Lees' method is open to criticism and is now outdated, but the time and reasons for its development are directly relevant to the climate in which British propaganda, with regard to India during the Second World War, was disseminated in the United States. Thus, it is of interest to measure British propaganda surrounding Cripps' Offer against the criteria set out in the Institute's seven-point analysis for separating factually accurate information from propaganda.

Described as "the tricks of the trade," the tests devised to identify propaganda were listed by names and basic information to allow a method by which a propaganda story could, with some research, be identified and separated from accurate reporting. The first test was entitled "Name Calling," which gave an idea a "bad" label so that it would be rejected by the audience without examining the evidence. The next test was called "Glittering Generality," and it associated an idea with a "virtue word" to promote acceptance and approval, again without examination of the evidence. "Transfer," the third test, carried the authority, sanction, and prestige of someone or something respected, across to another issue, to make that issue, in turn, respected. "Testimonial" consisted of having a respected (or hated) person say that a given idea, program, or person was good (or bad). The fifth test, named "Plain Folks," was the method used by the propagandist to convince his audience that he and his ideas were good because he was "of the people." "Card Stacking," the sixth test, involved the selection and use of facts or fiction, illustrations or distractions, and logical or illogical statements to give the best (or worst) possible case for an idea, program, or person. The final test, named "Band Wagon," concluded the seven-point analysis. In this test, the propagandist attempts to convince members of his audience that, because everyone accepted his ideas, they should also "jump on the band wagon."[18]

Application of the seven tools for analysis of media content and identification of propaganda to British propaganda in the United States produced interesting results.

In illustrating their use, broad generalisations about Indian unfitness for self-rule, stated and restated in press releases in America, are utilised. Discussion of the detail of the propaganda story Churchill and his information bureaux told unfolds in subsequent chapters. Broadly, then, in

naming or labeling the Congress Party as unrepresentative and by emphasising Hindu–Muslim tensions, known as the communal divide or communalism, British propaganda ensured that the idea of the Congress Party as a suitable government for India was rejected by the American public without questioning or further investigation.

Claiming its responsibilities for the Indian minorities and the Indian princely states in any transfer of power, Britain made *responsibility* a virtue word, a "glittering generality" that the American public could approve without question.

The idea of the British Empire carried the authority, prestige, and respect of a long-established institution. This idea was transferred as the carrier of such trust in the propaganda message to approval for continued British rule in India.

The editors of *The Fine Art of Propaganda* considered that a respected (or hated) person could testify that a given idea, program, or person was good (or bad). Lord Halifax, British Ambassador in Washington, former British Foreign Secretary, and a previous Viceroy of India (as Lord Irwin), then known to be sympathetic to Indian aspirations,[19] represented the respected person, and he affirmed that the Congress Party was "bad."

"Card Stacking" involved the selection and use of facts or falsehoods, illustrations or distractions, and logical or illogical statements to present the best (or worst) possible case for an idea, program, or person. British propaganda's representation of the Congress Party as not prepared to take responsibility for governing India and as making outrageous demands in a time of war met the card-stacking criterion.

Jumping on the "Band Wagon" was perhaps not as whole hearted as the British ministries concerned with propaganda would have liked. A small majority, however, as shown in polling, indicated their preference for granting India independence after the war, rather than immediately.[20]

Lee and Lee's analytic method clearly could have been applied by any reader unconvinced about the veracity of the British propaganda message, and the swings in opinion polling suggest that other sources of information or verification were sought by the general public.

Further shifts in American opinion on the question of independence for India from mid-1942 forced the British to renew their propaganda campaign. Opinion polling was not a clear indicator of a pro-Indian nationalist swing as questions varied from poll to poll, but a trend was discernible.[21] Most British evidence of the need for a strong second propaganda push came from their Washington Embassy and Ministry of Information reading of the United States' press.[22]

Halifax's successor at the Foreign Office Sir Anthony Eden's paper on Anglo-American relations indicated public opinion was volatile on the subject of India,[23] and the renewed surge of pro-independence views following the Quit India movement arrests discussed in the later chapters compelled the British into another propaganda push. The reasons for propaganda

remained unchanged. Churchill could not be sure that Roosevelt would not intervene to secure a political settlement in India, and he must, if the Prime Minister's interests were to prevail, be persuaded by majority American public opinion not to take such a course of action. If influential groups such as members of the State Department, the Harvard Group, Pearl Buck's East West Society, and the President's representatives in India persuaded a majority of American public opinion to support immediate independence for India, pressure on Roosevelt to act would increase.

India Office, Foreign Office, Ministry of Information, and Government of India files reveal the sense of urgency behind the large number of man hours spent and cables sent developing what was quite openly called propaganda for dissemination in the United States.[24] Their frequent communications planned the timing and content of announcements about the progress of Cripps' Mission to India, bearing an offer of limited reform in March 1942, and revealed their expectation that it could fail. The interaction of staff below ministerial level in London, Washington, and New Delhi, many of whom had served in India and understood what Churchill and his India Committee sought to achieve, give breadth to the history of the period. This allowed some recognition for the development of policy to fall on the civil servants involved, where "credit" is usually given to politicians[25] in accounts about international relations.

Primary source material is abundant. It includes Nicholas Mansergh's and Edward Lumby's collected documents, *India: The Transfer of Power 1942–47,* the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series, and exchanges between the British Embassy in Washington and the departments involved in propaganda in Britain and India, which are held at the Public Records Office in London. The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, New York, holds official files on India, the President's personal files on writers Louis Fischer and Edgar Snow, his unofficial informants in India, and the Louis Fischer Papers. As war correspondents in India, Fischer and Snow provided the President with views contradicting the propaganda story on India. The Edgar Snow Papers are held at the University of Missouri, Kansas City Campus. They provided access to his many articles (as did the Library of Congress in Washington DC), most published in the *Saturday Evening Post,* and revealed his growing interest in India and his conversations about it with President Roosevelt. Louis Fischer's articles in *The Nation* are another example of the many British and American journals cited in the bibliography. Newspapers, primarily in the United States but also in Britain and India, also yielded insights to the many-sided story.

Nehru's papers, held at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in New Delhi, fleshed out the progress, duration, and, finally dashed hopes of his friendship with Cripps. Parallel with the downturn in Nehru's relationship with Cripps, his communication with Colonel Louis Johnson, Roosevelt's Personal Representative in India, grew.

Hadley Cantril's meticulous public opinion polls on the question of political change in India provided invaluable information on shifts in American views, enabling Churchill's propaganda machine to adjust its campaign.

Churchill's India Committee; the Viceroy of India, Lord Linlithgow; Sir Leo Amery, Secretary of State for India; and Lord Halifax, British Ambassador in Washington remained convinced that such a propaganda drive was vital to their imperial agenda.

Frequent quotations from the key players, found in documents and newspapers, add to the flavour of the 1940s' use of language. Rather than a chronological history, the succeeding chapters build and add depth to previously mentioned events.

India's interest as a case study in British and American international relations strategy lies in its unsuccessful bid for independence—a bid that nonetheless threatened Britain's war-related agenda focused on the United States and its long-term imperial intentions. The indications of possible harm to its interests drove Britain into a propaganda campaign to convince its ally, the United States, fighting a war for freedom, that the continued subjugation of the Indian people was appropriate.

1 Churchill, Roosevelt, and India
The Genesis of the Propaganda Game

The bazaars of India, like the London coffee-houses of the last century, are always full of marvellous tales . . . a single unimportant fact is exaggerated and distorted, till it becomes unrecognisable. . . . So the game goes on.[1]

The idea of the "Great Game" fascinated Winston Churchill. The phrase was immortalised by Rudyard Kipling in *Kim* and first coined by Captain Arthur Conolly and Colonel Charles Stoddart, British army officers facing execution in Bokhara in 1842 for their part in the intrigue that cloaked the political ambitions of Britain and Russia in Central and South Asia. The "Great Game," an ongoing and frequently dangerous enterprise undertaken to protect and secure the interests of the British Raj, continued throughout the 19th century and greatly impressed Winston Churchill when he was attached to the Malakand Field Force as a correspondent in 1897. The horse-mounted men patrolled the northwest heights of the Hindu Kush on what was then the border between India and Afghanistan and out-flanked and outwitted recalcitrant tribes, whose displacement was often based on information gleaned from local bazaars.

Almost half a century later, in 1942, within one month of America's entry into the Second World War, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt embarked on a new "Great Game," a propaganda campaign played to decide India's immediate political future. At stake was a continuation of its imperial status under Britain or self-government promoted by anti-colonialist America. Indian nationalists arguing for their country's freedom did not have an effective hand to play, and protest in the form of the Quit India movement led them back to gaol.

The Anglo-Russian "Great Game" continued across the region throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries and continues to have relevance today on a grand scale in America's coalition of the willing challenging Islam for control of the hearts, minds, and weaponry of Muslim majority countries from the Middle East to Pakistan. The "game" as it was played in the

late 19th century greatly influenced Churchill, then a young reporter. He observed the pacification of tribes close to the Afghan border, utilising the bazaars to both gather intelligence and disseminate propaganda, swiftly backed up with force, securing time and again the British Raj position along the north western ramparts of the Hindu Kush massif.

At that time, Churchill was embedded with the Malakand Field Force, writing for the *Allahabad Pioneer,* which also published much of Kipling's early writing. Churchill's letters and telegrams, despatched from the sites of border skirmishes, were also published by *The Daily Telegraph* and the *Indian Weekly News* between September and November 1897. He was seduced by empire and intrigue. Information gathered along the northwest heights of the Hindu Kush sustained the "Great Game," as it was then played, and inspired his life-long commitment to maintaining Britain's Empire and his fascination with the power of propaganda employed against enemy and friend alike when survival of an ideal was at stake.

His commitment to "hold India to the Empire"[2] was such an ideal and was to determine much of his first forty-five years in Parliament. Propaganda that supported his style of personal diplomacy[3] developed from his early glimpses of bazaar intrigue was used by him with great effect in the new "game," the propaganda campaign undertaken in the 20th century, as in the 19th century, to defend the Raj. His self-imposed task during the Second World War, supported by his "die-hard" conservative colleagues, was to convince his friend and ally, President Franklin Roosevelt, not to intervene in the Government of India during the Second World War, forcing Britain to concede to self-government there.

Churchill's presence in political and military Britain had been established early. In 1898, at age twenty-two, again as a war reporter, he served at Omdurman under Lord Kitchener. His book on the South African War, describing his capture and imprisonment by the Boers as well as his escape, established his reputation as a writer and soldier in England. The then sixteen-year-old Roosevelt was at Groton School, yet to go to Harvard and Columbia School of Law.

Churchill was elected to Parliament as a Conservative in 1900, at age twenty-six, on the strength of his reputation as a war correspondent, but his commitment was to issue and cause rather than Party. He left the Conservative Party in 1904 (the year Roosevelt achieved his Harvard BA) when he crossed the floor and joined the Liberals. He was rewarded with an appointment as Under-Secretary for the Colonies after their election victory in 1905, and, in a series of portfolio moves, he became Home Secretary in February 1910 and First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911.

Experience across this range of portfolios and gained during the handful of years remaining before the start of the First World War honed Churchill's belief that political misunderstandings could be stabilised by informal negotiations with a potential enemy or with a friend. Personal diplomacy, he believed, would enable Britain to maintain its world power position, and

central to this idea was the maintenance of the Empire, Britain's flagship. Much of his personal diplomatic effort was invested in holding on to both. In his later ventures in Cold War diplomacy, he remained confident in his ability to persuade people to his view.

Perhaps remarkably, Roosevelt also was destined for naval appointment. He was made Assistant Secretary of the navy in 1913, where he remained through Churchill's Gallipoli disaster and his subsequent voluntary service in the trenches in France. Prime Minister Lloyd George restarted Churchill's parliamentary career, appointing him Minister of Munitions in 1917, Secretary of State for War in 1918, and Colonial Secretary in 1921, before he lost his seat and the Coalition Government fell in 1922. Re-elected in October 1924, opportunities now lay across the floor, and, as a born-again conservative, he served as Chancellor of the Exchequer in Prime Minister Baldwin's Ministry until the radical declaration in 1929 by the then-Viceroy of India Lord Irwin.

Irwin, who became Lord Halifax and led Churchill's propaganda team in Washington in 1942, declared during his Viceroyalty that Dominion Status was the goal for India, a significant move toward eventual self-government. It so enraged Churchill that he removed himself from the political mainstream. He remained on the back bench until the beginning of the Second World War and the start of his "pen-friendship"[4] with Franklin Roosevelt.

Their paths into government were different. Churchill went from Sandhurst to military service, elected to Parliament without a political apprenticeship in 1900. Roosevelt began a career as a lawyer before being elected to the New York State Senate in 1910. He became the leader of a group of insurgent Democrats and allied himself with reform elements in his Party. He campaigned vigorously for Woodrow Wilson in the 1912 election. President during the First World War, Wilson brought America into the war in 1917 and headed the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1918. Wilson outlined his celebrated Fourteen Points, which he believed the peace settlement must cover, to Congress at the beginning of 1918. He envisaged creating a new world society that would be governed by "the self-determination of peoples," free from secret diplomacy and wars, and that would establish an association of nations to oversee international justice. This idea proved an inspiration for Roosevelt and guided his anti-colonial ideals throughout his political life.

While Churchill was embroiled in debate over India's future, Roosevelt was elected Governor of New York in 1928. He was reelected in 1930 at the beginning of Churchill's wilderness years and became the Democrat presidential candidate in 1932. He was elected in November that year, defeating the Republican incumbent, Herbert Hoover, and embarked on his New Deal policies to restore the American economy.

Roosevelt too was fascinated by intrigue. His secret service experiences were gained, contemporaries record, with great enthusiasm. During the

final years of the First World War as Assistant Secretary of the Navy assigned to the Office of Naval intelligence, he galvanised the outfit, "catapulting it into the wider and rougher world of international intrigue." He suspected German-American plots and sent the Director of Naval Intelligence "alarmist" reports, which were put together from his own sources. Through his Director, Captain Roger Welles, Roosevelt met the British naval attaché, Captain Sir Guy Gaunt, who "had taken to the murky world of counter-espionage like a duck to water" and ran a network of agents from his hotel, the Biltmore, in New York.[5] British code-breaking activities, which included tapping the American transatlantic cable as well as intercepting and reading German messages, fascinated Roosevelt.[6] A cooperation with British naval intelligence had developed, a fact that remained with Roosevelt who contemplated a new alliance as early as 1937 while his country's Neutrality Acts were still in place, making that all but impossible. That year, the American navy's most successful spy ship of that time was sunk in the Yangtse River by the Japanese while it was observing their activities outside Nanking.[7]

Roosevelt, who arrived in Britain in July 1918 in his role as Assistant Secretary of the Navy with a broad mandate from President Wilson, was feted by the British as a person who could be an important connection. This notion was clear in the meetings set up for him. Roosevelt met King George V and talked with Prime Minister David Lloyd George and Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour. The First Lord of the Admiralty organised an inspection of British and American bases for him, and he attended a dinner for Allied war ministers at Gray's Inn. There he was invited to speak, without prior notice, after Lord Curzon and General Smuts.[8] After his impromptu talk, he had what he regarded for the next two decades as an unpleasant first encounter with Churchill, then Minister of Munitions. As a result, Roosevelt avoided overtures to reopen contact by Churchill until he himself commenced their "pen friendship" in 1939. Despite this, the strong and favourable impression made by his contact with British naval intelligence operations in New York and his first visit to Britain cemented Roosevelt's determination to maintain their countries' relationship.

Roosevelt learned one more lesson about intelligence-gathering and secrecy during his period with the navy, before he resigned in 1920 to stand without success as the Democratic vice presidential candidate. Caught up investigating a scandal that was not relevant to naval intelligence, he came close to ending his political career. In extricating himself, it became clear that he had issued instructions verbally rather than in writing and had, in the course of self-defence, acquired the useful skill of plausible deniability.

After he became President in 1932, Roosevelt resumed his interest in intelligence-gathering through official and informal channels, under the radar of the Congress and his isolationist colleagues, identifying a group of prominent citizens who formed a secret society known as "The Room."[9] The group met to discuss economic and international issues, providing intelligence to Roosevelt and convincing him of the merit of gaining such

extramural information, a practice he continued during his propaganda "game" with Churchill over India.

That practice led to an interesting intelligence operative overlap in at least one instance and a view into Churchill's methods. Roosevelt's fellow student at Colombia Law School and, subsequently, one of his valued intelligence sources was a lawyer named William "Wild Bill" Donovan, reintroduced to the President by members of The Room. Roosevelt sent him on various fact-finding missions overseas. On his return from Europe in mid-1941, Donovan was appointed Coordinator of Information (COI), which later became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), directed by Donovan from June 1942. Churchill's intelligence chief in the United States, William Stephenson, promoted the creation of the COI and OSS. His mission was to contain some of Donovan's activities that might damage British interests and manoeuvre his agents into positions in Donovan's organisation.[10] Donovan also had an MI-6 code number and was a member of Churchill's Special Operations Executive (SOE).[11] While it was clearly advantageous to share intelligence operatives, Donovan's intelligence identities represented the intrigue behind activities that both Churchill and Roosevelt relished. In a link to Roosevelt's intelligence-gathering in India, Donovan sought to set up an OSS office in New Delhi to monitor British and Indian political moves in South and South-East Asia. As soon as he was made aware of the plan, Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy of India, sought to obstruct it. Missing the political point, Linlithgow complained to London that "Donovan's agency was intent on conducting secret operations in India and digging into the country with a view to American commercial penetration after the war." Leo Amery, the Secretary of State for India, "urged Churchill to raise the issue with Roosevelt" whom he thought might be behind the plan.[12]

Churchill's Malakand experience some fifty years earlier had taught him that intelligence-gathering and its use were inseparable, that those who assembled and assessed information and "who understand the whole question"[13] should act on it, flagging the innovative manner in which he approached intelligence and propaganda throughout his career as a war correspondent, writer, and politician. His tactics to both recruit and restrict Donovan demonstrate his use of earlier lessons. Churchill's hand in British secret service operations is well known,[14] but his expertise as a propagandist was particularly noted by Isaiah Berlin, an Oxford philosopher attached to the Prime Minister's public relations unit in Washington in the early 1940s. He recognised Churchill's propensity was to absorb information that re-emerged with a spin, "transformed" by the meanings he attributed to the raw material.[15] This "transformation" of information was a tool that, as Prime Minister, Churchill used frequently in his communication with President Roosevelt. Their interests did not always coincide, and their close relationship did not preclude misinformation when differences emerged. Roosevelt's intention that the post-war world should also be post-colonial was the grounds for violent verbal clashes between them, adding

to the tensions and suspicions embedded in their relationship. During the early 1940s, when, despite the demands of the war in Europe, India's political future became a cause of great friction between them and the centre of a game of bluff, Churchill's propaganda skills were brought into play. This was an attempt, questionably successful, to allay what he saw as the anti-colonial President's suspicion that all was not well in India.

Churchill's passionate commitment to Britain's interests in India that emerged from his youthful experience remained firm. His romantic view of the Indian Empire, the "Jewel in the Crown" and the responsibility its maintenance entailed, together with his determination not to preside over its conversion from imperial possession to independent nation, lay uneasily beside Roosevelt's vision of a post-war world free of colonialism. Roosevelt's interest in intelligence-gathering saw him using networks that were outside formal diplomatic exchanges to bring other perspectives and opinions to bear on what Churchill said about political stability in India through his information bureaux's propaganda.

Roosevelt had several unofficial informants in India, and Churchill's dilemma lay in the fact that, during 1941 and 1942 and the remaining years of Roosevelt's life, he continued to be unsure about how much the President knew about conditions there: the lack of real preparedness for war, the slow pace of industrial advance, and the consequent discontent among political, communal, and business leaders, indicative of the level of unrest. How much the Prime Minister himself knew about conditions in India remains a moot point. Unhappily, the country that Churchill chose to make the focus of his political wilderness years was the stuff of preconceptions and imperial dreams, not physically revisited since his time as a subaltern in the late 1890s. His lack of detailed knowledge showed up in parliamentary debates in the early 1930s, when he less than rationally opposed constitutional reform for India, a pattern of opposition that he had rigorously pursued and would maintain.

The President knew little about India either, although he set out to rectify this soon after he and Churchill first clashed on the future of colonial possessions in the postwar peace. Thus, India became representative of an ideological struggle that each was determined to win, but was left virtually without a voice in the battle of words over its political future.

The case for a propaganda campaign was made strong by Roosevelt's constant pressure on Britain from mid-1941 to reach a political settlement with India, giving it at least a measure of self-government. Pressure was also brought to bear by the Indian Congress Party, which had demanded independence since the earlier failed attempt at political reform in August 1940 as the price for active cooperation in the war effort. Further, Chiang Kai-shek visited India in February 1942, reporting on conditions there to Roosevelt with Britain's knowledge that he would do so, but not the content of his report. The Labour Party in Britain also pushed for resolution to the persistent political instability, and Japan's success in Singapore and

Burma made strategists briefly assess that India might be the next target. Stable and cooperative government there was as much in America's interests as Britain's, but the question remained, who would govern?

The first active round in the propaganda game was played by Churchill. In the early months of 1942, the Prime Minister and his newly formed India Committee devised a means to persuade the President that there was no suitable nationalist group to take over the governing of India from the British. Churchill released his plan to send Sir Stafford Cripps, Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons, to India to offer limited power-sharing immediately to representatives of political parties and a longer term proposal for constitutional change and eventual independence after the war ended.[16] Cripps' Offer was designed to convince Roosevelt and the American public (whose opinion played a crucial role in policymaking) that, regardless of the outcome, Britain had done everything in its power to negotiate a settlement acceptable to political parties in India.

Starting their acquaintance anew in their correspondence in 1939, Roosevelt recalled that his first meeting with Churchill had not been cordial. Churchill, then Minister of Munitions in David Lloyd George's Coalition Government, appeared "pompous, patronising, even dictatorial to the Americans present." Roosevelt, who regarded himself as an American of equal standing, was irritated, so much so that he ignored approaches from Churchill's publishers to review his book, *The World Crisis,* in the mid-1920s, and later that decade he avoided a meeting with Churchill on a visit to New York.[17] Despite his earlier reaction, Roosevelt began a private correspondence with Churchill to build, as he explained to Joseph Kennedy, American Ambassador in London at that time, a relationship with a man he felt might become the next Prime Minister.[18]

As President and Prime Minister, their second and mercurial meeting started on August 9, 1941, in circumstances of secrecy and adventure that pleased both men. Although their meeting to discuss and ratify the Atlantic Charter met Roosevelt's anti-colonial agenda, the circumstances of their meeting were conceived by Churchill. In London on July 17, 1941, he had met with the President's adviser and friend, Harry Hopkins, who was there to discuss the practicalities of the Lend-Lease Act to supply Britain with military equipment, signed the previous March. With Hopkins' encouragement, Churchill determined that he must meet Roosevelt as soon as possible to discuss war progress and approve the Atlantic Charter, setting out their agreement on peace-time aims.[19] Provision for such a document was made in the Lend-Lease Act.[20]

They made the decision to meet off the shores of Newfoundland. Churchill determined to steam through U-boat-patrolled waters from Scapa Flow in Scotland on *The Prince of Wales,* entailing a vast amount of organisation to spirit him, his Chiefs of Staff and technical advisers to the other side of the Atlantic. He sailed on August 4. Roosevelt left on his yacht, *Potomac,* on August 3 for a fishing holiday along the New England coast and was

quickly missed by the American press, leading to speculation about where he might be. Roosevelt transferred to the U.S.S. *Augusta,* the symbolic link between the British and American navies engaging their imaginations and setting the scene for a meeting that the two men deemed had to be held in secret. Walter Thompson, Churchill's bodyguard, was "overwhelmed by the idea that he was not only seeing history but sharing the making of it." When Churchill introduced him to Roosevelt, the President asked whether Churchill was "troublesome," to which Thompson "dutifully lied."[21]

Harry Hopkins sailed with Churchill and joined the President on the *Augusta,* on arrival at Placentia Bay. Also with the President were Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles and Averell Harriman, a diplomat posted to London as one of Roosevelt's personal representatives to oversee all matters concerning the implementation of Lend-Lease. He also was charged with raising the matter of India's Government with Churchill as frequently as possible.[22] Also accompanying Roosevelt were the Chiefs of the American fighting services. Churchill's entourage included his Chiefs of Staff, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary to the Foreign Office, and Lord Beaverbrook, Britain's Minister of Supply.[23]

Hailing each other as their ships closed,[24] they proceeded to a series of meetings at which their differences over Empire came to the fore. Elliott Roosevelt, the President's son and member of the American Navy, was also on board and recorded several sharp interchanges: "The peace," anti-colonial Roosevelt said, "cannot include any continued despotism. The structure of the peace demands and will get equality of peoples. . . ." "It was an argument that could have no resolution between these two men,"[25] and nor did it. The Atlantic Charter, as it came to be called, was an eight-point statement of war objectives. Churchill thought that defeating Hitler was aim enough and that Roosevelt was "putting the cart before the horse," laying claim to outcomes for a war his country had yet to enter.[26] Roosevelt was determined on his post-colonial vision.

Middle-aged when they met again at Placentia Bay (Churchill was born in 1876, Roosevelt in 1882), their friendship became mercurial and "an ongoing pleasure in compatibilities and a continuing reconciliation of incompatibilities."[27] From similar old- and new-world backgrounds, Churchill and Roosevelt shared a classical education and the elitism and confidence of those born to power and social standing. During their long-distance friendship, the exchange of letters initiated by the President, Churchill signed his letters "Former Naval Person," initially to preserve his anonymity[28], but it became a reminder of their shared naval backgrounds.

In his essay on Churchill and Roosevelt written in 1949,[29] British philosopher and essayist, Isaiah Berlin, utilised his familiarity with the two men to suggest that each was fascinated by the other. He argued that, although the President was a typical child of the new world and the 20th century, the Prime Minister remained a man of the 19th century. The differences between them were greater than the similarities and were representative

of two continents and two centuries. Nonetheless, the war drew them together, and they formed a "unique personal bond" that Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's Special Adviser, observed and encouraged.[30]

Berlin saw Roosevelt as imaginative, optimistic, self-confident, cheerful, fearless, flexible, and steeped in the idea of social progress, typified by his New Deal policies. He saw Churchill, while also imaginative, as steeped in history, more intent, more concentrated, and preoccupied. Churchill had come to believe in the permanent character of races and classes and a social order that should not be upset. Berlin pointed to the key difficulty in attempting any comparison of the two men. By the 1940s, Churchill had written extensively as a journalist, a novelist, and a historian, leaving a trail of information. Roosevelt, who died unexpectedly in 1945, had not, and much information about him comes in fleshing out his intuition and vision from his fire-side chats, speeches, records, and documents.

In *Their Finest Hour,* the second volume of Churchill's war reminiscences, his Roosevelt stands out most for his lack of fear of the future. He had an awareness of social and individual trends, the movement of American public opinion, and its significance for the future that has been described as uncanny.[31] Churchill was different. His strongest sense was his sense of the past and imperial traditions for which he assumed personal responsibility. In its protection, he was proactive as demonstrated in his defence of Britain's responsibility to rule India in its best interest. But for all their differences, they were drawn to each other, "fascinated not so much by the other as by the idea of the other."[32] There were strong similarities, too. Each had a vivid public style, deliberately developed, which worked best in times of crisis when their rhetorical skills commanded public support.

Both used the art of oratory, the persuasive use of language, to influence the thoughts and reactions of listeners. Indeed, Churchill wrote an essay in 1897 entitled *The Scaffolding of Rhetoric,* in which he expressed his views on the power of the speaker. Both sought to enlist the support of the people and both used unsupported or inflated discourse, but did so differently. Churchill's rhetoric was persuasive and plausible, and he convinced himself of its truth. He brooked no criticism, and he was not interested in the views of others. He "acted rather than reacted."[33] Roosevelt's preferred medium was radio, where he felt his contact with the public was direct and not mediated by reporters, whom he generally felt were hostile to him. He liked to be pushed by public opinion into policy decisions and to react, and he sought support using rhetorical devices such as fear of what might eventuate if a certain course of action was not followed and guilt by associating non-supporters with the consequence of not acting.[34]

Despite their differences, Roosevelt was Churchill's supportive friend and Britain's ally to the extent that this was possible before America entered the war. Along with the convergence of pressures for self-government for India in late 1941 and early 1942, what he saw as the anti-imperial thrusts of the Lend-Lease Act and the Atlantic Charter seemed sufficiently threatening

to Churchill to warrant the development of a propaganda campaign. Its purpose was to persuade the American public and through it the President, that granting India some measure of independence in 1942 would not be in the best interests of the allies nor in Churchill's.

The dilemma for Churchill and his conservative supporters, and members of the newly formed India Committee, was whether Roosevelt had sufficient information to justifiably intervene between Britain and India to secure immediate self-government. Roosevelt's interest in intelligence-gathering and his attraction to unofficial sources of information was no secret. He had private access to his newly appointed Personal Representative in New Delhi, Colonel Louis Johnson. Donovan emerged as a player, and, additionally, American war correspondents in India, particularly Louis Fischer and Edgar Snow, kept him informed.[35] Fischer and Snow avoided British censorship by reporting directly to him and the Secretary of State on visits to Washington, enabling Roosevelt to privately rebut the British propaganda line. Thus, Churchill was continually unsure about how much the President knew of the alarming political situation in India.[36]

The perceived danger to Britain's India-related agenda, however, did not end with substantive threats, such as the coincidence of pressure, the progress of the war, and caveats built into the Lend-Lease Act discussed in the next chapter. The volatility of the American press and the President's susceptibility to it in framing policy were more unpredictable. Churchill met both threats by directing propaganda to pro-British sections of the American press and sympathetic broadcasters, through his information bureaux, kick-starting the new "Great Game."

Churchill had assembled his propaganda team, which was drawn from the Ministry of Information's network in Britain, including old "India hands," formerly in the Indian Civil Service and well versed in Churchill's imperial ideals. Pro-British American journalists and visiting academics and writers attached to the British Library in New York pushed the imperial line on India.

A generally more pro-British stance on United States involvement with Britain's war effort, the second part of Churchill's agenda, was promoted by Roosevelt's inner circle. This circle of people included Robert Sherwood, his speech writer; Gilbert Winant, the United States Ambassador to Great Britain; Vincent Astor, the President's cousin; members of The Room, and Harry Hopkins, his adviser, who pushed toward America's entry to the war, although they stopped well short of supporting Churchill pro-empire stance.

In another propaganda ploy successful in the First World War, major British publishers were again asked to publish books that gave an "ideological construction" to the war—one that distanced Britain from its "land-grab" reputation,[37] and writers such as E. M. Forster, Somerset Maugham, and Beverley Nichols were cooperative.

Although the British Embassy in Washington was habitually suspected of issuing propaganda, Lord Lothian, Ambassador in 1939 and 1940, who

was careful not to be seen as a propagandist nonetheless supported the setting up of the Inter-Allied Information Committee, whose members could speak freely in support of Britain, including the Australian Minister in Washington, R. G. Casey.[38] John Buchan, the novelist who as Lord Tweedsmuir was Governor-General of Canada until he died in 1940, also was a "behind-the-scenes operator well connected to British intelligence and propaganda."[39] Herding American public opinion toward pro-British positions was thus stage-managed with Churchillian flair and intelligence agencies' attention to where support would be best placed.

The groundwork for the India propaganda campaign had already been laid. Competing agenda over India's political future had become the subject of occasional newspaper reports in the United States, gathering momentum during 1941. It was given added impetus in the new year by Churchill's information bureaux in Britain and India, which released through the Washington Embassy historical material about Britain's record in India and the importance of the new offer of reform about to be put to Indian leaders. This background information was followed from late March 1942 by the prediction that Cripps' Offer would fail to gain acceptance in India, proving that there was no viable alternative government. The official explanation for the Offer's failure was then released: Indian intransigence and unwillingness to "take responsibility" and, later, the elements of the August 1942 Quit India resolution that could be presented as damaging to allied war aims. This situation, in turn, attracted contradictory comments from the liberal American press that supported India's struggle for freedom. Public opinion polling on questions relating to the timing of Indian independence appeared in the United States from March 1942[40] and swung during the following months between, as previously noted, support for Britain's position and liberal arguments in the United States. The debate generated increased American awareness of the unresolved political conflict and re-energising the propaganda game. In August 1942, the imprisonment of tens of thousands of Indian supporters of the Quit India movement silenced Indian comment and, with it, American press interest. The Indian issue, however, did not die for Churchill or Roosevelt.

2 America's Interest in India
The Reasons for Britain's Propaganda Campaign

Roosevelt, who has been described as representing mainstream American liberal thought,[1] was "in search of monsters to destroy."[2] Colonial empires, particularly the British Empire, were appropriate targets. In his frequently stated anti-colonialism and his pressure on Churchill to grant India self-government, the President pushed the normal boundaries of appropriate intervention in the domestic policy of an ally, and it was sufficiently intrusive to threaten Britain's war-related dual agenda focused on maintaining support from the United States and retaining its Empire.

Liberals in the United States generally favoured self-determination and supported policies directed toward individual freedom. In foreign policy particularly, Roosevelt was a liberal in theory, if not always in practice. During the 1940s, he at times allowed his anti-colonial principles to be over-ridden by war-related priorities. His over-riding commitment, however, to fighting a war for freedom and not continued enslavement remained. One illustration of his continued pressure to end the British Empire is recorded in a conversation in 1944, in the diary of Edward Stettinius, Lend-Lease Administrator from 1941 to 1943. The subject was decolonisation, and Britain was the primary target. When the President was asked whether he wished to bring that matter up again, he replied, "Yes . . . it is something we should discuss with them at every opportunity."[3] Roosevelt did precisely this from 1941 until his death.[4] Churchill's fear of American intervention in India was well founded.

The uncertainty that Roosevelt created about his intentions toward India began with the Lend-Lease negotiations in 1941 and continued throughout that year and, despite Churchill's endeavours, into mid-decade. Churchill, needing to act in defence of continued British rule, approached India with a proposal for limited self-government in March 1942. The proposal, itself a propaganda exercise, was the subject of the intense British propaganda in the attempt to preempt American intervention in India. Aware of Roosevelt's susceptibility to public opinion, the object of the propaganda campaign was to convince a majority of American public opinion and, consequently, Roosevelt that India was not fit for self-government at that time.

The reasons for Churchill and his India committee's pro-empire propaganda drive in the United States are to be found in many facets of the

relationship between Britain and America. Within the context of America's interest in India, the President's intelligence gathering there increased his knowledge of political conditions. The nationalists effectively led by Pandit Nehru demanded self-government in return for actively opposing the Japanese, industry was underdeveloped, and the country ill prepared for war. Unsure about the extent of Roosevelt's knowledge, other elements of the relationship that increased Churchill's apprehension included, primarily, American anti-colonialism, but also the anti-imperial thrusts incorporated in the Lend-Lease Act and the Atlantic Charter.

Roosevelt and Americans of his generation remembered the squalid negotiations of the Paris Peace Conference at the end of the First World War and the formal and informal empires that resulted. President Wilson's noble dream of a war to end all wars, a war to end the old era of secret diplomacy and imperial deals, dissolved at Versailles, but his attempt to set in place agreements that sovereign nation states would replace colonialism left a lasting impression on Roosevelt.

Wilson's conviction that the late 19th century scramble for Empire had led to the tensions in Europe that produced the First World War influenced Roosevelt profoundly,[5] and he was determined that the present war would not leave the possibility of similar a legacy. Wilson's democratic and anticolonialist principles, embedded in Roosevelt's political psyche, were summarised in statements Wilson made in February, July, and September 1918:[6]

> . . . peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were chattels or pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power . . .

that political relationships must be

> upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery. No special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all.[7]

Roosevelt identified with both the principles and the sentiment. He took them further in the 1941 Atlantic Charter, which purported to set out American and British aims for the future peace.[8] It was a propaganda document, not a contractual one, and it was aimed primarily at Britons and Americans whose values and similar intellectual environments made it understandable to both.[9] The Lend-Lease Act, which was signed the previous March, to send Britain weapons and supplies free of charge to be repaid in kind after the war, validated the issue of a joint statement before

America entered the war, if this were to happen. It also reminded Britain that American aid was not completely free.

The third and fourth clauses of the Atlantic Charter reflected Roosevelt's extension of Wilsonian ideals, embodying the American commitment to ending imperialism, both colonial and economic. The signatories, Roosevelt and Churchill, who met secretly at Placentia Bay in August 1941, agreed that

> . . . they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them

and that

> . . . they will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states . . . of access, on equal terms, to the trade and raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.[10]

Although the Charter was jointly signed, it appears much more the President's document, reflecting American rather than British policy direction. The British contingent at Placentia Bay attempted to sidetrack any future attack on their Imperial Preferences scheme[11] with the addition of the words "with due respect for their existing obligations," seen in the fourth Charter's fourth clause. It has been suggested that, for the President, the meeting at Placentia Bay was a reconnaissance, a meeting to discuss further ways to assist Britain without declaring war; a way of changing his "pen-friendship" with the Prime Minister into a personal one.[12] It also has been suggested that Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter as a ruse to get the United States "a little bit further into the war . . .,"[13] and that he saw it as an opportunity to publicise Anglo-American friendship and, by implication, the United States' closeness to declaring war.[14]

The colonial implications of the third clause were seen just days after the Charter's publication, and, within a month, Churchill denied the relevance of the clause to the British Empire. The first reaction from nationalist India was a message from V. D. Sarkar, President of the Hindu Mahasabha, an Indian political party, asking whether President Roosevelt, under the terms of the Charter, could guarantee Indian independence.[15] But the Governor of Burma's question about the timing of self-government in the region caused a storm in the India and the Colonial Offices. The Colonial Office hierarchy could not accept the idea of immediate self-government for India or any part of the Empire, and Secretary of State for India Sir Leo Amery's proposed statement from the India Office did not help them. Of necessity supportive of the Atlantic Charter that Churchill had so recently signed, but also intended

to be reassuring to Britain's imperial possessions, Amery's statement read, in part, " . . . that the British Empire, animated by a spirit of liberty, pursued the goal of self-governing institutions."[16] Churchill, however, saw the point of the statement. He had to be seen publicly to stand by the Charter, vital to Britain's agenda in the United States, but at the same time clarify, in the gentlest and least provocative terms, that Britain's agenda in India was different.

In a masterly speech to the House of Commons on September 9, 1941, Churchill adopted Amery's statement as his underlying text. He massaged it into a message for both protagonists and antagonists of Empire, stating that the Charter was not intended in any way to qualify earlier commitments that Britain had made to India. Britain's commitments to India, of course, did not include immediate self-government. Churchill reiterated the intention of the August 8, 1940, Offer to help India toward equal partnership in the Commonwealth, subject, of course, to a raft of interlocking conditions to meet Britain's responsibilities there.[17]

The propaganda effect of Churchill's speech was mixed. British imperialists were reassured that the slow pace of reform remained unchanged. The Indian nationalists heard nothing that had not been said before. For them the question remained the timing of independence. American liberals, including anti-colonialists within Roosevelt's administration, were disillusioned, bolstering American support for nationalist India. The idea that they might again support Britain in a war to protect its Empire was incomprehensible. American opinion polling in January 1942, four months after Churchill's speech, showed that 72% of people polled favoured self-government for India, whereas 28% were undecided. No one believed that India's demand for a national government should be rejected.[18] Because the President's decision making was influenced by public opinion, such figures were a potential threat to the survival of Britain's Empire, both colonial and economic.

As Roosevelt's understanding of the strength of American influence increased following his country's entry into the war in December 1941, the idea that it could be used to force colonial change was aired frequently.[19] But from 1941 to his death in 1945, at the many points when Roosevelt had the opportunity to intervene on India's behalf in its campaign for independence, his anti-colonialist values gave way to pragmatic war-related decisions. In his private correspondence with Churchill, however, the pressure for reform in India did not cease, nor did the unspoken threat to intervene, keeping the level of uncertainty high. At the same time, Roosevelt kept India's hopes of his support alive. He continually let Indian nationalist leaders know of his interest in the struggle for self-government through his intelligence informants there.[20] India's supporters in America continued to put the nationalist position to the public, and, in perhaps the only common strand with Britain, India, too, was uncertain about American intentions.

Anti-colonialism had been a powerful force in the United States' thinking since the War of Independence that freed America from Britain. It has been suggested that Americans believed that Washington's victory was the start of

the decline of the British Empire and that since then they had waited for its collapse.[21] The losses of Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, and Burma in 1941 and 1942 signalled that the end of the British Empire was close and, along with America's own security concerns about India, briefly threatened by the Japanese on two fronts, gave Roosevelt the impetus to repeatedly challenge Churchill on the issue of self-government there.

Historically, opposition to imperialism was at the forefront of American thinking. The 1823 Monroe Doctrine was designed to keep European Empires out of South America; the west was "won" to liberate it from the Spanish, and wars were fought to free Cuba and the Philippines. The return to Europe to enter the war in 1917 and set terms for the Paris Peace Conference was to give the right of self-determination to the people of the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires.[22]

American wars to liberate subject peoples were and are themselves open to question, and American global intentions during the Second World War remained an issue of contention for Britain. When Roosevelt referred to "trusteeships" in the context of Asia, Churchill suspected that it was a metaphor for American postwar expansion.[23] America's postwar activities in Korea, Vietnam, Granada, Kuwait, and Iraq to some extent vindicated Churchill's suspicions. Throughout the Second World War, the United States' understanding of the notion of popular support for independence movements may have been imperfect or naive, resting on an assumption that popular democracy would always succeed authoritarian rule[24] following any interim trusteeship arrangement. This belief encouraged the American anti-colonial thrust and Britain's fear of it.

America's interest in India, although minimal, was as long-standing as its anti-colonialism, but actively seeking information about the country became pressing in the context of the war. Indeed, as Sir Frederick Puckle, Secretary of the Government of India's Department of Information, said, America's knowledge of India began in 1939. Its interest developed initially from trade in jute, tea, and cotton exchanged for manufactured goods, trade that alternately expanded and declined over the years from the 1780s until the Second World War.[25] America also established early representation in India, and its first consulate at Calcutta preceded the 1857 Indian uprising. When the capital moved to New Delhi in 1927, however, foreign consulates remained in Calcutta and other provincial cities primarily to look after trade matters. Full diplomatic relations were exercised between the United States and Britain, which represented its Empire overseas, thus America had no direct diplomatic contact with India. Constitutionally, the Government of India, responsible to Whitehall, did not exchange representatives with other countries. Limited diplomatic relations between India and the United States were finally achieved after the passage of the Lend-Lease Act in 1941, after which an America Mission (not with the status of an Embassy) was set up in New Delhi. In a trade-off negotiated with Britain, the Government of India gained an Indian agent general in Washington.

India was not prominent in American popular thought in the 18th and 19th centuries. School curricula, for example, paid little attention to India. To the extent that they did, history texts described the British assumption of power favorably.[26] Popular writing, including articles, short stories, and novels, often in serial form, were published during the early part of the 20th century, generally depicted the unusual, and Kipling's turn-of-the-century writing reinforced Britain's role in India. Katherine Mayo's book, *Mother India,* critical of Indian culture and religions, was published in 1927. It influenced its readers for a decade until the release in 1939 of the film, *The Rains Came,* which presented popular audiences with a realistic and encouraging view of Indian lives. Earlier films about India, some 35 before the Second World War, had continued the trend in popular written work of distorting views of culture, practice, and religion. Films in the interwar years ignored the Indian nationalist movement and "glorified" Britain's achievements, including the routing of apparently subversive tribesmen in the high-border country, a subject dear to Churchill,[27] hardly surprising because film makers drew their information from the India Office in London.

Parallel with popular information about India, returned missionaries publicised and supported Indian claims for independence and appealed to an audience committed to principles of self-determination. Historians acknowledge the role of the American Board of Foreign Missions and returned missionaries who, from the late 19th century, increased American awareness of Indians as a subject people.[28] From their number came the strongest support for Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi after his return from South Africa in 1914, and publicity against Britain's repression of the Indian Congress Party began to feed into American anti-colonial ideals. Early in 1940, four American missionaries were expelled from India for endorsing the Congress Party's demand for immediate involvement in their government.[29]

Distinguished Indian speakers who visited the United States also engendered wide support among liberal Americans, who understood the common theme in America's past and India's present connection with Britain.[30] Indians living in the United States, although not numerically strong, regarded themselves as unofficial ambassadors for their country and argued persuasively against imperialism and for their independence as a nation. The most widely known Indian association, the India League of America, through its publications became the Indian Congress Party's mouthpiece, counteracting British propaganda with mixed success. The *Atlantic Monthly* began publishing Nehru's work in 1940, and, among other groups, the East West Association, led by writer Pearl Buck, condemned British imperialism.[31]

Academic influence, which included Indian residents appointed to American universities, was strong. Organisations such as the Harvard Group gave "scholarly sanction" to the broad range of pro-independence

interests, as did religious organisations.[32] Student activists and African-American pro-Indian independence groups also supplied intelligence to bolster the Administration's growing support for Indian claims, and strong pro-Indian statements sourced from the State Department[33] continually worried Britain.

India had briefly been a focus for American anti-colonialism at the outbreak of the First World War, when Gandhi was at the height of his anti-discrimination battle against White racialism in South Africa before he returned to India. Anti-colonial agitation in India moved President Wilson to pledge American support for self-determination against colonial oppression.[34] Indian nationalists imagined that the President's rhetoric was a statement of American intentions, only to find that this was not the case.[35] At the operational level, Wilson gave precedence to smooth relations with European allies.[36] Older but wiser in the 1940s, the same Indian leaders maintained the hope that Roosevelt might step in where Wilson had failed to act. Early in the Second World War, nationalist Indian expectations of American support had been rekindled by the Atlantic Charter, but Roosevelt found himself, like Wilson, constrained, having to choose between his anti-colonialist principles and the need to remain openly on good terms with Britain.

Nonetheless, the sympathy of the American public and the Roosevelt administration had leaned toward the nationalists since the 1940 August Offer of political reform failed to address the growing political unease in India. It was an offer of reform that did not meet nationalist demands.[37] If India was to fight again in a European war, recognition of its service with at least a measure of self-government was seen as reasonable by sympathetic Americans. Britons, therefore, could not assume that Roosevelt's pressure on Churchill to grant some form of self-government in India from 1941 would not become a demand for broader political reform.

America's interest in India also was strategic. Following Pearl Harbor and the quick succession of Japanese military successes in southeast Asia, India seemed a likely target for Japan's next strike. At the same time, German advances in North Africa and Russia made it appear that India might be the point at which the Axis powers met.[38] The threat to India did not last long, but it was instrumental in involving America in that theatre of the war and fuelled Roosevelt's urgent need to know more about conditions in India.

Japan controlled the Bay of Bengal after the fall of Singapore. Colombo and parts of the east coast of India were bombed in March 1942, but the attacks were not followed up. British and Indian troops were driven out of southern Burma as the Japanese advanced, but Allied strategists did not consider that a land invasion of India would be a priority for Japan. As early as April 1, 1942, Churchill had signalled to Roosevelt, "my feeling is that the wisest stroke for Japan would be to press on through Burma northwards into China. . . . They may disturb India, but I doubt its serious invasion."[39]

This comment may be read as reassurance for the President that India would not be directly involved in the war against Japan, thus he need not

focus on India's political problems. However, in other contexts, the possibility of a Japanese invasion remained a useful tool.

Any doubt about a land-based Japanese threat in 1942 was resolved by mid-year. An invasion of India from Burma was out of the question with the advent of the monsoon in July.[40] The seaward threat also did not eventuate. By May 6, the Philippines had fallen, and in early June the Japanese were engaged at Midway Island. It became clear that Japan did not intend to advance further west. Churchill, nevertheless, kept the threat of a Japanese invasion of India alive to explain the imprisonment of the Congress Party's leaders and many thousands of the Party's members during the repression of the Quit India movement in August that year, Gandhi's response to Cripps' Offer, and continuing British rule.

Japan's more realistic aims in India were to appeal to Gandhi's neutralist sentiments by denying any designs on the subcontinent and encouraging a revolt against the British. It also has been suggested that the Japanese may have hoped to drive a wedge between Britain and America. In June 1942, for example, the Japanese organised a conference in Bangkok. It was called the "Indian Independence League," and it voted for complete separation from Britain, playing on American anti-colonialism.[41]

The fall of northern Burma had galvanised Lieutenant General Stilwell's retreat toward India. He was the United States Deputy Supreme Commander S.E. Asia Command, and his retreat from Burma attracted public notice. This was the start of America's physical involvement in the China–Burma–India theatre. India became a supply and communications base, one end of the air route over the "hump" to China and a direct recipient under the Lend-Lease program to supply the Allies.[42]

The Lend-Lease Act was a controversial piece of legislation, authorising the President to transfer weapons and supplies, to be replaced postwar and for which the Congress would appropriate money. In the first instance, such "loans" would go to Britain, but then to any country whose defence the President saw as essential to the defence of the United States.

In marshalling public support for Lend-Lease, Roosevelt illustrated his point with the much-quoted garden hose analogy: If his neighbour's house caught fire, would he not lend his garden hose, to be returned or replaced after the fire had been put out?[43] Such an appeal in Roosevelt's rhetorical style caught the public's imagination, giving the President the assurance of public support he so often sought before introducing controversial policy.

When the Lend-Lease Act was passed in March 1941, Roosevelt designated India as a country whose defence was vital to United States interests.[44] This action implied that closer diplomatic links between America and the Government of India should be established, to some extent cutting out Britain and the War Cabinet. That diplomatic link with the New Delhi Government was established in mid-1941 after much quibbling by Britain about the terms and conditions of the arrangement with the appointment of Roosevelt's Personal Representative Colonel Louis Johnson.[45] The concession

was reluctantly made as a cost of ensuring Lend-Lease supplies, despite the fact that an American Mission in the capital opened further opportunities for the United States to intervene between Britain and nationalist India.

Perhaps most threatening to British control in India was Section 9 of the Lend-Lease Act,[46] which gave the President almost unlimited power to administer the Act as he chose. With India a direct beneficiary of Lend-Lease supplies, satisfactory conduct of the war in the southeast Asian theatre might depend on self-government being granted there if the President so decided.

Although Roosevelt became Churchill's supportive friend, anti-colonialism remained a potent force on public opinion, and the Lend-Lease debates to some extent echoed anti-colonial sentiment in the Administration.[47] As a *quid pro quo* for assisting Britain, the possibility of bargaining for political reform in India was raised. Self-government for India and the abolition of Britain's trade advantage under Imperial Preferences arrangements were the levers most favoured by influential members of the State Department, and both issues had reappeared in Clauses 3 and 4 of the Atlantic Charter. This situation left British officials with the certainty that the United States wished to dissolve the Empire and "milk dry" its preferential trading arrangement.[48] The Act, when taken in conjunction with the tenor of the debate, allows interpretations wider than the actual terms set out. This combination of factors, along with Roosevelt's separate pressure on Churchill over India, also impelled Britain into Cripps' Mission, the offer of limited political reform in India, and the propaganda that surrounded it.

Sections of the Lend-Lease Act that could threaten Britain's control of India throw additional light on the reasons for Britain's propaganda drive in the United States.

Lend-Lease, according to Churchill, was a "most unsordid act." Despite its generosity, it did not come free of charge.[49] Britain's autonomy was eroded, and the legislation contained threats to Britain's power. Three sections of the Act[50] could potentially be used to justify American intervention in India. Section 3 (a) specified that the President could act " . . . in the interest of national defense . . ." in a range of aid matters. Roosevelt had designated India as a country whose security was essential to America's own,[51] putting it within the ambit of American national defence. Section 9 allowed the President to freely introduce new rules and regulations:

> The President may, from time to time, promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out any of the provisions of this Act . . .

Section 3 (b) allowed that

> The terms and conditions upon which any such foreign government receives any aid . . . shall be those which the President deems satisfactory, and the benefit to the United States may be payment or repayment

in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory.[52]

The final clause of Section 3 (b), read in conjunction with the other parts of the Act cited, constituted a substantial threat to Britain's position in India should the United States wish to install self-government there in 1942 or at any time during the life of the Act. When considered in conjunction with suggestions early in the Lend-Lease debate that British colonies be swapped for aid or leased to America,[53] and Roosevelt's penchant for trusteeships in postwar Asia,[54] Churchill's need for a propaganda campaign to secure Britain's imperial position becomes more apparent.

Taken in combination, the threats to Britain's survival as an imperial power, the favourable terms of trade under the Imperial Preference Scheme targeted in the fourth clause of the Atlantic Charter, the terms of the Lend-Lease Act, Roosevelt's anti-colonialism focused on India, and Britain's need to boost American support for the war pushed Churchill to reopen the reform agenda with the Indian nationalists in March 1942. He did so only when a policy shift was necessary to secure his dual agenda: maintenance of American support for the war and retention of the Empire.

A description of the plan for negotiations that would surround the reform offer Sir Stafford Cripps would take to India and the possible outcomes of the negotiations, mirrored in propaganda developed by Churchill's information bureaux in London and New Delhi for dissemination by the Washington Embassy, was explained in the American press before Cripps left for India. Editors and columnists in the *New York Times* publicising Cripps Mission[55] additionally reused the propaganda material disseminated at the beginning of the year about Britain's vital role in India. Press articles warned the Indian leaders and their readers in advance of negotiations about the likely consequences should the proposals be rejected, including a change in the American attitude to India. Roosevelt's pressure on Churchill to settle with India, however, did not stop, and uncertainty about the President's intentions was sufficiently unnerving to convince Churchill to push ahead with the propaganda campaign.

Controversy over war aid for Britain continued. Britain had defaulted on its First World War debts to the United States, and the Lend-Lease debates revealed American suspicion that it might again "be conned by the wily English."[56] Britain's economic record in America eyes was not good. It had gone down the road of protectionism and economic discrimination, disadvantaging the United States, as well as defaulting on its war debts.[57] A direct consequence of the latter was the 1934 Debt Default Act that prevented Americans from extending loans to defaulters.[58] This Act was an attempt to coerce Britain and other European countries to repay their loans so that they would be eligible, if loans were again forthcoming, to borrow from the United States.

A second consequence of British and European economic and defence decisions in the interwar years was the series of United States Neutrality Acts, the

first of which was passed in 1935. These Acts ensured that Americans would not again be involved in a European war and were overwhelmingly supported by the public. In 1937, in response to the question, "If another war like the World War develops in Europe, should America take part again?," 95% of people polled said "no."[59] The 1937 Neutrality Act was passed in the shadow of the Spanish Civil War and the real possibility of further European conflict. With public opinion in mind, the main provisions of the previous Act were retained, but it now gave the President some leeway to authorise assistance for Britain in the form of a "cash-and-carry" plan.[60] In October 1939, the Neutrality Acts were further liberalised, repealing the embargo on the export of arms and retaining the cash-and-carry principle.[61] Another poll that year showed that Americans were still almost universally opposed to going to war, with 96.5% recording their opposition.[62] The possibility of a war to protect outdated empires was, as has been said, unacceptable to the American people.

The Neutrality Acts gave legal frame to isolationist philosophy. Isolationism was a part of American thinking from the early 19th century. It emerged as the Monroe Doctrine in the 1850s and reemerged forcefully after the President's failure to convince Britain and Europe to his views at the Paris Peace Conference in 1918–1919. As a result, the United States refused to participate in the League of Nations or to take any active part in international cooperation.[63] This decision was a decisive break in Anglo-American relations, not helped by what America saw as British economic intransigence over its war debts. It is thus hardly surprising that Britain felt uncomfortable in its American relationship and that Churchill welcomed Roosevelt's "pen-friendship" initiative. It is no more surprising to find Britain defending its unpopular imperial position in the newly forged, war-motivated relationship with America.

Aware by 1938 of the risks for America in the Neutrality Acts as they stood, the President was in a difficult situation largely of his own making. He had been elected and reelected as a non-interventionist, if not an isolationist.[64] He was not prepared to make a direct assault on public opinion,[65] and all his persuasive skills were employed to gain support for the Lend-Lease idea.[66] His success is measured in a series of polls under the heading "Lend-Lease Bill,"[67] and he was provided with weekly reports on moves in public opinion by his Division of Press Intelligence so that he could observe shifts in it for himself.[68]

Roosevelt's success in gaining public and congressional support for Lend-Lease assistance to Britain was a remarkable achievement in a nation that had only recently drawn back from isolationism. Economic aspects of that debate, which had a bearing on India, were complex and revealed the strength of opposition in the United States administration to Britain's preferential trade practices.

The May 1940 imposition by the British Government of India of strict exchange and quota controls on foreign trade, for example, was a cause

for concern, creating trading problems for the United States. The controls were a part of the British Empire dollar pool plan and had an immediate effect on trade between the United States and India.[69] As all India's foreign relations were conducted from London, excluding direct American interaction, the dollar pool plan gave further impetus to American plans to achieve diplomatic representation in New Delhi and attempt to free up trade locally.

These controls and the possibility of further postwar monetary and economic restrictions flagged by John Maynard Keynes, sent to the United States by the British Treasury to discuss the Lend-Lease terms in May 1941, contributed to the tightening of Lend-Lease policies in 1943 and 1944.[70] Together with unanswered questions about how long the aid program might last, this, in turn, posed another threat to Britain.

Once Lend-Lease became law, the "temptation" to use it to gain economic concessions from Britain was great.[71] Much debate centered on Secretary of State Cordell Hull's belief that the Lend-Lease negotiations should be used as a lever to end the Imperial Preference Scheme.[72] The Imperial Preference Scheme was devised at the Imperial Economic Conference held in Ottawa in 1932, and it disadvantaged the United States. Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles saw that it constituted "an obstacle to any healthy flow of trade between the nations of the world,"[73] and Hull campaigned persistently to have the Scheme abolished.[74] With trading arrangements in place that favoured Britain, Hull did not accept the fact that Britain could be short of funds by 1940 and need military supplies virtually free of charge while still running colonial and economic Empires. Although the idea of using Lend-Lease as a bargaining tool with Britain was not openly discussed by the State Department during the framing of the legislation, "it quickly made up for lost time afterward."[75] Stettinius felt that the British were exaggerating their financial difficulties, whereas Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury (and even Roosevelt), could not believe that Britain was "broke."[76]

Negotiations on the Empire provisions of what Hull still labelled the "interim" Lend-Lease agreement continued in January 1942.[77] John Winant, American Ambassador in London, in reply to a State Department query about the progress of discussions in London, noted that an agreement with the United States

> in which the . . . unity of the Empire is questioned even in the field of economics . . . is opposed by Empire preference Tories who . . . are nothing more than imperialists.[78]

Winant went on to say that the British Government assumed that both the President and Morganthau were "indifferent" to their Empire preference concerns. Opposition to it was no more than "a special position taken by

Mr. Hull based on his general economic policy as expressed in trade agreements which he had advocated. . . ."[79] British Chancellor of the Exchequer Kingsley Wood led the opposition to Empire aspects of the latest draft proposal, supported by Leo Amery, Secretary of State for India.[80]

Amery was quick to label Hull "an anachronism"[81] and alerted the Viceroy of India, Lord Linlithgow, to the danger of submitting to American pressure in "our anxiety to secure Lend-Lease."[82] The timing of Amery's communication to Linlithgow, in January 1942, demonstrated how long the pressure on Imperial Preferences continued. It had begun a year earlier at the start of the Lend-Lease discussions. The level of economic pressure on Britain can be followed through successive State Department and Treasury drafts that looked continually for concessions from Britain.[83]

Britain was made particularly vulnerable not only through the continual revisiting of the Lend-Lease provisions, but also by the terms of the Atlantic Charter. Both brought to the surface the old tensions surrounding imperialism. Both were forged on American terms. The intense mistrust of British motives and Anglophobia, with roots in America's First World War and earlier colonial experiences, still coloured its view. The United States came out of the Lend-Lease negotiations with unaltered determination not to support a war for outdated British goals, such as the maintenance of empires and favourable trading agreements. In this way, the process of giving aid to Britain reinforced American values, in turn forcing Britain to repeatedly defend its imperial and economic priorities.

America's strategic interest in India, a result of the brief threat from Japan, Stillwell's retreat from Burma, and Lend-Lease aid to India, was further demonstrated when a Technical Mission was sent there in April 1942 to examine the means of developing industry in a country not prepared for war production. The failure of the British to develop India industrially became apparent in the information flowing to Roosevelt after the collapse of Cripps' negotiations for political reform there.

The Technical Mission, once set up, worked swiftly. The United States Tariff Commission released the Mission's report, the Grady Report, in June 1942,[84] and the Economic Defence Board submitted a program to implement recommendations in August.[85] Implementation of the report required a fundamental decision that India and, more specifically, Calcutta's industrial areas would be defended against any future Japanese attack.[86] The idea that India might not be defended reinforced Indian nationalist ideas that a form of self-government that gave them control of their defence was imperative.

The urgency of establishing viable heavy industrial production in British possessions east of Suez had been belatedly recognised by Britain toward the end of 1940. A conference was rapidly organised and held in New Delhi on October 25 that year, some five months before the Lend-Lease Act was passed. The Eastern Group Conference was attended by delegations from the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, Malaya, India, Burma, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), South Africa, East Africa, Rhodesia, Palestine,

and Hongkong, each a British colonial or mandated possession. They represented more than 5 million people,[87] many vulnerable to the Japanese advance into Asia.

The Eastern Group endorsed a radical move away from the practice that British dominions, possessions, and colonies were solely suppliers of raw materials to industrial Britain, to be processed there, to becoming regional producers. India and Australia were selected as the most suitable for rapid conversion into industrial bases. Australia was well advanced, but India's development required a fundamental shift in British post-war policy for India. India's geostrategic location made its conversion to a supplier of war materials to strategic points from Egypt to Malaya, rather than Britain, an essential part of the continuing war effort.

America's Technical Mission evolved from a conversation between Adolph Berle, Assistant Secretary of State, and Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the newly appointed Indian Agent General in Washington, and centered on a report entitled "India's War Effort," issued by the Government of India. Bajpai's objective was to ascertain whether the United States Government would be interested in assisting with the development of Indian war production.[88] The Government of India's report had been produced in March 1941 by the Chatfield Mission coinciding with the passage of the Lend-Lease Act. Sir Ernle Chatfield had been Minister for Coordination of Defence in 1939 and 1940, and there is no indication that he had further links with India. He concluded that, although India's industrial capacity was "not negligible," the need for rapid action to strengthen defences was essential.[89] He argued that the fate of India depended on support from Britain and America. Despite the October 1940 Conference and the Government of India report, little progress had been made. There was small production of simple machine tools and machinery and the beginnings of a heavy chemical industry. The Alkali and Chemical Corporation of India, along with Tata Chemicals, had plants under construction in 1941. Indian plants were treating imported aluminium, and it was estimated that bauxite would be produced locally by the end of 1942. Nonetheless, progress with machinery such as tanks, war planes, and armoured vehicles, needed east of Suez, was negligible because India was dependent on fully imported engines. Indian industrialists had offered at the start of the war to manufacture aircraft, but were delayed for more than a year. Similarly stalling, the British Government blocked the construction of Indian-owned shipbuilding yards and opposed the establishment of an Indian automotive manufacturing plant.[90]

The factors limiting increased production in India were set out in Berle's memorandum to the President on the need for a Technical Mission to inspect the sites of Indian industrial development. The limiting factors included the shortage of material, the shortage of trained supervisors, and shortages of nonferrous metals, particularly tin, lead, zinc, tungsten, and limited aluminium treatment.[91] India also lacked generators, motors, and machine tools, and Berle proposed that America might provide technical assistance

together with "limited quantities" of machine tools and other parts. He also pointed out that all the Indian Army's vehicles had already been supplied from America. Berle suggested that, as a first step, a representative preferably chosen by the Office of Production Management be sent to India to assess the situation and that the Office of Production Management, the Lend-Lease Administration, and the State Department should facilitate any plan that might be proposed as a result of the assessment.[92]

Roosevelt signalled that Berle's proposals merited urgent exploration.[93] A meeting was convened on February 3, 1942, the day after his meeting with Edgar Snow, emphasising the President's focus on India. The participants were well qualified to advise: the Executive Director of the Board of Economic Warfare, two members of the British Empire Division of the Board, a representative of the Division of Defence Materials, and the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.[94] There was strong interest in assisting India to reach its industrial potential, and the only note of doubt aired was that it might not be easy to persuade the British Government that India should be made self-sufficient in war production because of British plans to retain a controlling interest in Indian markets after the war.[95] Thus, the British Government was opposed to any large growth of Indian-controlled heavy industries because the intention was to continue to dominate both production and trade postwar.[96] Consultation with the Whitehall Government and the Government of India, however, produced agreement for the Mission to go ahead because India's industrial development was now extremely urgent and, on March 6, the State Department issued a press release announcing a new step in American–Indian collaboration.[97] The decision to send a Technical Mission to India was seen in some quarters as an event of great significance that recognised that India was no longer solely Britain's concern.[98]

The members of the Technical Mission were published on March 9, within weeks of Cripps' departure for India with his offer of political reform. The coincidence of timing reveals not just American pressure on Britain to industrialise India, which sections of the Lend-Lease Act, feared by Britain, allowed, but also Churchill's realisation that he had to urgently demonstrate through an attempted reform process that there was no suitable alternative government for India to his own.

Colonel Louis Johnson was appointed Chairman of the Technical Mission, but was reappointed Roosevelt's Personal Representative in India before the Mission left America. In his place, Henry Grady, a former Assistant Secretary of State in charge of trade relations, led it, and the members were Arthur Herrington, President of the Society of Automotive Engineers to advise on the production of automotive equipment, Harry E. Beyster, President of the Beyster Engineering Company to advise on the conversion and organisation of Indian plants for war production, and Dirk Dekker, Director of Personnel and Training, Illinois Steel Corporation.[99] His role was to aid in the training of the skilled and semi-skilled workforce.

The Technical Mission spent five weeks in India; on its departure, a press release was issued in India. It described the Mission's work in general terms and stated that Grady's Report would not be published there because parts of it were sensitive.[100] A summary of the Technical Mission's findings was sent to the Vice-President on June 12 by Harry Beyster, and included were the sections of the Grady Report considered suitable to be handed to the Government of India. Neither was favourable, and a number of strong recommendations were made.[101] In the context of America's likely future presence in India, Beyster noted that the Mission "was shocked and disturbed by the conditions existing there that might be faced by our military forces."[102]

Such information, combined with Louis Johnson's report as Roosevelt's Personal Representative in India and Arthur Herrington's as President of the Society of Automotive Engineers, presented to the Division of Near Eastern Affairs on the political and military situation in India after the collapse of Cripps' negotiations,[103] together with the tacit recognition that British rule in India would continue at least *pro tem,* gave the United States departments concerned with implementation of the program much to consider. The Board of Economic Warfare, nonetheless, devised a program in recognition of India's strategic importance.[104]

The Technical Mission had discovered the extent to which Britain had restricted Indian development economically, industrially, and politically. Arguably, the size of the task of modernising India and gaining its cooperation was far greater than the United States anticipated and contributed among other events that developed over the year to the late 1942 decision not to proceed with the Technical Mission's program at that time.

No discussion of America's strengthened interest in India can be separated completely from the broad parameters of America's relationship with Britain. India, however, was the main area over which United States and British interests clashed during the Second World War. Aspects of that relationship which affected India directly or made the British fearful of the consequences for their imperial agenda remain focused on Churchill because the War Cabinet's India Committee decisions were largely his. He was already a "maverick"[105] in British political thinking on India, but his Coalition Cabinet colleagues did not seriously challenge him. While he remained in power, his agenda on India prevailed.

American hostility to British imperialism, as opposed to its broad anticolonialist commitment, was a crucial factor in the relationship at that particular time. It provided the reasons that Britain, a friend and then an ally of the United States, needed to mount a propaganda campaign in America. India was Britain's Achilles heel. Provoking Roosevelt and his Administration to intervene in India would wreck parts of Churchill's war agenda: first, to maintain and increase American support for the war, and, second, to keep the Indian Empire. He was particularly vulnerable on the latter part. Churchill had to prove to American public opinion, and

hence to Roosevelt, that Congress Party recalcitrance and not imperial imperatives prevented agreement to Cripps' Offer in April 1942.[106] British propaganda urged Americans to accept that 1942 was not the year that India should be granted self-government.

Despite their opposition over Empire and India, Roosevelt and Churchill became "the greatest of friends"[107] and forged an alliance between their countries that is often seen as long term. The impetus for their friendship came from the half-American Churchill, who envisaged a trans-Atlantic partnership with the President as Britain's "vital friend."[108] The Anglo-American alliance, however, resumed at the start of the Second World War. It was not continuous. Despite the United States intervention on Britain's side in 1917, the partnership was allowed to lapse for the next two decades. What Churchill called a " . . . fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples"[109] in fact "quickly disintegrates unless it receives careful and continuous political direction,"[110] which, in the interwar years, it did not. The Anglo-American alliance, resumed at the start of the Second World War, may thus be seen as a relationship of convenience especially for Britain.

As Britain's awareness of its loss of strength grew in the early war years, so did its leaders' feeling that American support was vital to British interests.[111] An alliance was seen by Britain as crucial both for the defence of the Empire and the means to defeat Germany. It was contrived despite difficulties such as America's determination not to again underwrite a war fought to preserve the British Empire, one of a multiplicity of problems for the new partnership that included strategy, the balance of power, trade, and tariffs.[112] The hostility, both current and historic, between the United States and Britain was repeatedly manifest in their clashes over British policy for India in the 1940s. Roosevelt was convinced that the Empire was an anachronism and was determined to push Churchill toward ending it. When Churchill was provoked into stating in November 1942 that he had "not become the King's first Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire,"[113] many liberal Americans felt duped, having assumed that the war they were now fighting for freedom would bring about the end of the Empire.[114]

Anti-colonialism also was sufficiently explicit within Roosevelt's administration to push Churchill closer to making a reform offer to India and to launch the Foreign Office, the India Office, the Ministry of Information, the Government of India, and the British Embassy in Washington into planning the propaganda campaign that surrounded the reform negotiations carried out by Cripps. A strategy for the timing and content of press releases on India in the United States was developed from the beginning of 1942, prior to the announcement of the Offer that Cripps would take to India. Its purpose remained to discredit India's claims for self-government and gain the support of the American public for Britain retaining control of India.

In addition to Roosevelt's public commitment to end imperialism, remarks made in February 1942 by Breckenridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State,

recorded the feeling of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee and pressured Britain still further. Long reported that the Committee's argument concerning India was

> . . . that we are participating on such a large scale and had done so much for England in lend-lease that we had now arrived at a position of importance to justify our participation in Empire councils and such as to authorise us to require England to make adjustments of a political nature within the framework of her Empire. We should demand that India be given a status of autonomy . . . [115]

In April that year, Long also noted that "India is about to fall. The uncomprehending philosophy of England is meeting its reward. Blind, self-centred and tenacious of the phantoms of the past . . . [*sic*]."[116]

Sumner Welles warned Roosevelt in July 1942 about the seriousness of the political unrest in India following the failure of the Cripps Mission in April and the perception, fostered in British propaganda, that the Congress Party might not resist a Japanese invasion: "This is a question of vital concern to our own military and naval interests in the Far East."[117]

Advice of this sort was not new. Before the Cripps Offer and the Congress Party's demands for immediate self-government, Hull, Berle, and Welles had urged that pressure be put on Britain to give Indians what they envisaged as full partnership in the government of their country. Roosevelt applied that pressure consistently after the publication of the Atlantic Charter in August 1941. Some months later, in February 1942, after the fall of Singapore, Berle wrote that, with the changed position in the Far East, tackling the Indian problem should be "the first item on the list" and "Why should India defend a freedom she hasn't got?"[118] Berle reminded Welles that Hull had twice during 1941 taken up with Britain the recognition of Indian self-government and further suggested that the United States and Britain together issue a policy statement on India.[119] Hull continued to press Churchill's Government to give India immediate self-government after the collapse of Cripps' negotiations.[120]

Churchill was well aware of how susceptible Roosevelt was to this sort of pressure from his State Department, and it was demonstrated continually in his prodding of the Prime Minister to settle with India. Even more likely to make the President intervene was the threat to his country's image and prestige in India if it was identified with British policy there. The Office of Strategic Services, which had agents throughout Asia,[121] including "Wild Bill" Donovan, did a survey of opinion in the region and warned the State Department of this danger. Loughlin Currie, one of Roosevelt's administrative assistants whose responsibility it was to obtain intelligence for him,[122] put it first to Vice-President Wallace that America must "maintain her own position with regard to races like the Indians . . . and not get sucked into taking the British position."[123]

In August 1942, Currie warned Roosevelt of the Indian Congress Party's tendency to see American inaction as supportive of British action.[124] Identification with British policy in India was not something Roosevelt would tolerate, but Indian nationalists, accustomed to verbal jousting with Britain, were not above goading America in this way.

The Congress Party's opinion that the United States supported British-Indian policy was expressed despite Roosevelt's efforts to let the nationalists know of his interest in India. During Cripps' negotiations, this was achieved through Louis Johnson, head of the New Delhi Mission and, at other times, through private informants. Johnson carried to India a letter from the President to Maulana Azad, President of the Congress Party.[125] Roosevelt's messages to Nehru were carried by his private informant, Edgar Snow. A letter from Gandhi and a summary of the situation in India were brought to him by Louis Fischer.[126] Thus, Snow, Fischer, and other writers and journalists reported to Roosevelt or the State Department, bringing political news about India, in addition to their published work as correspondents. The President's wartime relationship with Britain (and British censorship in India) made more direct contact for him with the Indian leadership diplomatically impossible.

Indian nationalists made a specific reference to American cooperation with British Empire policy in February 1942. The Congress Party suspected that anti-British, pro-Indian comments in the Hearst press and other newspapers were not reported in India "because the [American] government has conspired with the British Tories."[127] The State Department replied that the Office of War Information had been cabling comments from newspapers regularly to India and the "tone was the same as that of the American press generally."[128] In terms of the British propaganda campaign, the Indian supposition about American sentiment was unfortunate.

Perhaps unknown to the American Office of War Information, however, the British Embassy in Washington had attempted to censor the Hearst Press. Comments of a "controversial nature" that came to the Embassy for "guidance" were not sent on to Hearst's international agency, the International News Service, for distribution in India.[129] Possibly the Indian Congress Party was correct in its charge that not all American news reports about India were published on the subcontinent, the result of British intervention.

The President sought to further distance his administration from any political association with Britain in India by emphasising, for example, the limited role of American soldiers based there, which precluded their taking part in any local law and order matters. This was particularly important during the aftermath of the Quit India movement in August 1942. Since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the American entry to the war, and Cripps' Offer to India, Churchill and the India Committee of Cabinet could not rely on Roosevelt and his Administration to stay out of British–Indian matters. Through his representatives, especially Harry Hopkins, Averell Harriman, and John Winant, Roosevelt raised and reraised the matter of

self-government for India,[130] repeatedly forewarning Britain of the possibility of intervention in its Empire.

This situation left Churchill with little choice: approach India with another reform package and effect a settlement or continue the propaganda campaign to keep before the American public his opinion that India was not fit for self-government. Churchill chose the latter with good reason. His prestige in the United States was high, his favoured interpretations were unlikely to be challenged in the usually pro-British newspapers, and his expectation was that a significant proportion of the public would not consider alternative arguments.

Churchill's assumptions that the section of the American public he targeted would neither question nor conduct research on his arguments were correct. Pro-Indian independence arguments were not considered by the majority of American public until mid-1942, and even then the effects of propaganda surrounding Cripps' Offer lingered. Although the level of support for Indian independence was maintained, more people thought it should be granted after the war and not immediately than in polls taken earlier in the year.[131]

Churchill and the India Committee's decision to wage a propaganda campaign in support of Britain's retention of control in India demonstrated clearly the point on which Anglo-American relations were weakest and where Britain was most vulnerable. Economic issues apart, and the fact that Britain had successfully hedged its bets on postwar concessions, Churchill, if not Britain, stood to lose the most if the United States was not persuaded to leave India alone.

Thus, America's interest in India was demonstrably sustained and sufficiently intrusive to threaten Britain's war-related agenda focused on the United States, and its imperial agenda focused on India. Tactically, reform negotiations had to be seen to be held. Churchill had no choice but to send Cripps to India.

3 Cripps, India, and the Evolution of the Propaganda Campaign

Sir Stafford Cripps became leader of the House of Commons and Lord Privy Seal, replacing Churchill and Clement Attlee, Labour Party leader and Deputy Prime Minister, in mid-February 1942.[1] He took the Churchill-inspired Offer of limited self-government to India in March 1942, suggesting the speed with which the Prime Minister reacted to the mounting pressure on him to reach agreement with Indians over their immediate political future. America's war-related interest in India was the galvanising factor.

Cripps' Offer had two parts: (a) self-government as soon as possible after the end of the war, an open-ended undertaking proposing no end date to the imperial connection; and (b) interim war-time measures that admitted Indians to minor involvement in their government. Minority rights were guaranteed, opening wider the door to possible partition of the country and the creation of a Muslim state when self-government eventuated.[2] Both parts of the Offer had to be accepted before the immediate measures could be put in place, suggesting that the key assurance for self-government in the future rested on Indian acceptance of the interim measures. Churchill was confident that the future provisions would slip away as immediate agreement was unlikely to be reached.

The Government of India at that time comprised the Viceroy and, his Executive Council, made up of the Commander-in-Chief, three British official members, and eight nonofficial Indian members. Linked with the Government of India were eleven Provincial Governments, each of which had a British Governor. Provincial Governments had been elected since 1937 following the passage in August 1935 of the India Act. Although only partly implemented before war broke out, it was the last major British reform agenda installed, a decade in the making and a substantial part of the reason for Churchill's wilderness years.

Seven Provincial Governments were made up of appointed officials, administered by their Governors under a section of the 1935 India Act, since their elected Congress Party Ministries had resigned in protest at the start of the war. Their protest was against the Viceroy's announcement that India was at war without consulting Indian leaders. The remaining four provinces had Muslim League Governments, but no Congress Party (Hindu

nationalist) politicians were in power when Cripps took his Offer to India. Although there were other political parties, the Congress Party[3] and the Muslim League[4] were the two main political groups. Both wanted independence from Britain, but had different demands.

The All-India Congress Committee, whose members included Gandhi, Nehru, Maulana Azad, Vallabhbhai Patel, Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, and Acharya Kripalani, each important in post-independence India, were involved in decision making for the Congress Party, framing and voting on resolutions. It was the responsibility of members of the Committee to negotiate with Cripps and come to a decision on his Offer.

Cripps' Offer was a response to pressure from a number of directions, including from Roosevelt's key advisers serving in London, and was, for the most part, drafted by Cripps under the supervisory eye of Churchill's newly convened India Committee.[5] Cripps' instructions from the War Cabinet clearly allowed him to negotiate with the Indian leaders from all parties to reach a settlement and was a vital part of his expectation that the Offer he took to India would be accepted. The word *negotiation* is frequently used in the context of Cripps' Offer, and its scope has been the subject of much debate, although the Annex to the India Committee's fifth meeting on March 3 is quite clear. Cripps left with instructions to "negotiate . . . some scheme by which they [the Indian leaders] can partake in an advisery or consultative manner in the counsels of their country."[6]

The freedom to negotiate on which he relied, however, was revoked in cables authorised by Churchill as key agreements with the Congress Party and the Muslim League appeared to be close.

Changing the ground rules in the course of negotiations led to the eventual rejection of the war-time provision in the Offer by all Indian Parties and nullified it as a whole. This situation armed the India Office, the Government of India, the British Embassy in Washington, and other involved Ministries with the ammunition they sought for the propaganda campaign coordinated in the United States.

The initial phase of the propaganda campaign from early in 1942 anticipated the likely failure of Cripps' Offer and steered the American public toward a complex view of India that only the British could properly understand.[7] Surrounding the propagandised progress of Cripps' negotiations, the "intricacies" of the caste system and the cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity present in India were stressed in the media.[8] The communal problems between Hindus and Muslims, much overused in British claims of responsibility to minorities, were cited as a further complication in handing over power to what might be a largely Hindu Government. It was presented to the American public as "unrepresentative" in terms of Lee and Lee's methodology for propaganda identification. The communal problem was a complication that Churchill had welcomed at many stages in the reform process over many years and was deemed by him to be "the bulwark of British rule in India."[9] In principle, as long as the communities

could not agree, power could not be handed over. However, the partition of India as a solution to the communal divide was flagged in Cripps' Offer and had indeed been raised in 1940, rendering that particular "bulwark" to the history of earlier, unsuccessful reform attempts.

Collectively named "the Indian problem," the propaganda campaign also drew in the threat to the allied war effort from any change to the government, the lack of preparedness of Indian nationalists for leadership, and the raft of anticipated difficulties in incorporating princely India into a self-governing nation. Within this barrage of information, Indian voices were seldom heard.

Churchill's reform proposal for India was a propaganda exercise, as has been said, designed to persuade American public opinion and Roosevelt that Churchill, his India Committee, and his War Cabinet had done everything possible to secure a settlement with India. Again, Indian voices seeking to publicise their version of Cripps' negotiations were largely unheard until writers Louis Fischer and Edgar Snow published their accounts some months later. The American public was misled by the pro-British press about the reasons for the failure of Cripps' Offer and the rejection of the draft declaration he took to India, but their accounts were not seriously challenged by readers as propaganda theory at the time advocated. This task would have been difficult in any case because neither the United States Government nor the public had access to British documents that recorded the War Cabinet's control of the progress of negotiations. Johnson in New Delhi and Roosevelt's private informants in India, Fischer and Snow did, as the President suggested, pass on a more complete version of the Offer's collapse than did British propaganda. Roosevelt used this information to keep up his pressure on Churchill, but, in line with his public silence on India to placate Churchill following their stormy meeting in December 1941 in Washington, he did not release it to the American people.[10] The Indian leaders were also misled. At the time when negotiations broke down, they were no more aware than the American public that Churchill had removed Cripps' power to negotiate at two crucial junctures. Cripps kept the "story . . . to himself,"[11] damaging his relationship with Nehru and the Congress Party, but preserving the integrity of the propaganda account.

Cripps' friendship with Nehru, the powers he thought he had been granted by Churchill's War Cabinet to negotiate with the Indian leaders, together with his well-known anti-imperialism played an essential part in giving his Offer credibility and suggests reasons why Churchill appointed him to speak for his attempt to deflect Roosevelt's attention from India.

The relationship between Cripps and Nehru sheds light on the less obvious objectives of the political reform offer. Cripps and Nehru were both, in their way, a threat to Churchill's position. Cripps was seen in some circles as a possible successor to Churchill as Prime Minister.[12] He was demoted after his failure in India, and he lost his place in the inner circle of the War Cabinet. If Nehru had accepted Cripps' Offer, he would have effectively

given India a national government, a measure of self-rule that Churchill vehemently opposed, and Nehru, further disillusioned, was "goaded . . . into rebellion"[13] following the failure of negotiations. The halt to talks with Britain, Cripps' apparent back-down, and adherence to British propaganda in the following months, pushed Nehru towards Gandhi's Quit India movement, and imprisonment by the Government of India.[14] This effectively removed him, other Hindu leaders, and thousands of their supporters from the political arena, and any future negotiations on Indian self-government while Churchill remained in power and opposed its independence.

Cripps had developed ties with the nationalist leaders, especially Nehru. He had visited India in December 1939, held discussions with Nehru, and met and talked with Gandhi and Azad, President of the Indian National Congress, and Nehru's papers include letters from and to Cripps dating from October 1936. Cripps' early letters were concerned with Labour politics in Britain and the Party's gradual engagement in opposition to imperialism, and they exhorted Nehru to "maintain the most rigid opposition to imperialism in all its forms."[15] Cripps' correspondence gradually moved from the stereotypical "We salute you as brothers and sisters in the common cause of freedom"[16] to a more personal exchange of views. At the same time, he attempted to raise the profile of nationalist Indian politics in Britain.

They had both keenly anticipated Cripps' visit to India in December 1939. Cripps held extended talks with Gandhi and Azad also, earning him his *Congress man* label. The exchange of letters continued until March 27, 1942, when Cripps cabled Nehru, "Am looking forward immensely to seeing you at the earliest possible moment . . . ."[17]

Mutual disappointment at the failure of the Mission damaged their relationship. Cripps had staked his reputation on persuading Nehru to accept his Offer, and he had told him, "Your position in the Council here, backed by my position in the Cabinet, will give us such moral power that the Viceroy cannot dispute you here nor the Cabinet challenge me in England."[18]

At the end of their talks, Azad remained convinced that Cripps had offered a *de facto* Cabinet Government, one in which the Viceroy would choose not to exercise his power of veto over his Council[19] and which appeared acceptable to both the Congress Party leaders and Muhommed Ali Jinnah, President of the All India Muslim League. When he was asked to restate this before negotiations broke down, Cripps retreated to a less contentious position,[20] arguing that constitutional amendment was not possible during the war and ignoring the fact that a *de facto* Cabinet Government required, in this case, only the Viceroy's cooperation. Nehru's disappointment over what he saw as Cripps' *volte-face* over the Cabinet Government issue was given expression in a letter to Johnson, Roosevelt's representative in New Delhi, after Cripps returned to Britain.

> The failure of the Cripps Mission had undoubtedly made the position much worse and any compromise harder . . . we came near . . . to a

> working arrangement for the present, but in reality the gulf was very far from being bridged . . . this became apparent as soon as basic matters, including the real transfer of power were discussed.[21]

Rather than explain the reasons for his retreat from the offer of a *de facto* Cabinet Government and a negotiated settlement on defence, Cripps followed the Whitehall Government's propaganda line, leaving his old friend without an explanation to bridge the gulf between them.

The collapse of Cripps' Offer was the direct result of Churchill's two-pronged agenda: (a) to show Roosevelt and the American public that there was no suitable alternative government for India (that a genuine offer had been made and rejected), and (b) that the British Government of India under the Viceroy must remain in place. This goal was achieved through the propaganda campaign. In the second part of his agenda, Churchill undermined the reform offer with cabled instruction to Cripps that negated the instructions he had been given to negotiate a settlement, ensuring its failure.

Roosevelt was briefed on the terms of the Offer and a version of its outcome by Halifax, the British Ambassador, and the American public was made aware through the media-based propaganda campaign.

The final clause of Cripps' Offer (Clause e),[22] the section where the war-time reform measures to be introduced immediately agreement was secured, proposed that "His Majesty's Government desire and invite the immediate . . . participation of the leaders . . . of the Indian people in the counsels of their country . . . ."[23] and while

> His Majesty's Government must inevitably bear the responsibility for and retain control and direction of the defence of India as part of their world war effort . . . the task of organising to the full the military, moral and material resources of India must be the responsibility of the Government with the co-operation of the peoples of India.[24]

In opening the negotiations, Cripps offered the Indian leaders, first Azad and then Jinnah, a form of Cabinet Government that did not involve constitutional change, but only a change of convention, to allow immediate Indian involvement in their government. Under such a scheme, the Viceroy, if willing, could say that he would make it his habit to deal with his Council as far as possible as if it were a Cabinet. Effectively, he would not use his over-riding power and would accept his Council members' advice.[25] Because the Viceroy's Council would be united in defending India, any disagreement would be unlikely. The Congress Party came close to accepting this as a means of sharing power before it became aware that this part of the Offer had been withdrawn. It did not know at that stage that Churchill's India Committee, in reaction to objections from the Viceroy, sent a cable to Cripps from the War Cabinet and changed the rules of engagement. Cripps' power to negotiate on this issue was revoked,[26] and Cripps elected not to

reveal at that time that he had been instructed to withdraw his *de facto* Cabinet offer.

The second part of the Offer to be put in place immediately retained for the British Government control of the defence of India as part of its overall war strategy and gave only the day-to-day, mundane task of organising military resources to a new Government of India.[27] The Congress Party leaders were unhappy with their lack of responsibility in the role allocated to them, but a settlement based on a new defence formula was negotiated and agreed to by the Party and the negotiating team.

The new defence formula, which became known as the Cripps–Johnson formula was drafted with the assistance of Roosevelt's Personal Representative. The new formula emphasised India's responsibility in the defence portfolio by retaining the existing Defence Department under an Indian head, rather than the Commander-in-Chief, and transferred the military functions to a new War Department under Commander-in-Chief Field Marshall Sir Archibald Wavell. This movement was little more than shifting the deckchairs, and Linlithgow signalled to Amery that he and Wavell were prepared to go along with the new formula, "Given all the circumstances and the importance of American opinion."[28] The Viceroy appeared to recognize that Cripps' Offer would be accepted at least in the immediate part, but Cripps had again stepped on the Viceroy's toes.

Linlithgow had not been aware that, while Henry Hodson, his Reforms Commissioner, brought copies of the redrafted proposal to him and Wavell in the early evening of April 8, at the same time Cripps had allowed Johnson to show a copy to Nehru. When Cripps and Linlithgow met at 10 p.m. that night, Linlithgow was still unaware that the Congress Working Committee also had seen the new formula. When during their conversation it became clear, the Viceroy was "exceedingly and reasonably angry." How could he now "resist a formula agreed by Cripps, the USA [via Johnson] and Congress"?[29] The Viceroy again cabled his concerns, and again the reform path was blocked.

Leading to this intractable position in India followed the pressure for political reform that had escalated simultaneously from a number of directions, including the United States. It forced the "no new constitutional advance" decision made by Churchill, Amery, and Linlithgow in January 1942 to change rapidly. Their January decision to offer no change in Indian governance was based on the Viceroy's assessment of Congress Party and Muslim League "manoeuvring." In other words, he raised the communal problem again. He also argued that the Congress Party would be satisfied with nothing less than full independence. Yet any attempt to reintroduce the rejected 1940 August Offer with its restated promise that "the future object" was Dominion Status, an enlargement of the Viceroy's Council and guarantees for Muslims,[30] could only be from a "strong position"[31] difficult to imagine at that time.

The British position was not strong in a war context, nor was it likely that Indian nationalists would now accept an offer short of self-government,

leaving open the possibility of another spell of civil disobedience and further instability. Thus, the August Offer, having been rejected by the Indian parties, was not a real option. Linlithgow, however, in a raft of arguments, concluded, "we should stand firm and make no further move."[32] He informed the Prime Minister of "all essential factors" in his recommendations and quickly received Secretary of State Amery's endorsement for "standing firm."[33]

Roosevelt had begun his campaign for self-government for India before the United States entered the war. He had hoped to get Churchill's commitment to end British rule in India at their first meeting when the Atlantic Charter was signed. Roosevelt had avoided confrontation with Churchill over the subject, recognising the Prime Minister's opposition to interference in imperial questions. Instead he included the clause supporting self-determination in the Charter. Churchill was similarly eager to avoid confrontation, fearing it would jeopardise his case for American aid. He accepted the Atlantic Charter's controversial third clause,[34] but his apparent cooperation was short-lived.

Churchill had attempted to "defang"[35] the Charter commitment on September 10, 1941, a month after the meeting, by excluding the Empire from the self-determination clause. He successfully argued his case in Parliament, reassuring British imperialists, but losing wider credibility. Roosevelt gained the moral high ground for the United States, and the Prime Minister found himself outmanoeuvred "in a classic exercise of public diplomacy."[36] Public attention was focused on the issue of self-determination to Britain's disadvantage. Indian nationalists, among other pro-independence movements, saw Roosevelt's commitment to self-government as unequivocal and drew heart from it.[37]

Two issues emerged and kept the matter of self-determination alive in the press. On the one hand, nationalists questioned the timing of its implementation.[38] On the other hand, there was comment in American and Indian newspapers about India's exclusion by Churchill from the guarantees of the third clause.[39] This form of pressure on the British Government, generated by Roosevelt's successful public diplomacy, continued during 1942 and beyond, keeping Churchill guessing about the President's intentions toward India.

Roosevelt returned to his anti-empire campaign within weeks of the bombing of Pearl Harbor. He suggested that Churchill make a public declaration on Indian independence at their Washington meeting in December 1941. Churchill recorded that he "reacted so strongly and at such length that he [Roosevelt] never raised it verbally again."[40] Not with Churchill directly, but Roosevelt's message was delivered verbally and frequently through his intermediaries, including Hopkins, who has been described as Roosevelt's personal foreign office[41]; Averell Harriman, his Personal Representative in London responsible for the administration of the Lend-Lease in Britain[42]; and John Winant, his Ambassador there.

He also raised the subject repeatedly in his personal correspondence with Churchill.[43] Although Roosevelt did not again discuss India verbally with Churchill, the Prime Minister's statement is misleading in its implication.[44]

Before the conclusion of the Washington meeting, Roosevelt had one more time brought the question of Indian independence to the fore. He insisted that India be one of the signatories to a Declaration by the United Nations, framed loosely on the principles contained in the Atlantic Charter. Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the Agent General for India in Washington, signed the Declaration for India, provoking reaction from several directions. Amery, for example, complained to Linlithgow that an Indian "has signed on behalf of India to yet another resounding declaration which bases itself upon the Atlantic Charter, so it can hardly be said now that India is excluded from its purview."[45] The *Bombay Sentinel* stated that the Atlantic Charter had no meaning for India and that Bajpai had signed the Declaration under instructions from the Government of India, whom he represented.[46] A *Hindustan Times* editorial expressed the view that,

> Under the present declaration, India is made to profess her faith in the principles and purposes of the Atlantic Charter, and since these principles are not to apply to her own case, she is evidently to "join the common struggle against savage, brutal forces" in order that these principles may be applied to other nations.[47]

The question of India's inclusion in or exclusion from the Charter was thus kept alive.

Another source of pressure on Britain came from an influential group of Indian moderates led by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. They had called for the reconstruction of the Viceroy's Executive Council as a provisional National Government in March 1941.[48] The moderates renewed their call on January 2, 1942, in an appeal to Churchill for a "bold stroke" for India. This time the proposal was Dominion Status for India under a National Government responsible only to the Crown,[49] requiring constitutional change. Sapru's telegram was sent to Churchill, still in Washington, on January 2. Sapru, as historian Anthony Low explained, "scored a bull." It seemed that Roosevelt may have seen a copy of the telegram. Low suggests that this might have been the cause of Churchill's outburst to Roosevelt on India.[50] Drafted replies to Sapru lapsed as the War Cabinet failed to pick a way between Amery's view that no immediate constitutional change could be made and Attlee, who was now urging that someone go to India to discuss the problem with the Indian leaders.[51]

Attlee increased the pressure on Churchill at the end of January 1942, taking further his December 1941 demand for a forward policy on India.[52] He did not agree with Churchill and Amery that a new advance on Indian constitutional reform was inappropriate. He anticipated the Cripps Mission when he raised the idea of sending someone to India to bring the political

leaders together in an attempt to reach an agreement. He stated that there is "a lot of public opinion here" that crossed party lines, and he was not convinced that "there is nothing to be done, but to sit tight on the declaration of August 1940."[53] He restated that view on February 2.[54]

The position of the Congress Party remained unchanged. The rejection of the 1940 August Offer had led to the ongoing Congress demand for complete independence immediately.[55] Although press support for India in the United States fluctuated, it was largely supportive of India in 1941.[56] This situation was a matter of continuing concern for Britain into the new year.

The build-up of pressure produced a compromise from Churchill on February 5, 1942, that briefly distracted the War Cabinet from Labour Party demands on India. The Prime Minister's intention was to expand the Viceroy's Council and extend its function to an elected body, representing the provincial governments and the princes, and to include responsibility for drafting a new constitution after the war.[57] The increasing danger to Singapore and the Viceroy's objections, however, put a stop to Churchill's proposal[58] until later in February the idea of consultation with the Indian leaders took shape in the form of Cripps' Offer to India.

Events moved quickly, and pressure on Churchill to act emerged from a new source. Chiang Kai-shek had visited India in early February. His object was to rally support for the defence of India against Japan as an essential part of the defence of China. He had asked Churchill for permission to see Gandhi and Nehru. This he did despite Churchill's reply:

> With regards to your seeing persons like Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Nehru, who are in "a state of . . . passive disobedience to the King Emperor, this you will readily see is a matter which requires very grave consideration. . . ."[59]

Churchill later stated that the Congress Party leaders had used the Generalissimo to bring pressure on Britain to yield to their demands.[60] An expert on Indian constitutional matters who was in India to report on the political situation to the Fellows of Nuffield College, Oxford, Sir Reginald Coupland, concurred with this view.[61] Azad acknowledged that the meeting with Chiang Kai-shek put the Government of India in an awkward position because he had come to India with the express intention of talking to the Indian leaders as well as the Government. Azad recorded that "the Viceroy could not therefore prevent him from establishing contact with us."[62]

Following his talks with the nationalist leaders, Chiang Kai-shek appealed to the Government of India to give real power to India as rapidly as possible:[63]

> . . . so that they may be in a position further to develop their spiritual and material strength and thus realise that their participation in war is . . . turning point in their struggle for India's freedom.[64]

Chiang tried privately and unsuccessfully to get the Congress Party leaders to state their support of the war, which they would not do without constitutional reform. He reported to Roosevelt that disunity in India could allow a Japanese invasion virtually unopposed. If, however, "the political situation in India were to change for the better, this may prevent the enemy from having any ambitions to enter India."[65]

He also informed his Ambassador in London and his Minister for Foreign Affairs in Washington that he was "shocked by the Indian military and political situation." Chiang's diplomats were to pass his views on to Roosevelt and Cripps, who, in turn, was to inform Churchill.[66]

Churchill may not have known that Chiang had visited India with Roosevelt's endorsement as early as February,[67] but he was aware when Roosevelt used the Chinese leader's views on India again in July 1942 to put additional pressure on Churchill. At that time, Chiang noted that "The United States . . . has a natural and vital role to play in bringing about a successful solution of the problem."[68] The Chinese leader stressed that his dispatch was strictly confidential. Nonetheless, Roosevelt immediately sent a copy to Churchill "in view of its nature."[69]

Armed first with Chiang's February views, Roosevelt instructed Harriman to raise the Indian question with Churchill again.[70] Harriman admitted that Roosevelt was "prodding" Churchill through him, and, because he was responsible for the administration of Lend-Lease in Britain, the implications were clear. Harriman was asked by the President to look into all matters relating to Lend-Lease for "a slant on what the Prime Minister thinks about the relationship between Britain and India."[71] On February 26, he received instructions to deliver to Churchill a "highly sensitive personal message" from the President.[72] In this message, Roosevelt asked what steps the Prime Minister intended to take to conciliate the Indian leadership in order to gain their support for the war. Churchill raised the "white man's burden" argument in reply, but, as Harriman recorded, "Roosevelt had taken it into his head that the Indian problem could be settled."[73] He proposed to Churchill two weeks later, on March 11, that the Indian problem could be solved in much the same way that the American colonies had achieved the Articles of Confederation.[74] Churchill noted what he saw as the President's lack of understanding of the Indian situation at the time and again in April, a month later, when Roosevelt restated his argument in a last-minute attempt to prevent Churchill from allowing Cripps' negotiations to fail.[75] Despite Churchill's private ridiculing of Roosevelt's grasp of the Indian problem, the President's pressure could not be ignored.

The coincidence of pressure from Roosevelt, Attlee, the Indian moderates, Chiang, Kai-shek, and the Congress Party left Churchill no alternative but to reopen the question of political reform with India. Sending Cripps, who had supported nationalist India's aspirations since the 1930s, was, as noted, a stroke of Churchillian genius because it left both Cripps

and Nehru exposed if the Offer failed. Nationalist India's hopes of settlement were unusually high because Cripps was involved and were revealed, for example, by a *Bombay Sentinel* editorial that regarded the Offer as an honest attempt to deal with a difficult problem. "If it were not an honest and sincere attempt . . . Sir Stafford Cripps would not have been associated with it."[76]

Cripps offered to take the draft declaration to India on March 7, 1942, but his suggestion was vetoed by Amery on the grounds that the Muslims regarded Cripps "as an out and out Congress man."[77] Amery's point was valid, but not for the reason he inferred. Had Cripps not been a "Congress man," nationalist Indian expectations might have been lower and the Offer's failure anticipated.

Earlier offers of reform had never been delivered in person, and negotiations had played no part, signalling a different direction. The 1940 August Offer had made it clear that no real change would take place during the war. However, Cripps' involvement suggested a fresh approach. Indian expectations were high, possibly making the reaction to failure more extreme.

Despite his opposition to Cripps going to India, Amery had a propitious change of heart and said that he had taken "a natural liking" to him, even though he saw him as "naive in his outlook on politics in general and on Indian affairs in particular . . . he had swallowed all Nehru's views."[78]

Linlithgow had "little doubt that Cripps would fail," but his biographer recorded that the Viceroy approached the mission with a "characteristic generosity" not generally associated with his views on political reform in India. The Viceroy went on to say, "Of course the Congress and the Hindus are jubilant. They think they've scored with the British Government and that Cripps is their man. . . ."[79]

On March 25, less than three weeks since he had offered to go to India, Cripps was there. Naive possibly, as Amery had said, he did not suspect that the draft declaration he took to India would fail because it was never Churchill's intention that it should succeed.

Ostensibly it failed, first, because Cripps took his powers to negotiate with the Indian leaders further than Churchill (supported by the India Committee) was prepared to allow, and, second, because the terms *National Government* and *de facto Cabinet Government* had, at different times, different meanings for Cripps, the Congress Party leaders, Churchill, and Linlithgow.

The success or failure of the Offer depended on the all-important issue of the terms of India's immediate participation in its government, seen by nationalist Indians as more important than the postwar provisions. Cripps' forced retraction of his offer of a *de facto* Cabinet Government,[80] as noted, was one breaking point. The probability that the Government of India would observe the conventions of Cabinet-style Government was no longer sufficient for the Congress Party. That is not to say that a real transfer of power in India was the only contentious issue. The continued control of the defence portfolio by Britain was another. A negotiated settlement, based on

a new defence formula, seemed possible until Churchill disallowed that too and returned Cripps to the original terms of the Offer, where India had no influence on or input into its defence strategy.[81]

The propaganda explanation for Cripps' failure published in the United States was developed from the Congress Party's refusal to accept the subordinate defence role offered. The Party's failure to accept the British position on retaining control of the Government of India's defence portfolio, first, and, second, their subsequent rejection of the Offer as a whole, was presented as their unwillingness to take any responsibility for governing their country at a time of crisis. The idea that India refused to take responsibility for its own government stemmed from a remark by Amery to Linlithgow on April 3: "I am not sure these people really want responsibility, and if we offered them the moon they would probably reject it because of the wrinkles on the surface."[82]

Halifax, British Ambassador in Washington and a former Viceroy, took this line further in a nationally broadcast speech on April 7 in New York, in which he predicted the failure of Cripps' Offer. He suggested that the Congress Party was not ready to assume responsibility for defending India and keeping order. That level of responsibility, of course, had not been offered. The *New York Times* noted Halifax's views on India's unwillingness to accept responsibility on April 8, before the negotiations broke down, and again on April 13,[83] when the talks had collapsed. The propaganda direction was thus developed, and the message was repeated to emphasise the points being made.

Churchill's intention had been that the unsatisfactory August Offer in 1940 would be the last word on India until the war was over. Churchill's determination not to devolve any real power to India was consistent, and his struggle against the India Act in the 1930s was not an aberration. His racist remarks, particularly about Gandhi, are well documented, as is his dislike of the Congress Party. His determination to hang onto India was well known.[84] A change of tack, however, was unavoidable because "the political price of holding the line on India was liable to be unacceptably high."[85] Churchill's tactic was to defuse the situation. His first move on February 5 to expand the Executive Council had been scotched by the Viceroy, who wanted to "stand firm." His next move was to set up the India Committee of Cabinet, which he chaired. Its members, with the exception of Attlee and Cripps, were scarcely progressive. Most had previous experience of the slow pattern of change and retreat that had guided British–Indian policy since the end of the First World War, when Gandhi's demands for political reform gathered strength.[86]

The India Committee's immediate task was to oversee preparation of the Offer that Cripps would take to India. During the process, Amery remarked that:

> While Cabinet had not been stormy . . . the storm was internal to Winston, who hated the idea of giving up all his most deeply ingrained

> prejudices merely to secure more American, Chinese and Left Wing support.[87]

The proposal, for the most part drafted by Cripps, a tactically sound move, was sent to the Viceroy by Amery on February 28. Its main focus was on the future and proposed calling a constituent assembly to frame a new constitution for India immediately after the war ended. It also repeated the August 1940 Offer provision that gave the Muslims the right to opt out of the new constitution, effectively conceding Pakistan. The new and controversial departure, however, dealt with the present and invited representative Indians' immediate participation in their country's governance.[88]

This new element was hedged with conditions, but, as Amery pointed out, it "leaves the field open for negotiation."[89] That Cripps, as the Government's emissary, had the power to negotiate was the clear intention of the War Cabinet, even if the possibilities of limiting that power were not fully understood. The instructions to the Viceroy, written by Cripps, stated, "You are authorised to negotiate . . . on the basis of paragraph (e) of the offer,"[90] although Linlithgow would not actually take part in negotiations. A clarifying War Cabinet Minute recorded that Cripps would take to India the draft declaration as the plan he would discuss with political leaders to see whether it was acceptable.[91]

The word *negotiation,* as noted earlier, is frequently used in the context of Cripps' Mission, and its scope has been the subject of much debate. The annex to the India Committee's fifth meeting on March 3 is unequivocal. Cripps left for India with instructions to negotiate "some scheme" by which the Indian leaders can take part in government in an advisory or consultative manner.[92] This statement appeared frequently in documents, in various wordings, emphasising the intention of the India Committee as a whole. The instructions also allowed the Viceroy to offer seats on his Executive Council (a move that he had advised against), as long as this process did not impede decision making on the defence and good government of the country during the war.[93]

Linlithgow, however, understood the full implication of Cripps' power to negotiate on behalf of the War Cabinet and its threat to his position. His concern was first expressed to Henry Hodson, Reforms Commissioner to the Government of India, in his often obscure use of language: "No one would choose this way of becoming Viceroy if that were his ambition,"[94] meaning that one would not choose to become Viceroy to share power in a form of Cabinet Government.

His growing hostility was next given expression on April 5 in a threat to resign should Cripps "assume" or "appear to assume" the role of Governor General,[95] which was the role assumed by Heads of State in the Dominions. The threat to resign also was his response to Cripps' proposals involving the allocation of seats in the then-likely new National Government sent to Churchill on April 4.[96] But it was the Viceroy's next warning telegram, on

April 6, "that gave Churchill his cue . . . not to support but reduce the emissary who had gone to India with a brief to negotiate."[97]

Churchill's reaction, which marked the beginning of the end of the negotiations, followed his examination of Cripps' telegram to him on April 4. In it Cripps described the state of play in the negotiations and suggested that, in the matter of a *de facto* Cabinet, it was time to decide " . . . how far we are prepared to go on the chance of getting a settlement."[98] Two points made by Cripps in his summary of the situation had particularly attracted the attention of the Viceroy, who read all Cripps' communications and again alerted the Prime Minister on April 6. In the first point, Cripps referred to "the new arrangements whereby the Executive Council will approximate to a Cabinet . . . ." In the second point, he referred to " . . . the difficulties as to the apportionment of seats when the Viceroy comes to form his new Government . . . ."[99]

These references to Cabinet and the new Government point to the different meanings these terms had for Cripps and for Churchill and Linlithgow, who had not envisaged such terms being so freely used, as well as the Indian leaders, for whom references to a new government meant effective independence. Their different reactions, the hostility displayed by Linlithgow and taken up by Churchill, and the hopefulness of the nationalists played a decisive role in the Offer's failure.

Sir David Monteath, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for India, wrote an appraisal of the draft declaration for the India Committee before Cripps left for India. He argued that, because the draft concentrated on the future and dealt "without precision and only in very general terms" with the present, it "exposes surfaces for criticism." Therefore, his conclusion that "the Offer fails as a bait" to attract cooperation with the war effort in India predictably did not disturb the majority of the India Committee.[100] For Churchill and his support base, the appraisal was reassuring. Attlee and Cripps, however, relied on the imprecision of Clause (e), the final clause of the Offer that invited the immediate and effective participation of the Indian leaders in their own governance,[101] combined with Cripps' power to negotiate to achieve agreement.

Cripps had left for India with his powers to negotiate intact, a measure of Churchill's confidence that the Indian parties would not accept the Offer. His confidence lay in the fact that embedded in the Offer were conditions that were unacceptable to both Hindus and Muslims. Both groups knew what was at stake—that they were required to accept the Offer as a whole before it could be implemented—and Churchill relied on what he thought of as their usual differences to prevent their cooperation with each other.[102]

In the India Committee's view, the most obvious point of disagreement for the Congress Party, if compromise with Britain was not achieved, was that control of the defence of India was to remain in British hands. Indeed, as noted, Amery could write within days of Cripps' arrival in India that all communications pointed to the Congress Party turning the plan down,

using defence as the main ground for rejection.[103] Amery expressed this view despite the fact that Cripps had not yet entered into negotiations on the defence provisions in his Offer and may indicate Amery's knowledge that any negotiated agreement that moved away from the drafted offer would not be allowed to proceed.

The first substantial problem, however, arose when Linlithgow regretted his earlier support for his idea of a new National Government of India. It was a concept with which he had seemed quite comfortable during the discussion phase at the beginning of March, when he had proposed to Amery that the Viceroy's Executive Council be " . . . reconstructed on National Government lines. . . ."[104] He reaffirmed this view to Cripps within days of his arrival in India, before his threat to resign late in the first week of April.[105]

> At Cripps' first press conference, held on March 29, he confirmed that: The object of the scheme is to give the fullest measure of Government to the Indian people at the present time consistent with the possibilities of a constitution which cannot be changed until the end of the war.[106]

Linlithgow did not object at that time,[107] nor, at that point, did Churchill, and Cripps continued his discussions with the Indian leaders. The India Committee must have been aware of the direction he followed. Nonetheless, hostile reactions from Churchill and the War Cabinet were not received by Cripps until April 6.[108] Cripps' request for advice on "how far we are prepared to go"[109] to achieve a settlement forewarned the Government that agreement with the Congress Party might be unexpectedly close. In summarising the position on April 4, Cripps also had referred to a "new arrangement whereby the Executive Council will approximate to a Cabinet . . .,"[110] triggering the Viceroy's defensive reaction.

Cripps probably offered a form of Cabinet Government to the Congress Party in his first discussion with Azad on March 25, although he later denied having done so.[111] At that meeting, he gave Azad a statement including proposals for discussion. Azad recorded that the main proposal concerned restructuring the Viceroy's Executive Council, and he sought clarification from Cripps on the position of the Viceroy in his new Council. In Azad's record of their conversation, Cripps replied that the Viceroy would function as a constitutional head like the King in Britain and that power would rest with the Council as it did with Cabinet.[112] In his record of that interview,[113] Cripps was less specific about his discussion with Azad, noting that the only points in his statement that interested Azad at all were those concerning the immediate steps in the final clause of the Offer and that Azad had concentrated on the defence provisions.[114] It is hardly surprising that Azad would move on to the next matter of concern, the defence provisions, having been reassured, as he had stated in his record of the conversation, that the Viceroy's new Council would function like a Cabinet.

Cripps gave the same statement and proposals to Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League. He subsequently recorded that Jinnah did not raise any objection to Clause (e), " . . . provided the Viceroy would consult the Congress and himself on the composition of the Executive and would treat the Executive as a Cabinet rather than as the Executive according to the constitution."[115] Cripps' record of his interview with Jinnah, together with Azad's account of his interview, suggests that the nature of the new Government was probably discussed more fully with Azad than Cripps mentioned later.

The discussion about what had and had not been said became academic. Churchill's reply to Cripps' *de facto* Cabinet Government proposal derailed it. On April 6, after his communication with the Viceroy, Churchill informed Cripps that

> . . . the constitutional position of the Viceroy's Council, however its personnel may be changed or enlarged in pursuance of the invitation contained in (e) of the draft declaration, cannot be altered in present circumstances. The position is and must remain that the Viceroy in Council acts as a collective body responsible to the Secretary of State and subject to the Viceroy's special powers and duties. . . . [116]

Cripps' proposal did not involve a change to the constitution, but there is no indication that the model Cripps put forward was considered seriously by the India Committee or the War Cabinet, nor is there any evidence that a constitutional expert was consulted. Churchill's agenda was, in any case, better served by rejecting any form of Cabinet Government out of hand.

Coupland remained in India as Cripps' constitutional adviser and independent observer after completing his report on the political situation in India for Nuffield College and undoubtedly briefed Cripps on a form of Cabinet Government possible without constitutional change, an issue he addressed in his *Report*. Coupland reasoned that the extent to which the Viceroy's Council could operate as a Cabinet depended on the difference between *de jure* and *de facto*. That is, in law, the Viceroy's Council was different from the British Cabinet: Any change to its legal position, therefore, required a constitutional change. It could, however, act as a *de facto* Cabinet if its decisions approved by a majority of the Council were allowed and not over-ridden by the Viceroy.[117] The idea was both possible and workable, but documents on the public record do not suggest why Cripps did not pursue it further.

Coupland's *Report*, although complete in early 1942, was not published until 1944. When published, it revealed that two members of the Viceroy's Executive Council confirmed that, since the Council had been enlarged in 1941, the Viceroy had never vetoed a decision of the majority.[118] Linlithgow had, in practice, operated his Council as a *de facto* Cabinet. The secrecy surrounding Cripps' discussions with the Indian leaders may have left the Viceroy confident that his practice would not be commented on, or at least

not immediately, and Churchill's destruction of the Cabinet proposal went unchallenged from any quarter.

Linlithgow clearly had a change of heart when he realised that what he had done in practice would be formalised if Cripps' April 4 proposals were accepted. He had signalled his alarm about his position as Viceroy rather than his practice to Churchill on April 5,[119] and the next day he set out his theoretical position *vis-à-vis* his Council (which he had previously referred to as a new National Government) as he now saw it:

> There can however be no question of majority decisions of the Council being effective against the requirements of His Majesty's Government . . . it is essential that the position of the Executive Council should not be glozed [*sic*] over in any clarification of the offer. This is the more necessary because of popular references to an Indian Cabinet or National Government. The vital test of Cabinet Government, namely, responsibility to an Indian legislature, does not and cannot exist in the interim period. . . . [120]

Amery, fully aware of the direction of Cripps' negotiations as they affected the powers and composition of any interim government, supported Linlithgow, and, on April 6, he argued successfully to the India Committee that "paragraph (e) of the declaration did not envisage any fundamental change in the relations between the Viceroy and his Executive. . . ."[121]

Amery's carefully crafted words concealed the fact that any change might be a reversion to earlier practice where a majority decision by his Executive Council could be and had been blocked by the Viceroy.

The telegram to Cripps that followed began the breakdown of his negotiations. Cripps, reminded of the cable he received from the War Cabinet earlier on April 6,[122] was instructed by Amery that, on the powers of an interim government, "There should be no misunderstanding between you and the Indian political leaders on this point."[123] Cripps saw no alternative but to back down. The long-term result of the India Committee's decision was made clear by Azad when he rejected the Offer on behalf of the Congress Party on April 10. Azad reminded Cripps that he had realised from his proposal of March 25 that the new Council would effectively be a National Government operating as a *de facto* Cabinet.

> The new picture that you placed before us was not really very different from the old, the difference being one of degree and not of kind. The new government . . . would just be the Viceroy and the Executive Council with the Viceroy having all his old powers. . . . [124]

This outcome was not the one that Cripps had intended in his discussions with Azad and Jinnah on March 25.

Cripps' retraction left in the air the convention that normally a Governor General accepted the majority decision of his Council.[125] Linlithgow, as noted,

had observed this convention since the enlarging of his Council the previous year, but he was clearly opposed to the ramifications of its being formalised, which would reduce his powers. To refer again to Linlithgow's words, "There can however be no question of majority decisions of the Council being effective against the requirements of His Majesty's Government . . . ."

The Congress leaders reacted by demanding guarantees that his practice would not change if they accepted that part of the Offer. Cripps hoped that if he could extract such assurances the Congress Party might still agree to join the Government. Churchill, however, continued to see their demand as one for constitutional change, and he had decreed that no such changes would be made during the war. There the matter uneasily rested for a few more days.

Coupland, too late to have effect, acknowledged, "the tragic irony in Churchill's onslaught against Cripps's readiness to throw away the Viceroy's legal powers . . .," whereas Azad and Nehru complained of his "obdurate" defence of them.[126] After the collapse of the Offer, Coupland reflected that quasi-Cabinets of the sort proposed by Cripps also had worked successfully with the "tact and persuasion" of their Governors, in two Indian provinces where Congress Party Governments had been elected following the 1935 India Act.[127] Linlithgow's refusal to allow formal recognition of his practice and Churchill's preference for his stance over his emissary's chance of success were crucial steps in retarding further the long-drawn progression to independence and represented the "die-hard" conservative position that dominated the India Committee. Roosevelt was unaware at the time and for a further month of these behind-the-scenes machinations.

Despite the reversal over the powers of a new government, the negotiations continued after April 6, as Cripps remained hopeful that agreement could still be reached. He sought and received Churchill's approval to invite Azad and Nehru to talk over the defence provision in his Offer with Wavell, the Commander-in-Chief, with Churchill stating,

> as long as the Commander-in-Chief retains his position on the Viceroy's Council and as long as his existing control and direction of the defence of India are not in any way weakened, there is no objection in principle to the appointment by the Crown of a new Indian member on the Council to co-operate in the sphere of military organisation.[128]

Cripps' proposed initial amendments to the defence portfolio to meet Congress Party objections were discussed with Linlithgow. The amendments overcame the "snag" of "specifying the functions to be transferred from the Defence Department under a new Indian head, to the War Department" by a change in the way they were to be listed, emphasising those to be retained by the Defence Department.[129] This was followed by a new formula on defence, put together with the assistance of Johnson, who arrived in India on April 4 and immediately became involved in the discussions.[130]

As noted, the Cripps–Johnson formula emphasised India's responsibility by retaining the existing Defence Department under an Indian head, but it transferred some of the functions to a new War Department under Commander-in-Chief Wavell. Linlithgow signalled to Amery that he and Wavell were prepared to go along with the new formula given Linlithgow's correspondence referring to the importance of American opinion.[131] The formula was discussed with Nehru who found the draft acceptable.[132] But the Viceroy's sense that he had been bypassed, despite his agreement, provoked him to again make his feelings known to the War Cabinet.

Cripps and Johnson felt that they had found a way to allow the Congress Party to accept the draft declaration and come into the Government. Success was close until Cripps was again reined in by Churchill's War Cabinet: "It is essential to bring the whole matter [of defence] back to the Cabinet's plan which you went out to urge."[133] The understanding that Cripps was to negotiate with the Indian leaders again disappeared when it looked as if he might succeed.

Churchill destroyed Cripps' Offer and the draft declaration, discrediting the political rival who was his messenger and goading Nehru to a point where he risked his own political future. When the Congress Party rejected Cripps' Offer, the other Indian parties followed. Thus, Churchill achieved his objective: its rejection. What remained was to present the Mission's failure in the best possible propaganda light to Roosevelt and the American public, and this was made possible because British documents, recording Cripps' negotiations and setbacks, were not available to the President.

4 Britain
Preparation for Propaganda

Cripps' Offer was the lynchpin of the struggle to retain the Indian Empire in 1942 and was fought by British propaganda agencies. It assumed the proportions of a new "Great Game" in which Churchill was never sure of his ground and never sure about how much Roosevelt knew about the political disarray in India. Churchill utilised his home- and India-based propaganda Ministries and his Information Services in the United States to present its case against immediate self-government for India. Lord Halifax, British Ambassador in Washington and former Viceroy of India, used his considerable skills to promote Churchill's and the India Committee's argument that India should remain under its control. To do so, Britain's propaganda machine had to be rebuilt to protect and secure the interests of the British Raj.[1] In the tradition of the late 19th-century "Great Game," it became an ongoing enterprise.

Britain had ended the First World War with a finely tuned propaganda organisation, but it entered the Second World War with an ill-prepared propaganda structure, allowed to lapse in the intervening years. The Ministry of Information, which had been re-created as a shadow organisation in May 1938, became operational only on the declaration of war.[2] It then disseminated day-to-day news to the United States, allies, and other neutral countries and sought to educate public opinion along the lines of the Government's foreign policy and to ensure that government communications were "beneficial to the interests of the source."[3]

Truth in propaganda was considered important at the start of the Second World War because the effective First World War propaganda organisation acquired a tainted reputation in America, along with other aspects of the relationship between the two. This notion was particularly important because of the widely held belief that the United States had been duped into going to war on the Allied side in 1917. The intention in the early war years was that no pro-British propaganda should emerge from the Washington Embassy or the associated information services: that any official effort to influence Americans to look favourably on Britain's Second World War aims would be regarded as propaganda and therefore be counterproductive.[4] However, this idea changed as Roosevelt gradually loosened the stranglehold of isolationism and India became a pawn in securing Lend-Lease.

Kingsley Martin, editor of the *New Statesman,* was convinced at the beginning of the Second World War that there would "never again be any British propaganda designed to bring America into the war," and he also maintained that ". . . no propaganda is successful which is not based on truth."[5] The idea that propaganda should be based on truth is an interesting one taken up by a historian who pointed out that, during the First World War, British propaganda became associated with lies in public opinion. He concluded that British propaganda was, nonetheless, "a careful process of selection and omission [which] never assumed the proportion of the whole truth."[6] Martin's judgment was borne out by Alfred Duff Cooper, briefly Minister of Information in 1940–1941. In describing his practical approach to propaganda, he stated that he "sought never to distort or minimise the truth but to keep it in proper proportion to the whole."[7]

The British case against Indian self-government in 1942 was similarly constructed in a process of selection and omission that convinced majority opinion in the United States that there was no alternative government for India. Roosevelt, who had his own sources of information, remained alert to Churchill's propaganda game.

Returning to his idea that the more truthful propaganda is the more successful it will be, Martin proposed that propaganda in neutral countries, such as the United States, may safely be trusted to the "friends of democracy" in such countries.[8] Churchill, however, could not rely on Roosevelt to put the British case on India to the American public. The reverse always seemed more likely.

Censorship was the natural companion of propaganda. A justification of Britain's censorship rules was sent to Washington by the Government of India's Information and Broadcasting Department for use in discussions or for information if the issue emerged in the public domain. In relation to censorship of material entering India, it was explained that "straight" news, however bad, was not to be suppressed, but that opinion that could be misrepresented or that distorted news would be. For use in press releases, it was further explained that every noncoded word telegraphed out of India, likely to be critical of the Government, was picked up by the enemy and used as propaganda in broadcasts back to India. Censorship of material leaving India, nevertheless, was slight. News and "fair comment" were not restricted. If censorship was applied, correspondents were given the opportunity to discuss the ruling.[9] This reassurance was misleading. Josselyn Hennessy, in charge of publicity at the Washington embassy, warned Sir Frederick Hale Puckle, Secretary of the Government of India's Department of Information, that, because of the political situation in India, "both press and public will regard [the] severity of censorship as evidence that the authorities in India have much to conceal."[10]

There is no indication that the Government of India relaxed its censorship rules. Indeed, the United States complained of censorship of

newspaper reports in September 1942, and some months afterwards an American news bureau was set up in New Delhi.[11]

The propaganda campaign that Britain undertook in the United States came from a substantial organisation. In the five-way process by which the propaganda line on India was developed between the Ministry of Information, the Foreign Office, the India Office, the Government of India and the Washington Embassy, the nerve-centre in London was the hub.

The idea of re-establishing the Ministry of Information and its overseas information services developed from a subcommittee of the Imperial Defence Committee that met during 1935 to examine the question of censorship in any future war. It was suggested that a system for issuing and controlling news should be considered jointly among all interested groups, and a report was later submitted to the Foreign Office. It proposed an organisation that would, in principle, after a declaration of war, distribute all information presenting the national case in both Britain and other countries. Following a series of redesigns and changes in top-level staff, the Ministry eventually emerged by 1940 in similar shape to the 1935 proposal, with five areas of operation targeted, including the United States.[12]

The Ministry of Information was not the only propaganda organisation operating in Britain at the outbreak of war. In 1934, the Foreign Office established the British Council, a peacetime establishment that continued to function during and after the war. Its purpose was to promote cultural propaganda, which was generally defined as including national aims, achievements, traditions, and lifestyle.[13] The view that its role was to promote Britain's friendship with neutral countries prevailed, and it was not brought under Government control nor officially used as a vehicle for war-time propaganda. However, the Vansittart Committee, convened in 1938, promoted cooperation among the British Council, the British Broadcasting Company (BBC), and the Ministry of Information after it was reactivated, blurring the Council's distinct role.[14]

In exploring the connections between people in high-government posts connected with propaganda and India, it is interesting that Lord Lloyd, Chairman of the British Council from 1937 until his death in 1941, had been a Governor of Bombay. Lloyd, along with Churchill, was one of the most vigorous opponents of Prime Minister Baldwin's 1935 India Act.[15] Brendan Bracken, Churchill's former Parliamentary Secretary who became Minister of Information in 1941, also supported Churchill in opposition to political reform in India.[16] Bracken's role firmly allied him with Churchill, putting an anti-Indian self-government triumvirate briefly at the centre of the propaganda output.

The BBC also retained its independence, although it did cooperate with the Foreign Office and various other ministries involved in war-time propaganda.[17] During the Munich crisis, for example, it responded with broadcasts to Europe in French and German, as well as English. When war broke

out, the BBC entered into an informal agreement with the Government to conform to official policy on the release and interpretation of news.

Despite its nominal independence, briefing the BBC became the responsibility of the Ministry of Information. This arrangement did not work well. Too many people in the Ministry, and members of other departments who sought unofficially to influence it, supplied often-conflicting information.[18] The attempted resolution of this problem by Brendan Bracken, after he became Minister in July 1941, merely caused another. He appointed a Foreign Adviser and a Home Adviser to the BBC who were to be the sole channels of information from the Ministry. They were immediately suspected of being part of a Government push to take control of the BBC,[19] which had an ongoing effect on the relationship between the Ministry and the broadcaster.

The Ministry's Foreign Adviser, Ivone Kirkpatrick,[20] had full responsibility for ensuring that the BBC's overseas services represented "the interests of the source" when making propaganda broadcasts,[21] including the Empire Service, primarily, but not exclusively, aimed at expatriates.[22] Also part of the BBC network was All-India Radio. K. C. Sharma, a one-time Director, records that the struggle for self-government had little support from it and that the "BBC did not miss an opportunity to project the seamy side of our people and polity."[23] Although the BBC maintained its independence while accepting guidance from the Ministry of Information, Sharma also records that the External Services were virtually a limb of the Foreign Office, promoting imperial rather than democratic views.[24]

All-India Radio had a chequered history. After an uncertain start in 1927, it was closed down by the Government of India in October 1931 beause it was run at a considerable loss. It was revived in 1932, however, funded by customs receipts and amendments to the Indian Tariff Amendment Act, which increased the duty levied on receivers, enabling it to survive.[25]

When Amery informed Linlithgow in May 1942 that the BBC was running discussions on India, giving both British and Indian points of view, the Viceroy, in an ungenerous mood, responded that, had he been consulted, he would have opposed them.[26] Linlithgow was even more incensed to learn that Cripps was taking an active interest in the broadcasts and, indeed, proposed that they should be repeated in India. Linlithgow also was vehemently opposed to Cripps' alternative suggestion that Indian representative speakers, such as Nehru and Jinnah, be given time on All-India Radio, followed by a neutral summing up of their talks. He rejected Cripps' idea that the propaganda result would be good and continued:

> I doubt if Cripps really understands what the position is out here . . . I am perfectly clear myself as to the grave disadvantages of encouraging political leaders to make statements on the wireless . . . the less we talk and fuss about India the better from all points of view. . . . [27]

Amery, backing away from expected hostility from the Viceroy, justified his support of the BBC broadcasts in Britain:

> . . . it seemed desirable to take advantage of current interest in India here to try to educated [the] ordinary listener . . . I am trying to ensure that [the] British case gets a good show, and I think that the general impression produced on the public will be that nobody in India can agree on anything.[28]

The last remark was a reference to the communal tension that Churchill saw as "a pillar of the Raj" and was fundamental to his argument that no political reform would be made without the agreement of the Muslims and other substantial minority groups.[29]

Although Roosevelt was well aware of this argument, Linlithgow's reference to censorship revealed the reasons for his opposition to Indian nationalists having air-time on All-India Radio. In stating also that Indian speakers "would certainly not submit to censorship,"[30] his fear was that American journalists in India would relay the content of the broadcasts to the United States, undermining the propaganda reasons for the failure of Cripps' Offer.

In February 1938, a Committee for the Coordination of British Publicity Abroad was created under the Chairmanship of Sir Robert Vansittart to coordinate existing propaganda machinery. Not in itself a propaganda organisation (its role was advisory), the Vansittart Committee gave propaganda a high profile in senior government circles and established its role in Britain and overseas, including the United States.[31] The Committee's influence owed much to Vansittart's reputation, established during his time as Permanent Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office from 1930 to 1938 and Chief Diplomatic Adviser from 1938 to 1941.

One recommendation of his Committee, implemented progressively from 1938, was that press and public relations departments should be attached to Ministries and Missions to "project" Britain at home and overseas.[32] Another recommendation was that the Foreign Office should expand its peace-time propaganda activities while preparing to transfer all overseas propaganda activities, except to enemy or enemy-occupied countries, to the Ministry of Information. If war broke out, the Ministry was to take responsibility for policy, content, and presentation.[33]

The fact that the Ministry of Information did not generate its own news, but was dependent on the often uncooperative Foreign Office and the Service Departments, hampered its operation.[34] Despite its brief to hand overseas propaganda to the Ministry at the outbreak of war, the Foreign Office had done "everything in its power to emasculate the Ministry."[35] Ronald Tree recorded from his first-hand experience in the Ministry as Parliamentary Private Secretary to successive Ministers, that the Foreign Office wanted full control of all news distribution. Sir Walter Monckton, Director

General of the Ministry of Information, noted in March 1941 that "we are flopping badly in foreign propaganda" and laid the blame with the Foreign Office, which jealously protected its preserve.[36] The Service Departments, too, protected their war news, using the Ministry "as a post office for a lot of unreadable and stuffy material." As a result, it became a target in both the House of Commons and in the British and American press, unfairly accused of not supplying up-to-date material.[37]

While the principles and objectives on which British propaganda rested were recognised clearly, that is, to educate public opinion along the lines of the Government's foreign policy and to promote British interests, the reality was that the actual dissemination of news and the accompanying interpretations lagged. From the beginning of the war, correspondents gathered daily at the Ministry for press releases that gave them little to write about.[38]

The Ministry also had some teething problems. The initial turnover of Ministers and senior staff was high, but stabilised in July 1941, when Churchill asked his Parliamentary Secretary, Brendan Bracken, to become Minister. He succeeded Alfred Duff Cooper, while Cyril Radcliffe (who later became the Boundary Commissioner, who divided Pakistan from India in 1947) succeeded Walter Monckton as Director General. The Bracken–Radcliffe partnership ran the Ministry of Information in 1942.

The succession of Ministers of Information from 1939 to Bracken's appointment in July 1941 was a combination of poor selection and inadequate performance. The first Minister, Baron Hugh Macmillan, sat in the House of Lords and so was unable to answer questions and criticism in the House of Commons. By the end of the year, Macmillan had "convinced his colleagues that he was not the man for the job."[39] In January 1940, Sir John Reith, director general of the BBC, was appointed, and a seat was found for him in the House of Commons.[40] Ronald Tree, a Conservative Member of Parliament between 1933 and 1945 who had already reported on Britain's information services in the United States for Macmillan, was asked by R. A. (Rab) Butler, Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, to monitor Reith, who had no political experience. Tree was appointed Reith's Parliamentary Private Secretary, a position he occupied with successive ministers. An American by birth, he was given charge of the Ministry's American Division in London.[41]

The latter role was particularly important because, Tree records, there was little knowledge among Government members about the United States and little communication between the two countries at a political level,[42] confirming the on–off state of Anglo-American relations between the wars. In support of this argument, Tree was able to demonstrate that Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary from 1935 to 1938, first visited the United States in 1938, whereas most of Neville Chamberlain's Ministers did not go there at all.[43] The exceptions were Churchill and Bracken, who visited America regularly.

Between the wars, American isolationism resulted in its withdrawal from Europe, whereas Britain saw its interests in Europe and the Empire. During

the 1930s, there were only two full-time British journalists in Washington, and their reporting of American politics was scant.[44] Harold Laski, Professor of Political Science at the London School of Economics,[45] promoted some understanding of American politics during the 1930s. However, it was not until 1937 that this policy oversight was acknowledged, when Kingsley Martin expressed regret that American politics were not given more weight in Britain.[46]

Finally, in 1939, the Labour Party asked the Government to establish closer contact with the United States. During the 1930s, British conservatives felt that America was a rival rather than a partner, especially where their interests clashed in Asia, and no community of interest was envisaged in the interwar years. The United States Neutrality Acts and the British policy of appeasement in Europe emphasised their political separateness. Chamberlain rejected an overture of cooperation by Roosevelt in 1938, an act of folly recognised by Anthony Eden that fuelled his decision to resign as Foreign Secretary. His resignation resulted in Halifax's appointment until Churchill sent him to Washington as Ambassador following Lord Lothian's death at the end of 1940. Halifax had no interest in the United States and initially regarded his posting as banishment.[47]

Tree's appointment to the Ministry's American Division was appropriate. Originally from the United States, he had settled in England and became a Conservative back-bencher between the wars. The American Division was staffed by people described by Tree as capable, but reduced to sending newspaper items to the British Information Service in New York and filing equivalent clippings from the United States.[48] Tree's section head was Sir Frederick Whyte, an ex-Indian civil servant appointed by Lord Lothian before he went to Washington as British Ambassador in 1939. Whyte's brief was not to interfere with Lothian's policy: "No propaganda: only information and as little as possible of that."[49]

Lothian, who had been Under-Secretary of State for India in 1931 and 1932 and was therefore familiar with Churchill's opposition to constitutional reform for India, was determined, as Ambassador, not to be called a propagandist and not to allow his Embassy to be used for propaganda purposes.[50] Lothian's anti-propagandist attitude stemmed from Britain's First World War reputation, and he had no intention of repeating his Embassy's earlier mistakes. His policy was, in any case, required by American legislation. The Senate's Foreign Agents Registration Act in 1938 required the registration of all overseas propaganda organisations operating in the United States.

Lothian's anti-propaganda conviction, however, may have been one of convenience and bluff. He welcomed the 1940 appointment of Richard Casey as Australian Minister in Washington and recorded that, "There are many things that an Australian Minister can say or do . . . which a British Minister cannot."[51] Historian Carl Bridge has postulated that the Menzies government allowed the Australian Legation to be used by the British "as

a conduit for covert political activities" that included propaganda, which argued the British case alongside the Australian.[52]

In Britain, Reith had taken over a Ministry staffed by undistinguished civil servants and "brilliant amateurs,"[53] historians and writers, among whom were poet John Betjeman[54]; Isaiah Berlin, the Oxford philosopher who became part of the propaganda organisation in the United States, and Sir Harold Nicolson, a former member of the Foreign Office and a Labour Member of Parliament from 1935 to 1945. Nicholson became a Parliamentary Secretary to the next Minister of information, Duff Cooper. This group of brilliant amateurs produced much of the anti-Indian self-government propaganda.

Reith set out to make the Ministry perform. His first initiative was to produce a Cabinet Paper entitled, "Notes on the Principles and Aims of Propaganda," in which he argued that there was no point in having a Ministry of Information if it was not allowed to inform.[55] The principles argued in Reith's paper were approved by the Cabinet, but not implemented until Churchill became Prime Minister and not by Reith. He had fallen foul of Churchill in the 1930s, refusing to give him air time on the BBC to talk about the political situation in India, and he was not retained as a Minister.[56]

Duff Cooper was Churchill's first appointment as Minister of Information, and Tree stayed on as his Private Parliamentary Secretary and adviser on the American operation. Harold Nicolson became Duff Cooper's Parliamentary Secretary, but the new appointments were not a success. Duff Cooper's impression was that the organisation and the staff were unmanageable:

> On the day of the outbreak [of war] the vast machine came into existence and 999 officials sprang to their office chairs. The result was formidable. A monster had been created, so large, so voluminous, so amorphous, that no single man could cope with it . . . Ex-ambassadors and retired Indian Civil Servants abounded, the brightest ornaments of the Bar were employed on minor duties, distinguished men of letters held their pens at the monster's service. . . . [57]

This was again a reference to the writers, former India hands and retired diplomats who contributed to Churchill's propaganda on India. Duff Cooper was constantly frustrated by the Foreign Office and the Service Ministries over inadequate news coverage, having failed to persuade them to release detailed news promptly despite Reith's paper. He also failed to regain the trust of members of the press, whom he disliked,[58] after he attempted to introduce a system of compulsory newspaper censorship when he first took office in mid-1940.[59] Harold Nicolson, in turn, also failed as Parliamentary Secretary, unable to withstand the barrage of hostile questions to which the Ministry was still subject in the House of Commons.[60] He was not offered another post by Churchill and felt it was because he was "dispensable," not "formidable."[61] Much of his time was occupied by writing, including his

weekly "Marginal Comment" in the *Spectator* and book reviews for the *Daily Telegraph*.[62] On India, Nicolson had "a feeling that we are wrong," and he felt enraged that the Cabinet had not listened to Leo Amery a year ago, at the time of the August Offer, and did not give India Dominion Status then.[63] He was not the man to have in Churchill's camp.

Duff Cooper resigned in June 1941, but he had made some useful changes. Frederick Whyte, appointed by Lothian, was removed from the American Division and replaced by journalist Douglas Williams of the *Daily Telegraph,* who knew America well. Duff Cooper had sent Ronald Tree to the United States for a second time in March 1941 to set up a British Information Service, separate from the existing British Library in New York.

Tree's task was not made any easier by Alan Dudley, who was appointed to Washington by the Foreign Office early in the war "to clamp down on anything that smacked of propaganda"[64] and was reluctant to face a shift on propaganda policy. Despite this, he became head of the British Information Service when much of Tree's report was implemented.[65] A breakthrough was the appointment of Robin Cruickshank as Press Attaché to the Embassy. He was editor of the London evening newspaper, the *Star,*[66] and established an immediate rapport with the American press,[67] providing a conduit for publication of the propaganda material. He was joined at the Embassy by Josselyn Hennessy, appointed in January 1942 as Information Officer to the Indian Agent-General and the Government of India's "publicity man" in Washington.[68] In 1936, at the start of Linlithgow's Viceroyalty, Hennessy had been appointed Director of the Government of India's Bureau of Public Information on the grounds that, as a journalist, he could best serve the interests of Churchill's campaign.[69] Hennessy was remembered unfavourably in India. The *Bombay Sentinel* held him responsible for the "great similarity of views" expressed in the American and British press, relayed to India, recording that "no doubt Mr. Hennessy is extremely active in his new sphere of work."[70] Hennessy proved to be invaluable in promoting Britain's propaganda case in Washington against immediate Indian independence.

Churchill called on Beaverbrook, Minister of Information during the First World War, to advise him on a successor for Duff Cooper. Beaverbrook supported Brendan Bracken, who reluctantly accepted the appointment, expecting that he would shortly join the "happy band of ex-Ministers of Information."[71] Bracken's somewhat mysterious Irish background has been thoroughly investigated by his biographers. Boyle's assessment is apt:

> If Bracken had been honest with himself, he would have gone down on bended knees to thank the Prime Minister for offering a post so perfectly suited to his peculiar array of talents.[72]

Bracken's talents remain elusive. He thwarted would-be biographers by arranging that all his private papers be destroyed within twenty-four hours of his death. Boyle, one of Bracken's biographers, was interested in him for thirty

years, but never fully penetrated the mystery that was Bracken's trademark.[73] His inventiveness about his early years in Ireland and then Australia created uncertainties about his background and education. Bracken's greatest talent as far as Churchill was concerned may have been his chameleon-like ability to adapt convincingly.

Bracken brought several advantages to the Ministry, one of the greatest being that he was Churchill's like-minded friend and confidant and had supported the Prime Minister's opposition to reform for India in the 1930s. He was never ignored by the Prime Minister's colleagues. Thus, he was able to overcome his predecessors' main problem: access to and some control over sources of news. A first step to reduce friction between the Ministries concerned with propaganda was to meet weekly with Eden, still the Foreign Secretary, and Dalton, Minister of Economic Warfare. This triumvirate was partly successful in its sharing arrangements. However, because Dalton had his own propaganda apparatus (the Foreign Office did not), he was the greater challenge for Bracken.[74] At this time, the Foreign Office cooperated with the new Minister, the Government of India, the India Office, and the Washington Embassy in the preparation of the propaganda case against Indian self-government.

The newspapers also welcomed Bracken's appointment. Journalists were on his side, and he was a press man himself. Good relations with the press were important to him, and this notion was extended to American journalists, many of whom he already knew.[75] Thus, the assembled team, including Cruickshank and Hennessy, was ideal to penetrate the American press.

Bracken's affection for the United States and knowledge of its politics were of great value to the Prime Minister. Bracken was keenly aware of Britain's dual agenda in America, which made him ideally suited to oversee the presentation of British interests there. In 1943, Beaverbrook mischievously proposed that Bracken would have immediate and immense success as "British Ambassador . . . in place of Halifax."[76]

The Ministry of Information appreciated that propagandists must be skilful, giving arguments the appearance of objective discussion and raising and answering objections that were likely to occur to listeners. Thus, it was less likely that "untrue" statements would be challenged especially if the propagandist was respected, authoritative, and had the means to reach the target audience,[77] circumventing Lee and Lee's propaganda-detecting methodology.[78] Although Halifax certainly had the means to be heard through his Embassy's media networks, the reasons for his appointment as Ambassador in Washington were clouded by Churchill's agenda.

Halifax was the first Foreign Secretary to relinquish that post for an Ambassadorship.[79] While seeing Halifax as fundamentally unsuited for the Washington Embassy, his recent biography suggests several reasons that Churchill insisted on Halifax's appointment to the United States.

First, like Cripps, Halifax was a potential threat to the Prime Minister's leadership because he had had Prime Minister Chamberlain's support,

although that threat ended with Chamberlain's death in 1940. Second, it may have been part of a strategy to push supporters of appeasement away from the centre of Government. Conspiracy theorists accused Halifax both of plotting against Churchill and preferring a negotiated peace.[80] Third, Churchill wanted to restore Eden to the Foreign Office. Halifax became Foreign Secretary when Eden resigned over Chamberlain's rebuff of Roosevelt in 1938, and Roberts suggests that Halifax was less malleable as Foreign Secretary than Eden.[81] Halifax suspected that Beaverbrook might have given Churchill the idea to appoint him to Washington. Halifax knew that Beaverbrook was critical of him and that Churchill often took his advice. Beaverbrook's 1943 suggestion to Churchill that Bracken would be a more appropriate Ambassador for the United States[82] was typically manipulative, but did not, in that case, succeed.

Moving Halifax to Washington effectively removed him from the centre of decision making for the rest of the war and out of any appeasement afterglow. There was another reason. Churchill may well have recalled that they were on opposite sides over India, that his opposition to the Gandhi–Irwin pact in 1928 put him outside mainstream politics for a decade. As Viceroy, Halifax (then Lord Irwin) negotiated an agreement with what Churchill called "the forces of subversion In India . . . ."[83] He persuaded the British government to declare in 1928 that Dominion Status was the ultimate aim for India. Churchill had retreated to the back bench in protest against this move, potentially putting India on a par with other British self-governing states, such as Australia and Canada. He remained out of office until the start of the Second World War.

In a link with Cripps' 1942 Offer, Halifax, when Viceroy, had first raised the possibility of a *de facto* Cabinet Government in India to counteract the slow pace of constitutional reform. In relation to the Central Government, he proposed that, although the then-Viceroy's executive could not be constitutionally responsible to the Council in New Delhi, "the Viceroy could ensure that as far as possible his Cabinet was responsive to it."[84] Ironically, Halifax's later propaganda in the United States involved denying that Cripps had made a similar offer to the Congress Party.

Despite their ideological differences over India that had spanned a quarter of a century, Halifax represented faithfully, although occasionally clumsily, the Churchill–Linlithgow version of events in 1942. In this context, Halifax may have been the best appointment for Washington. Although Churchill vehemently opposed his new Ambassador's former India policy, in propaganda terms, Halifax, known widely to be sympathetic to Indian political aspirations, was invaluable in his measured presentations of Britain's ongoing responsibilities to India. In another context, however, Halifax seemed a most unsuitable appointment. He abhorred the idea of going to Washington, which he called an "odious thought."[85] Like other Conservative Members of Parliament, he had visited the United States only once and had no knowledge of nor interest in it and no sympathy with the people.[86]

He had little regard for the media, was a Tory aristocrat, and had been Foreign Secretary during the Munich crisis.[87] In this particular context, less appropriate credentials are difficult to imagine, and indeed in Britain his appointment was considered a risk for Anglo-American relations at a time when they were crucial: Aid for Britain and maintenance of its imperial agenda were at stake. But despite his own misgivings and those of pro-British elements in Washington, Halifax established adequate relations with Roosevelt's senior advisers, although he always felt that the President was "too beholden to the vagaries of American public opinion."[88]

With Halifax in Washington as a high-profile Ambassador, the British Information Service in the United States was modernised following Tree's recommendations. Its functions were to provide British *information,* a less pejorative word than *propaganda,* to the American press and radio, and to produce a survey of American opinion for use by the Ministry of Information, the Foreign Office, and the Washington Embassy. When America entered the war at the end of 1941, a Survey Section was attached to the Embassy. Its responsibility was to analyse and interpret congressional, administrative, and public opinion and to weigh its influence on groups and individuals in general, and in Washington in particular. The information gathered was used in propaganda disseminated in the United States to counteract opinions most damaging to Britain, such as speculation about future war debts and the selling of equipment supplied under the Lend-Lease arrangement. The Survey Section's weekly political summaries were generally drafted by Isaiah Berlin and delivered to the Embassy's Head of Chancery, who showed parts of the summaries to various officers who might suggest omission or alteration. This notion is reminiscent of Duff Cooper's approach to truth in propaganda. Halifax occasionally added his own remarks.[89]

Halifax also sent annual political reviews to the Foreign Secretary at the end of 1940, 1941, and 1942 (after which they became quarterly reviews). The 1942 review of relations with India gave an account of the widespread criticism of British policy and recorded that the hostile press reports were dealt with more effectively after a publicity unit was set up for Bajpai, the Indian Agent-General in Washington.[90] The unit was led by Hennessy, which put another piece of the propaganda organisation in place.

Tree's first examination of British information centres in the United States, at Macmillan's request in 1939, showed that such information as was distributed came from the British Library, a small office in The Rockefeller Center in New York. A relic of the First World War, it was headed by Angus Fletcher, who had been the librarian for many years. Alan Dudley, then a junior Foreign Office clerk, was added to his staff in 1939.[91] Tree was amazed that Lothian had been afraid that the Library might be seen as a front for propaganda. So ineffectual was it that, "If the British Government intended to prove to the world that it had no intention of propagandising . . . in the United States, it could not have done a better job."[92] Halifax,

however, wrote in his 1942 review of British publicity in the United States that, "Early recognition of the need to avoid the stigma of propaganda in its pejorative sense paid . . . dividends."[93] It allowed his new propaganda organisation to begin operations with a record untarnished during the first two years of the war.

Outside New York and Washington, Tree found that there were no functioning British information centres. Even in Chicago, the home of the isolationist movement, the British Consul did nothing to counteract its arguments, promulgated virtually daily by Colonel McCormick through his newspaper, the *Tribune*. Despite the recommendation of the Vansittart Report, no British press or publicity officers had been appointed to British Consulates. Needing inspiration for his report, Tree sought the advice of novelist John Buchan. He had worked on propaganda in the United States with Lord Northcliffe, who had preceded Lord Beaverbrook as head of the First World War Ministry of Information. Since 1939, Buchan, then Lord Tweedsmuir, had been Governor-General of Canada and a valuable source of insights on the successful dissemination of propaganda.[94]

Tree's report and recommendations to Macmillan were put on hold until Duff Cooper was appointed Minister of Information. Duff Cooper sent him to America again in March 1941 to re-examine his recommendations in the light of the Minister's decision to set up a British Information Service independent of the British Library. Tree found that a start had been made on building a propaganda organisation in New York and Washington, but nothing had been done to establish press or publicity offices elsewhere. He proposed an expansion of the Information Service to Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles; the immediate appointment of press agents; and a recruitment program to find suitable staff.[95] At the end of 1942, Halifax was able to report that the propaganda organisation had expanded rapidly, with the policymaking centre at the Washington Embassy; the main centre of operations in New York; branch offices in Washington, Chicago, and San Francisco; and Consulates across the country being organised for publicity exercises.[96]

Sir Gerald Campbell was initially appointed to head the new British Information Service. In Tree's view, he was a poor choice. He had been Consul General in New York from 1931 to 1938, but had no experience in publicity, propaganda, or press relations; far from diminishing the dissatisfaction of the information-starved American press, he increased it.[97] Tree advised that Campbell needed an experienced person who was known to and trusted by the American press to work under him and proposed David Bowes-Lyon,[98] who was head of the Ministry of Economic Warfare's Press Section. However, continuing problems between Eden and Dalton in Britain led to his rejection by the Foreign Office "because he was not one of their own men."[99] But Campbell was assigned two assistants who met with Tree's approval. Both had volunteered to work at the British Library at the beginning of the war.

The first assistant was Aubrey Morgan, whose American wife's family had introduced him to leading columnists and editors, valuable contacts for the Information Service. The second was John Wheeler-Bennett, an historian who had worked in the League of Nations publicity organisation in the 1920s. After some years in Germany, where he fell foul of the Nazis,[100] he became a lecturer in International Law at the University of Virginia, moving to the British Library in 1939. Not long after he became Minister of Information, Bracken moved Campbell to the Washington Embassy. He appointed Alan Dudley to lead the Information Service, with Morgan and Wheeler-Bennett effectively directing operations.[101]

Tree also had recommended a program of visiting lecturers to promote Britain's interests in America and to increase public support. Bracken was as familiar as Tree with the President's preference for being pushed into action by public opinion, but in this instance, he disagreed with Tree. He believed that pro-British American journalists like Vincent Sheean (who had accompanied Gandhi on his Salt March in 1930), Roy Howard, Dorothy Thompson, and Helen Kirkpatrick could do more to influence Roosevelt than a clear propaganda message from visiting Britons.[102] The value of using American journalists was also picked up and taken further by Halifax in February 1942, when American pressure on Britain again increased.[103]

The summaries of American press opinion passed on by the Embassy and the Information Service alerted the Ministry of Information, the Foreign Office, the India Office, and the Government of India to swings in public opinion toward the Indian position. Lothian had fielded questions about constitutional change and nationalist politics in India since the resignation of the Congress Party Provincial Governments at the start of the war and the August 1940 Offer of limited political reform, which was unacceptable to nationalist Indians. His standard reply, sent as advice to Halifax by the Ministry of Information in February 1942, was not helpful. Lothian answered all questions on India in the same way: that the Indian provinces enjoyed about the same amount of autonomy under the 1935 India Act as did provinces in Canada or states in America. More relevant material was required. On February 17, Halifax asked the India Office for information on Indian military strength and the state of preparation for war.[104] Berlin followed up in his weekly summary of February 26 that comments on the proportion of the Indian army to the country's total manpower would be useful publicity.[105]

The search for general, nonpolitical information about India, however, was overtaken at the end of the month by preparation for the India Committee's offer of reform that Cripps would negotiate with the Indian leaders.

Halifax, through his staff, regularly consulted his colleagues in Britain and India about the lead-up, progress, and collapse of Cripps' negotiations. The propaganda line to be taken, and the timing and content of press releases were the subject of constant communications, as were the occasional fires that had to be contained: unexpected questions from

Roosevelt's Administration about censorship, for example, and its application to American journalists in India.

Building profiles of subordinate staff working on the British propaganda case against Indian independence has proved difficult. Their Ministers' names are usually associated with major historical events, but little has been found to identify staff below the Parliamentary Secretary level. Files at the Public Records Office have yielded surnames and an occasional initial, but there seems to be a conspiracy of silence among diarists and raconteurs about their generally nameless staff. Ronald Tree is the most informative, and dictionaries of biography have been of some assistance with tracking such staff usually selected because of familiarity with Churchillian British–Indian policy.

Halifax's personal assistant was Charles Peake. He had been the Foreign Office representative at the Ministry of Information. Robin Cruickshank was his Press Attaché, and Josselyn Hennessy was the Government of India's press agent in Washington. He also was the Information Officer for the Indian Agent-General there and had spent some years at the Information Department in New Delhi. His opposite numbers in Britain were Darvall at the Ministry of Information, Butler[106] at the Foreign Office, and Alec Joyce, Adviser on Publicity to the Secretary of State for India. Joyce had a long Indian career behind him in a number of government posts during the 1930s, was awarded an Order of the British Empire (O.B.E.) in 1938, and became a Commander of the Indian Empire (C.I.E.) in 1943. Sir Frederick Hale Puckle, Knight Commander of the Indian Empire (K.C.I.E.), was Secretary of the Government of India's Department of Information. He also had many years of political service in India. The propaganda case against Indian self-government was thus constructed by men well versed in Churchillian attitudes toward India.

An early Halifax initiative to favourably influence the President and American opinion was the appointment of Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai as Agent-General for India when the establishment of an American Mission in New Delhi was negotiated. Bajpai was a former member of the Viceroy's Executive Council who demonstrated, by virtue of his past and present roles, Indian influence within the leadership of British India. Like the other Indian members of the Viceroy's Council, Bajpai was not a member of a political party. In return for his appointment to Washington and as part of the arrangement to make India a direct beneficiary under Lend-Lease, Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles also achieved their objective, representation in New Delhi by Louis Johnson, giving the United States access to the Government of India and the Indian political leaders for the first time.[107]

In a communication to the India Office, Halifax, while confirming his confidence in Bajpai, worried about the risk that the United States Government might deal exclusively with him and "overlook the interests of His Majesty's Government."[108] After discussion at the India Office, it was decided that the propaganda value of the extension of Bajpai's role

"should do much to impress on official minds . . . that India enjoys a very considerable degree of autonomy," and because he "seems to be a man of good sense," there should be no adverse consequences.[109] Indeed, Bajpai's reports to Halifax of his interviews frequently gave a new dimension to the Embassy's understanding of the United States' thinking and allowed timely adjustments to the propaganda direction.

Following the fall of Singapore, Halifax informed the India Office on February 17, 1942. that his immediate propaganda aims were to publicise India's war effort to "counter hostile influences," which suggested that Britain was "lying back" and leaving America to cope with the war in that theatre.[110] He also intended to repeat India's historical and constitutional position at every opportunity to demonstrate Britain's ongoing responsibilities there. He saw this as a means of promoting American understanding of Britain's position in the short term and laying the foundations for postwar Anglo-American understanding.[111] This idea was vitally important because the American press insinuated that British prestige "has never been so low here" and "all criticisms end with and what about India [*sic*]."[112] Press statements about Cripps' Offer were still some days ahead, and there was no positive and new publicity material to influence public opinion. To get Halifax's message across and to prepare for the Cripps' releases, Hennessy sent Joyce a list of the main channels through which he proposed that propaganda would be directed.

The document can be seen as a wish list because there is no later information about how many of the outlets he referred to were often or generally used. Hennessy referred to probable access to nine hundred radio stations and, out of an unknown total, some thirty-two commentators presumed sympathetic to the British view of India and who were heard by an estimated forty-six million people on any one night. The source of his statistical data is not recorded. Hennessy also referred to a figure of twelve thousand newspapers and journals, again unnamed, and thirty-six "reputable" columnists.[113] With the help of Tree's recommendations, it can be assumed that the columnists included Dorothy Thompson, Helen Kirkpatrick, Roy Howard, and Vincent Sheean. Anne O'Hare McCormick,[114] whose "Abroad" column in the *New York Times* was usually supportive of the British position despite her generally anti-colonialist stance, and Raymond Daniell of the *New York Times'* London-based contingent, may also be included.

Hennessy's list, if it did nothing else, demonstrated the potential range of the propaganda push. His game plan was to use and further develop personal contacts to gain additional radio and newspaper cover and to distribute illustrated pamphlets and press releases to the broader community. In the Ministry of Information's terms, Halifax had the means to be heard.

Hennessy went on to signal that films, such as the propaganda films made by the Government of India, "would not (repeat not) be suitable here." Such films, used in overseas news broadcasts, showed, in the main, contented Indian workers responding to imperial priorities in factories and on

military exercises.[115] Hennessy probably assessed that they were not appropriate for an American public beginning to hear about the lack of development in Indian industry and India's lack of involvement in its own defence strategy. Hennessy also raised again the idea of lecturers from Britain who could be "fed raw materials," but that idea had lost favour with Bracken.

Hennessy listed the staff necessary to pursue his ambitious program, but added that he had only been able to take on temporary part-time staff because the "sanctioned rates are approximately the same as current American unemployment rates."[116] A note on the file cover remarked that Hennessy was unlikely to get far unless the Government showed more than its usual generosity in its financial dispositions.

This raises an interesting but unanswered question. Was the Government of India expected to pay for all propaganda connected with the British case against Indian independence, and was Hennessy, who also was Bajpai's Information Officer, expected to charge his time to the Agent-General's office, an appendage of the Government of India? Funding was clearly an issue because another message on February 17 from the Embassy to the India Office, relayed to the Government of India, asked for the amount India contributed to the British Library in New York.[117] No reply was recorded. Because the files contain no further references to Hennessy's expansion program and no mention of printed propaganda material, it seems likely that press releases and personal contact with sympathetic reporters and commentators remained the method of spreading the British case.

Darvell, in a communication copied to Joyce and Butler, let the Embassy know that initial planning was taking place to coordinate the expected announcement of an offer to India. Joyce reported that, at a meeting on the subject, he had stressed to the Secretary of State the importance of giving advance notice of the broad content of the announcement to allow Halifax time to persuade the President to "say some useful words" at a press conference. Roosevelt did not do so, nor did Wendell Willkie. Willkie had stood against Roosevelt as the Republican candidate for President in 1940, but Joyce had felt that, because Willkie had made a statement in support of Britain during the Lend-Lease deliberations, he might do so again. Willkie's book, *One World,* published in March 1943, however, made clear his anti-colonialist views. Joyce's third suggestion was that Campbell, the newly appointed British Minister in Washington, might be able to persuade his acquaintance, Dorothy Thompson, and other commentators "to stress the points we wish."[118] Although it is not clear whether Halifax approached Roosevelt or Willkie to speak in support of the forthcoming Offer, it is clear that a boost to public opinion in favour of British rule in India was needed.

The same file contained a memorandum from the American Division of the Ministry in London (Tree's Division), containing extracts from recent editorials on India that concluded that, "These extracts are the first indication that what Britain does in India is of direct importance to the United States

in as much as it can affect the course of the war."[119] The strongest message quoted came from the *New York Mirror:*

> India must be induced to raise an army of 10 millions. To induce her to do this, England must be persuaded to grant any demands that India makes—complete freedom if need be. Persuade is not perhaps the correct word to define the action that Roosevelt must take to secure this full cooperation from Britain—compel may become a proper verb.[120]

In the Ministry of Information-based American Division's view, this represented the opinion of a considerable proportion of the American press. A poll of American opinion taken in March 1942 on whether Dominion Status should be granted to India during or after the war confirmed the Division's view: It resulted in a total 65% of those questioned responding in favour of self-government, 41% during, and 24% after the war.[121] The Ministry of Information recognised that more pressure would be brought to bear on Britain to "make a gesture," but its immediate response was to assume American ignorance on the subject of India, advising that

> it was therefore less important for our press officers in the United States to be able to answer questions in detail, than it was for them to know which plain and simple facts they should endeavour to get emphasised persistently and insistently.[122]

Further, less simple guidelines came from the Foreign Office on February 26, suggesting that the issue was not *whether* Britain was prepared to give India freedom, but *when* India would be in a position to exercise it under a constitution acceptable to all parties there. A poorly punctuated explanation for the American press followed, and was also a response to Chiang Kai-shek's appeal after his early February visit to India, that Britain give it real political power rapidly.

> It is clear that neither political opinion in India nor in this country is prepared to acknowledge the complications of the situation as presenting an insuperable barrier towards a fresh examination of the whole problem with a view, not to attempting the impossible in the middle of the war, but to seeing whether some means cannot be devised, within the broad framework of the existing constitution which would enable all parties and interests to cooperate wholeheartedly . . . subject, of course, when the time comes . . . to a broad measure of agreement. . . . [123]

This statement virtually preempted the Offer that Cripps took to India, and a cynical, unsigned margin note read, "our refusal [to transfer power] in a nutshell."[124] It also pre-empted part of the propaganda case, allegations of communal disagreement the time-honoured British reason for not transferring

power. As seen, this notion was raised again despite the fact that the Pakistan solution had been flagged, making the argument no longer relevant.

Referring to preparation of the draft declaration on February 13, the Ministry of Information hoped again that the Secretary of State would give two or three days warning of the announcement to allow for preparation in the United States. An additional unsigned note on March 4 read, "I sincerely hope that in our hurry to make some declaration here, we shall not risk spoiling the effect, so far as America is concerned, by not giving time for preparing ground for that declaration."[125]

Linlithgow and Amery also were anticipating press reaction in the United States that, if properly directed, would not blame Britain for the outcome of Cripps' Mission:

> If the offer is rejected the public . . . in America . . . will realise . . . that the real difficulty lies in the unreasonableness of Indian politicians and the incompatibility of their respective domestic policies.[126]

Tempted to proceed against Nehru, whose February speeches were seen as disruptive, if not dangerous, Linlithgow warned that

> it would be difficult to choose a worse moment than the present to proceed against Nehru . . . and the effect on world opinion, and particularly in America, might well be disastrous.[127]

With this temptation overcome, Amery returned to the draft declaration and its intended effect:

> I believe that if we go as far as this draft we shall have gone a long way to meet American and even Indian criticism and to create an atmosphere in which such interim concessions as we can offer might possibly be accepted or, if rejected, leave us very much in the right.[128]

Amery, reflecting to Linlithgow on Roosevelt's pressure on Churchill to reach a settlement with India and the consequent British move away from the position that no political change could be made together with the decision to send Cripps to India, wrote:

> From the point of view of putting across what is essentially a Conservative policy . . . there is much to be said for sending out someone who had always been a Left Winger . . . but the end result should be . . . to mitigate any blame thrown upon the Government as a whole for failure . . . It will, I think, also have cleared the air both here and in America. . . . [129]

Pessimism about the propaganda outcome, however, surfaced within days of Cripps' departure for India:

> The Cripps Mission has had a very good send off [in Britain and America]. But I already detect a note in the Left Wing papers of a readiness, if Cripps does not succeed, to denounce the whole thing as a Right Wing fraud, endeavouring to put a Churchill-Amery policy across under cover of Cripps, the innocent victim of our machinations.[130]

Whether the "whole thing" was a propaganda exercise has been discussed, but it won a substantial reprieve for Britain. However, American pressure on Britain resurfaced mid-year, when support for Britain and criticism of India reversed. Initial American reaction to Cripps' Offer and his press conference on March 29 in New Delhi can be summed up by the *New York Times'* message: "if Indians refuse this gift [of freedom] for petty, personal or spiteful reasons, they will lose American sympathy . . . ."[131]

Questions to Cripps at his press conference in New Delhi on March 29 for the most part concentrated on the postwar provisions of the draft declaration. However, there were some questions on immediate change.

On the question of responsibility for defence, Cripps was able to answer a series of questions illuminating the content of the draft declaration, but left an impression that, "So far as this document is concerned, it contemplates joint responsibility."[132] This statement was invaluable in that it gave further validity to the propaganda argument that India would not accept responsibility for its own government. The most contentious issue for the Congress Party was the extent to which a new National Government would function as a *de facto* Cabinet. Cripps was not asked a direct question on this matter. However, in reference to the final clause of the Offer and the "immediate" and "effective" participation of Indians in the reformed government, he was able to say that " . . . the word 'immediate' means starting as from the day after the acceptance of this scheme . . . ," and that "effective" means not nominal but "real."[133] Cripps envisaged at this point that the message he had given to Azad and Jinnah on March 25 about the future operation of the Viceroy's Executive Council as a *de facto* Cabinet would not change.[134]

The American press, generally speaking, was loud in its praise of British sincerity and critical of Indian intransigence. Even liberal journals briefly abandoned the nationalists and accurate reporting. The *New Republic* claimed that "it should be clear even to the Indians that the British cannot be stripped of all their military control in India." *The Nation,* following the *New Republic's* claim, wrote "that in view of the war crisis India had no right to demand full freedom."[135]

Commenting on the success of British propaganda in the United States, Halifax referred to editorials in the nationalist Indian press that even before the collapse of negotiations, expressed resentment about misinterpretation of the Indian position by the American press:

> They [Indian editors] have received word of unfavourable reaction to the reluctance of India's leaders to strike a bargain with the British.

> Indian nationalists declared that American editors do not understand all angles and nuances of the Indian political situation. . . . [136]

Among many editorials and articles in the *Hindustan Times* and the *Bombay Sentinel,* for example, published in early April, one editorial puts Indian impressions of British propaganda and the American press in a nutshell:

> If the ineffectual dunderheads in charge of British propaganda are under the impression that India could be cowed down into acceptance of the Cripps proposals by such unimpressive examples of Yankee journalism, we can only pity their ignorance. . . .[137]

The propaganda battle over the United States' understanding of Cripps' Offer was not over in the Indian press. It had, however, been won in America by Britain, if only temporarily. By August, when the Congress Party leaders were imprisoned following Gandhi's Quit India resolution, public opinion in the United States had begun a brief shift to support the Indian position.

The Washington Embassy under Halifax devoted a significant proportion of its time in 1942 to convincing the American public to accept a particular view of events in India, which, in turn, allowed Roosevelt to be convinced. Roosevelt believed "that the mass of humanity does think," and that it could "make up its mind on the pros and cons of all public questions."[138] His weekly reports of editorial opinion and the "general drift" of press opinion allowed the President to see how it divided[139] and ascertain where majority support lay.

Lord Birkenhead recorded that Halifax was liked and admired by the American press,[140] although that approval was by no means universal. Lippmann, for example, noted the propaganda agenda in the speech made by Halifax on April 7, preparing the American public for the failure of Cripps' Mission. He wrote to John Maynard Keynes that, "From listening to Halifax many Americans were beginning to believe . . . that while the war in Europe was one of liberation, the war in Asia is for the defence of archaic privilege."[141] The idea that the war in Asia was to entrench European imperialism was given an Indian context by writers such as Snow and Fischer. They reported to Roosevelt or his administration and wrote books and articles when they returned to America, out of reach of censorship by the Government of India. Their views provided the balance to British propaganda that the President sought, but ultimately did not act on.

5 United States
Approach to Information Gathering

Compared with Britain, the United States was reluctant to set up propaganda and information-gathering services similar to the Ministry of Information. Opposition to propaganda was also part of isolationist thinking, and the prevailing view was that the media could inform the country more credibly than any government agency. The notion of presenting the American political position in a positive light overseas, as Britain sought to do, had no currency in the early years of the war.[1] Congressional and public antipathy toward information gathering for any purpose, however, did not prevent Roosevelt from letting Indian nationalists leaders know of his interest in their struggle for self-government. Roosevelt achieved this goal in three ways: through the new American Mission in New Delhi and his representative there, Louis Johnson, who opened channels of communication with political parties and business leaders, through the American Technical Mission, and through direct contact with the nationalist leaders by his "unofficial informants." They were journalists and writers working in India, including Fischer and Snow, who let the President know their impressions of the political situation, drawn from research and interviews undertaken for books and articles subsequently published in the United States. The information they gathered enabled Roosevelt to recognise the misinformation contained in the British propaganda message, reminiscent of his pleasure in secrecy, illustrated in his early career and in the secret meeting with Churchill at Placentia Bay in August 1941.

During and immediately after Cripps' time in India, Johnson briefed the President fully on his progress, of which he was well aware, having advised and supported Cripps when he amended aspects of his Offer to move closer to nationalist demands. Direct contact with his unofficial informants was less frequent and occurred when they returned to the United States. Through one avenue or another, including "Wild Bill" Donovan's investigations, the President sought information about the British–Indian problem and did so continuously from mid-1941 until his death. His informants, official and unofficial, invariably supported the nationalist claim for self-government, adding much to Roosevelt's understanding of the undisclosed nature of the political crisis in India.

Once America entered the war, opposition to propaganda and information gathering lost currency, and the Office of War Information was set up with British assistance in June 1942. Like the British Ministry, the American information service was staffed, in part, by writers, including Robert Sherwood, the playwright and Roosevelt's speech writer who also wrote about the political lives of the President and his adviser, Harry Hopkins,[2] and Archibald MacLeish, the poet and, until 1939, Librarian of Congress.[3]

In a more overtly political context, in 1941, Roosevelt had to find ways to put his Administration's case for developing Lend-Lease. Hence, another government agency was set up to provide the American public with information on defence assistance to Britain. Any public assumption that the agency might be engaged in something like home-front propaganda was dispelled by its name, the Office of Facts and Figures.[4] The agency was headed not by a statistician or public relations expert, but by MacLeish in his first propaganda appointment. Also in 1941, Roosevelt set up a foreign intelligence service to gather information overseas. It was headed by "Wild Bill" Donovan, a lawyer, a former colonel in the army, and fellow student of Roosevelt's in earlier days. Once again, in order not to disturb public opinion, Donovan's innocuous title was Coordinator of Information.[5] He added to the pressure on Roosevelt to intervene in India by putting the subcontinent on his agency's list of concerns,[6] despite British attempts to curtail his activities, discussed in Chapter 1.

Disturbed by the limited understanding of American views overseas, an outcome of close to two decades of isolationist policy following Wilson's withdrawal from the Peace Treaty at Versailles at the end of the First World War, Sherwood persuaded Donovan to assist him to set up a clandestine news service to broadcast to neutral and friendly countries. It began to operate in 1941, before America entered the war, but gained official support in February 1942 when Sherwood brought together a number of private broadcasters, forming the Voice of America.[7]

The Office of War Information, set up in mid-1942, pulled together the propaganda agencies under the directorship of Elmer Davis, a *New York Times* journalist and news analyst. Sherwood became Head of the Office of War Information's overseas organisation, known as the United States Information Services.[8] However, Sherwood's organisation, involved in pro-American propaganda, failed to let India know of the extent of America's interest. This situation arose because Johnson had no official mandate from the President to represent his views, reflecting his decision not to openly provoke Churchill. Yet Johnson's interventions in Cripps' negotiations did reflect Roosevelt's intention that Cripps' Offer should succeed.[9]

MacLeish became Policy Development Director in the War Information Office and was widely known to be well informed on India.[10] MacLeish, Sherwood, Davis, and Paley, President of the Columbia Broadcasting System, went to London in mid-1942 to organise air time on the BBC's medium- and long-wave transmissions. Negotiations were held with Ivone

Kirkpatrick, the Ministry of Information's Foreign Adviser to the BBC, who recorded that it was in the common interest that the Voice of America should be heard in Europe,[11] but that "in the field of broadcasting the Americans had fallen down."[12]

The failure to develop the technology to broadcast successfully to Europe was another part of the American reaction to world events in the interwar years. A failure described as part of "the fetish of isolationism,"[13] it contrasted with Britain's mission to ensure that Government communications were heard and were "beneficial to the interests of the source."[14] While British propaganda "never assumed the proportion of the whole truth,"[15] American propaganda was bound by moral and idealistic overtones.[16] However, its information gathering in India was less hide-bound, prepared, as it was, to evade Government of India censorship.

India was represented diplomatically by Britain as part of their imperial relationship, effectively quarantining the nationalist leaders from the United States Administration. The United States was represented in India by Consular officials in the provincial capitals, but had no establishment in Delhi until mid-1941. To monitor the political situation there independently, Roosevelt sought ways around the formal diplomatic framework.

An exchange of private letters and messages, carried in and out of India by visiting American journalists and writers during 1942, was one method. Their reports, which were given to Roosevelt personally or to members of his State Department, and their work as correspondents added to their value as his "unofficial" informants. The information gathered by China expert Edgar Snow and his analysis of the situation he found in India in 1942, together with the work of Louis Fischer and, to a lesser extent, journalist Vincent Sheean and others were a vital element in the President's information gathering.

A more formal method was arrived at in May 1941, when the United States agreed to Bajpai's appointment to Washington as India's Agent-General. In return, America was accorded representation in Delhi. The arrangement, as it unfolded, was unique diplomatically. The new Mission's status was never completely clear, but it served American interests in a number of ways. Not only did it become possible for the United States to gather information that did not have a British gloss, it allowed American input into the Cripps negotiations. In the Lend-Lease context, it also made possible ongoing and often unfavourable assessments of Britain's war preparations in India and its lack of support for industry there.[17]

The first American appointment to Delhi with the rank of Commissioner was Thomas Wilson, serving in the Calcutta Consulate at the time of his appointment in 1941. He provided the United States with direct reporting of political events with an official imprimatur, which gave Roosevelt the means to demonstrate to India and Britain his interest in their problems. His interest was interpreted differently by each. For India, it suggested possible intervention on its behalf; for Britain, it bordered on interference that

was occasionally met with aggression by Churchill. As an example of his work, Wilson was asked to report on the strength of Gandhi's and the Congress Party's popularity following the latter's Working Committee's Bardoli resolution on December 30, 1941. The resolution stated the Party's preparedness to support the Allied war effort in return for independence.[18] The Congress Party's concession was the sort of information that enabled Roosevelt to push Churchill toward what became Cripps' Offer. Wilson's reports were generally critical of British policy, and he, too, pushed the State Department for a stronger American reaction.[19] Roosevelt, as has been stated, was also under pressure from Donovan, the Coordinator of Information, who had put India on his Agency's list of immediate concerns.[20]

As political events accelerated with the build up to Cripps' Offer in March 1942, the American Mission's full potential emerged. Roosevelt wanted a more proactive organisation in Delhi, but one that was seen to observe the fine line between the United States' interest and interference. He took the opportunity with the departure for Delhi of the American Technical Mission to replace Wilson with an appointment from outside the diplomatic net.

Initially, it appeared that Louis Johnson, a lawyer and former Assistant Secretary of War, not a diplomat, would lead the Technical Mission. Roosevelt, however, appointed Henry Grady to head the Mission. This last-minute switch left Johnson free to take over from Wilson and, in his interpretation of his responsibilities, blurred the line between interest and interference.

Controversy surrounded Johnson's appointment. Naming a special envoy to be his Personal Representative was not unusual for Roosevelt. He had done so when he sent Averell Harriman to London in February 1941, and it meant that the appointee would report to the White House, rather than the State Department.[21] But Johnson's diplomatic status was unclear, and Halifax reacted rapidly when, on March 9, 1942, the *Washington Post* published a United Press message from New Delhi to the effect that the United States and India had agreed to exchange Ministers. He cabled to the Foreign Office that, "It looks as if the Americans are trying to force our hand by anticipating the grant of full Dominion Status to India."[22]

Ensuing communications confirmed that the constitutional position in India did not allow it direct diplomatic relations with another nation and that there could be no question of an exchange of Ministers. Halifax was instructed by the India Office to make this point to the State Department, and he reported that the Whitehall Government and the Government of India agreed to Johnson's appointment as Roosevelt's Personal Representative.[23] Johnson, nonetheless, retained the rank of Minister.[24]

The idea of a Technical Mission to advise the Government of India on industrial expansion was floated to Berle by Bajpai.[25] Berle, in turn, proposed that a representative be sent to India to assess its needs in war production.[26] His suggestion fitted neatly into the range of the Lend-Lease

operation in India. Roosevelt's response was positive,[27] and Bajpai was able to report that the Government of India would welcome such a Mission. In a conversation with Berle, Bajpai expressed the hope that if its head was "a man of the world," he might assist in evaluating the constitutional position there. Berle, with Bajpai's report of their conversation in mind, replied that America could not consider "interfering" in a matter or issue that concerned Britain and India.[28]

The latter part of Bajpai's remark seems extraordinary. Churchill had told Roosevelt that India was off limits. American assistance and opinion were not sought by the War Cabinet or the Government of India. However, on March 10, Roosevelt took an unprecedented step that bordered on intervention. He cabled Churchill with a proposed solution to the Indian deadlock over Cripps' Offer, a central temporary Dominion Government made up of a representative group.[29] Churchill privately made light of the proposal (which was modeled on the 1787 American Constitutional Convention), both in March and a month later when the President re-raised it in a last-minute intervention to save Cripps' Offer.[30]

Roosevelt's letter to Linlithgow on March 19, apprising him of Johnson's appointment as the President's Personal Representative with the rank of Minister, not head of the incoming Technical Mission as had been expected, reflected, however, the tenor of Bajpai's remark. Roosevelt concluded, "I consider him specially qualified to further the mutual interests of the Government of India and the Government of the United States."[31]

This does not suggest an appointment limited to observation, information gathering, and reporting. In his study of Cripps' Offer, Moore argued that when Johnson was briefed by Shaw, Assistant Secretary of State, on March 11, prior to his changed appointment in India, it was clear that he was going to India "as far more than the head of a mission on munitions."[32] Shaw had informed Johnson that his duties as the President's Personal Representative would "take precedence over his work as Chairman of the Mission."[33] Johnson then asked Shaw whether he should involve himself with the Indian nationalists. Shaw's reply was that he could, but that ". . . it must be done with the utmost care."[34]

The President's letter appointing Johnson as his Personal Representative to India with the rank of Minister made no mention of any connection with the Technical Mission. It did, however, make reference to his duties as Personal Representative. But the statement outlining them, as dictated by the President, is not contained in his file, although it remains in the index.[35]

The timing of Johnson's appointment in mid-March, the *Washington Post* reprinting a message from Delhi on the exchange of Ministers with India, and the wording of the President's communication to Linlithgow are clear indications of America's continuing strong pressure on Britain. These events occurred at the same time as Roosevelt's pressure on Churchill in London through Harriman and Winant, and in the aftermath of Chiang Kai-shek's visit to India and his subsequent report to the President.

Cripps' negotiations were at a crucial stage when Johnson arrived in Delhi on April 3. The probable contents of Roosevelt's instructions to Johnson have been the subject of much debate. Historian Hess, for example, argued, on the one hand, that Roosevelt knew Johnson was outspoken and aggressive; if the President had intended to remain on the sidelines in the negotiations, he would not have sent Johnson to represent him. On the other hand, he reasoned that, although Johnson's time in India demonstrated to both Britain and India the level of America's interest, the outcome showed the limits of that interest.[36]

Other attempts to clarify whether Johnson was acting on the President's instructions when he entered Cripps' negotiations, or on his own initiative, move from the point that "Roosevelt directed Louis Johnson . . . to mediate between Cripps and Viceroy Linlithgow on the one hand and Nehru and the Congress Party on the other,"[37] to an opposite view: that Roosevelt ". . . sent Colonel Louis Johnson to India as his personal representative . . . to keep him apprised of the real situation in the subcontinent."[38]

This view suggests that Johnson was little more than one of Roosevelt's information gatherers, albeit with an official role, charged only with providing the President with an unbiased account of Cripps' negotiations.

Other writers saw Johnson as immediately involving himself in the negotiations, legitimately so as he held a Presidential commission. Johnson quickly became *amicus curiae,* mediating between Cripps and Nehru and proposing key new initiatives in the defence portfolio to facilitate the Indo–British agreement. He was a highly visible expression of America's hopes for settlement in India.[39]

Cripps' three biographers, Cooke, Estorick, and Strauss, agree that Johnson acted positively and with obvious power during the negotiations, but none suggested that he acted on instructions from Roosevelt.[40] Cooke came closest when he suggested that the British "were unable to gauge the force of Colonel Johnson's interventions . . . which were undoubtedly powerful enough to prevent an earlier breakdown of the talks with Congress" and speculated that Johnson was "moving from the field of persuasion into that of negotiation."[41] However, Cripps' biographer, Strauss, simply quoted from Cripps' speech in the House of Commons following his return to London, in which he assured members that, "At no time did he [Johnson] act otherwise than in a purely personal capacity."[42]

In his formal report on the constitutional problem in India prepared for Nuffield College and first published in March 1943, Coupland stated that Johnson, after his arrival in New Delhi, "took an informal but active part in the negotiations."[43] He was more partisan in his propaganda work, *The Cripps Mission,* published some nine months earlier, where he recorded that, " . . . the rumour was soon abroad that Colonel Johnson's arrival at this juncture was no accident. The American President . . . was determined to have [a] say in the Indian settlement."[44]

The rumour to which Coupland referred was probably generated by *bona fide* reports in Indian newspapers. For example, a headline in the *Hindustan*

Times on April 7 read, "Can Roosevelt Step in to Avert Breakdown?"This story was followed by a report that talks had taken place among Nehru, Azad, and Johnson and between Cripps and Johnson. Similarly, a report in the *Bombay Sentinel* on April 10 acknowledged the part that Johnson had played in "these vital negotiations" and recognised that American influence had been "exerted" in favour of democracy. Perhaps more provocative were Shankar's cartoons in the *Hindustan Times,* portraying Cripps and Linlithgow as helpless while Roosevelt and Johnson took over.[45]

Interestingly, within India, Britain made few attempts at censorship of political material that originated from the local English-language press. Its main challenges during 1942 were directed at the Calcutta-based editor of the *Statesman,* who was British, and the *National Herald,* which supported Nehru. The British acceptance of Indian nationalist freedom of association and speech during Cripps' Mission fits well with what Oliver in *Leadership in Asia* described as a long tradition of British tolerance of freedom of speech, extended to the "uninhibited" verbal expressiveness of India.[46]

Although Coupland put the possibility of Presidential interference down to rumour, it was, nonetheless, the possibility most feared by the British: that the imperial agenda in India might be removed from British hands. Therefore, it is arguable that, in what was essentially a popular work, *The Cripps Mission,* Coupland made the British public aware of a situation that might again arise: that the United States could intervene in British imperial policy. In promoting the propaganda line that India was exclusively a British matter, Coupland, like Strauss, cited part of Cripps' speech to the House of Commons on April 28: " . . . I wish to make it abundantly clear there was no question of any American intervention, but only the help of a very able American citizen."[47] In his examination of Cripps' Mission, Moore referred frequently to Coupland's diary, to which he had access. The diary appears to provide a personal account of Coupland's almost daily conversations with Cripps. Their conversations clearly related an inside story that did not find its way into Coupland's official and propaganda accounts, but added to the evidence that Johnson's role was primarily political.[48] Clymer, who resifted the evidence, also saw Johnson's role as political and part of the President's effort to keep the pressure on Britain to reach a settlement with the nationalists.[49]

Thus, it can be argued that Roosevelt's purpose in appointing Johnson to Delhi, instead of retaining Wilson or replacing him with a career diplomat, was political, arguably clandestine, and part of his anti-imperial agenda. The absence of the President's instructions to Johnson, which may well have been politically indiscreet, his ultimate failure to take a strong stance on India despite his rhetoric, and the war-generated need to remain on good terms with Britain all add weight to this conclusion.

Clymer suggested that the fact that Roosevelt did not intervene when Johnson first asked him to do so on April 4 was consistent with the argument that Johnson's role was political in the broadest sense. It was not clear

on April 4 that Cripps' Mission would fail.[50] Clymer recalled, as has been stated previously, that the President offered Churchill at least an interim solution in the Central Dominion Government proposal on March 10 only three weeks previously. Roosevelt intervened, again unsuccessfully, on April 11 after receiving Johnson's urgent assessment on the same day that Churchill wanted the Congress Party to reject Cripps' Offer.[51]

Roosevelt informed Churchill that public reaction in the United States would be disastrous for Britain should the negotiations collapse because of British intransigence. The President's statements about India's willingness to accept a compromise on the defence portfolio and Britain's refusal to concede self-government indicated that Johnson reported to him fully on the negotiations, including the Cripps–Johnson formula and the withdrawal of Cripps' powers to negotiate.[52] Roosevelt's threats were, however, based on a selective reading of public opinion. Churchill, who received Roosevelt's message during the early hours of April 12, Greenwich Mean Time, claimed wrongly, in response to the President's request that negotiations continue, that Cripps had already left.[53] Cripps had been due to leave New Delhi during the morning of Sunday, April 12, Indian Standard Time, but he did not actually leave India until the following morning, Monday, April 13, Indian Time (6.5 hours ahead of GMT).[54] It seems highly unlikely that Cripps' departure would have been earlier than 11 p.m. or midnight on April 12, GMT.

On Tuesday, April 14, the *Hindustan Times* reported a press conference held in Karachi before Cripps left the subcontinent.[55] Had Cripps' press conference been held on Sunday, April 12 (IST),[56] it would have appeared in the *Hindustan Times* on the previous day; such was Cripps' importance. Thus, it is clear that Churchill could have stopped Cripps' departure and sent him back to Delhi. It is equally clear that the Prime Minister was prepared to gamble on the President's reaction, and this strategy paid off. The British propaganda drive in the United States convinced United States majority opinion that the Congress Party was responsible for the failure of negotiations. British censorship ensured, for example, that the contents of Azad's communication of April 9 were not publicised in, for example, the *New York Times*. It had set out the level of compromise on the defence portfolio that the Congress Party was prepared to accept,[57] potentially damaging the British argument that nationalist India would not cooperate in government unless it controlled defence. The failure of this information to reach the American public meant that Roosevelt was not "directed" by public opinion to take a decisive role in solving the Indian impasse. American opinion was informed only from British propaganda.

Keeping secret the alternate story denied American opinion the chance to shift and put pressure on Roosevelt to act for India. Linlithgow, unaware of how much the President knew, nonetheless remained convinced that Johnson's role was not one of information gathering and reporting only. He expressed to Amery his strong view that he did not like anyone in Johnson's position involving himself so closely in negotiations with Indian politicians.

He went on to say that he would be "relieved" if there was "no misunderstanding or confusion arising on account of Johnson's activities and perhaps on the part of the President himself."[58] Linlithgow's next communication concerning the negotiations followed his late-evening interview with Cripps and Johnson on April 8, making it clear that the Viceroy was angry because the Cripps–Johnson formula had been put to Nehru without his knowledge.[59] He also admitted the bind he was in: If the British government's "emissary," Roosevelt's "personal assistant," and the Congress all agreed, he also must be seen to support the new defence initiative.[60] Cripps acted quickly as well. At 1 a.m. (IST) on April 9, Cripps cabled Churchill to ask him to thank the President on behalf of the Government for Johnson's help.[61] At this point, Roosevelt was closest to influencing the outcome of Cripps' Offer, adding to the mystery surrounding Johnson's role.

Churchill discussed the Viceroy's communications of April 7 and of the early hours of April 9 with Hopkins on the morning of April 9, adding that Linlithgow was convinced that Johnson was acting under the President's instructions.[62] Seeking to clarify the situation, Churchill floated the idea with Hopkins that the Cabinet might turn down the Cripps–Johnson proposal, in which case Roosevelt would "be in the embarrassing position of having ostensibly made a proposal which the British Government rejected."[63] Hopkins, impressed with the attention he received from the Prime Minister, was anxious to put the most favourable gloss on Churchill's remark and at the same time insulate his President from Johnson's activities. Disingenuously, he assured Churchill that Johnson's original mission to India had nothing to do with Cripps' Offer, which is obvious because the initial intention had been that he led the Technical Mission. Hopkins gave his view that it was in Cripps' interest to get Roosevelt's name identified with the new formula.[64]

Ignoring Hopkins' failure to answer his proposition that the President might be linked with a proposal that his Government rejected, Churchill cabled Cripps at 1.20 p.m. (GMT) on the same day, April 9, that Johnson was not Roosevelt's Personal Representative in any matter outside the Technical Mission.[65] Churchill discounted Johnson. The India Committee also met on April 9 to discuss the proposed new defence formula, and at 4 p.m. (GMT) finally killed the proposal and with it, Cripps' Offer. Churchill added his own *coup de grace* on April 10:

> It was certainly agreed between us all that there were not to be negotiations but that you were to try to gain acceptance . . . of our great offer which has made so powerful an impression here and throughout the United States.[66]

Cripps did not seek to protect his reputation and supported the propaganda line. He chose to keep the real story of his Mission's failure to himself and take advantage of "the handle that the Congress rejection gave to the propagandist."[67]

In supporting the British propaganda line in the United States, Cripps, Halifax, the Ministry of Information, the Foreign Office, the Government of India, and, indeed, Coupland were virtually immune from challenge in the United States. British censorship of material leaving India, referred to as a *communication blackout* in India,[68] netted international press cables and Indian newspaper reports of Cripps' Mission and, more important, Congress Party statements. The only remaining threat to Britain's immunity came from Americans in India who, rather than risk censorship of their reporting in dispatches, wrote after leaving the country. The British were aware, as India Office files show, that the President's information gathering evaded Government of India censorship.

Two examples indicated the ongoing censorship enforcement problem faced by Britain. A communication from the Chief Press Adviser to the Government of India in 1944 to Joyce at the India Office referred to the draft of a book by Preston Grover, who wrote for the Associated Press of America. Grover went to India in April 1942[69] and completed his draft during his period there. Krichner recorded that: " . . . The chapters on India . . . showed a regrettable anti-British bias . . . it misrepresented British rule in India and gave a completely one-sided version of the events of August 1942. . . ."[70] He resolved, with India Office approval, that, because Grover was to return to the United States shortly, the book was not to be submitted to censorship because, once back in America, the author could produce a more damaging account over which there would be no control.[71] Similarly, outside the control of censorship was an advertisement in the *New York Times* for an article entitled "Must Britain Give Up India?" by Edgar Snow, to be published in the *Saturday Evening Post*.[72] A copy of the advertisement is held at the India Office and read, in part:

> Are the British kidding themselves that they can hold India against India and Japan combined? Snow cables from Bombay why India will swing her tremendous resources to the Axis unless Britain backs down . . . and what action is needed immediately by the United States.[73]

Although the article was not as damning as the advertisement suggested,[74] a letter from New York, also contained in the India Office file, claimed that its appearance would be "highly damaging in view of the enormous influence of that publication."[75]

"Must Britain give up India?" was published after the arrest of Congress Party leaders following the passage of the Quit India resolution on August 8, 1942. Snow's article, an outcome of Roosevelt's information-gathering methods, also analysed Cripps' Offer and contributed to a backlash against British action in India by the American public. Britain reinvigorated its propaganda drive in response.

The first phase of Churchill's propaganda drive from February 1942 to mid-year had convinced the majority of Americans that Cripps' Mission

failed because of nationalist intransigence. Roosevelt, of course, knew the real story, but again chose not to reveal it. Churchill, however, could not rely on his silence.

Johnson was withdrawn from India in May ostensibly because of illness, but possibly because he had too closely linked the President with his own role in India. Grady, who led the Technical Mission, cabled to Roosevelt that while in India Johnson had "overplayed your interest" and "made some pretty strong statements in your name."[76] Although Johnson may well have emphasised the President's interest in India, this notion did not receive air time because the majority of the American press supported the British position in April 1942, rather than that of the nationalists. Arguably, the reason for his recall was his potential to embarrass Roosevelt, in part, due to his outspokenness and, in part, due his overt support of Cripps and the Congress position, which was no longer seen as appropriate after the Offer was rejected and British rule re-endorsed. His parting speech, delivered at the Delhi railway station and broadcast by All-India Radio on April 24, contained a personal message, attributed to the President, for the people of India. His speech also contained another message that he had indicated to Nehru in a note sent the previous day. He wrote, "I am saying between the lines what I hope the good people of India will understand are the convictions, not alone of myself, but of those Americans who are not selfishly hidebound."[77] Although the content of the speech was not overtly contentious, it demonstrated his anti-imperial feelings more than his sound political judgment. This view is borne out in a speech that Johnson made to the National Convention of the American Legion on September 20, 1942: "I should like most of all to talk today with you . . . about India—but, for reasons all too obvious, that is not to be."[78] Halifax also indicated that Johnson had been indiscreet and had exceeded his instructions, causing widespread hopes of American intervention both in the United States among Indian sympathisers and in India.[79]

Six months elapsed before Johnson's successor was appointed. Roosevelt chose a career diplomat who was an old friend. A member of a prominent Boston family, William Phillips brought more prestige to the Delhi post than had Johnson, and his appointment emphasised yet again the importance the President attached to India. This appointment, in turn, rekindled Indian hopes of American intervention.[80] Phillips, however, was serving in London when he was offered the post, and he seemed likely to be sympathetic to Britain's stance on India.[81] In fact, Phillips' reports during 1943 were much more critical of the British position than the President expected.

Gandhi's strongest personal protests were to fast, and in an early letter to Roosevelt about the jailed Mahatma's fast in February 1943, Phillips wrote that strict censorship prevented the American press from reporting the level of apprehension in India caused by official bulletins on Gandhi's health, which indicated that he would not survive. Thus, the American public was generally unaware that political events in India were

again newsworthy. Phillips' next letter analysed the political situation as he saw it. He argued that both Churchill and Linlithgow were "well-satisfied" to let the political deadlock remain for as long as possible, and he proposed American intervention. He suggested that the President invite Indian political groups to meet and discuss the future under American chairmanship. He went on to suggest that United States' chairing of such a meeting would serve the dual purpose of showing American interest and acting as a guarantee to India of independence.[82] Thus, both Phillips and Johnson saw the need for Presidential or American intervention in India. Information gathered in India in 1943 thus supported the previous year's intelligence.

The information-gathering vacuum left by Johnson's recall to the United States until Phillips' appointment was filled for Roosevelt by his unofficial informants, the writers and journalist who were in India in 1942. Chief among the President's sources of information on India from mid-year was Edgar Snow.

Snow met with Roosevelt in February 1942 before leaving for India as a war correspondent for the *Saturday Evening Post*. He had another meeting with the President when he returned to the United States in 1944 and had a final talk with him in March 1945. Their discussions about India were built on Snow's articles and books, as well as the President's views. Although Snow's written reports to the President are not among either Snow's papers at the University of Missouri, nor the Edgar Snow or India files at the Roosevelt Library, the direction of their conversations suggests that Snow's articles and his other writing utilised, for the most part, the same information as he conveyed personally to Roosevelt. After Johnson was withdrawn, Snow became the President's key covert source of information about the deteriorating political situation in India.

Edgar Parks Snow was born in Kansas City on July 19, 1905, where he was educated. He attended the University of Missouri School of Journalism in Columbia, but left in 1924 and moved to New York to begin a career in advertising.[83] He had no political agenda or interest in China when he began his period overseas and his writing career there in 1928. He returned to the United States in 1941, a "politically astute" China hand and well-known writer.[84]

Snow first visited India in 1931, soon after Halifax (then Lord Irwin) and Gandhi had negotiated a fragile truce between the Government of India and the Congress Party.[85] There he found national upheaval on a scale that rivaled his recent experiences in China. At that time, he " . . . had little stomach for all the study and preparation necessary to engage himself deeply in the Indian national movement."[86] After meeting Gandhi, whom he described as a "considerable bore," and Nehru, whom he instantly admired,[87] he returned to China.

He did, nonetheless, write two thoughtful articles about India, one for the *New York Sun* and the other for the *China Weekly Review*. He also

wrote a series on India in the adventure-travel genre for the *Sun*. They bore titles such as "Calcutta, India, City of Contrasting Beauty and Squalor—The Hindu Rituals on the Banks of the Sacred Ganges River," "Beside the Ganges River: Benares, India, Where Filth and Ignorance Abound," "The Taj Mahal—That Which Earth Has Not Anything to Show More Fair," and "Seventh City of Delhi: The Modern and Prosaic British Capital of India Today With Its Beautiful Architectural Reminders of Gay, Brave Days Long Past."[88]

Snow's two serious articles on India discussed, first, the communal problem and Gandhi's attempt to frame a pact that both Hindus and Muslims could agree to before the start of the Round Table Conference in London in 1931,[89] and, second, the boycott of British goods. In this article, Snow raised his concern that the boycott might open a market in India for Japanese piece goods.[90]

His writing demonstrated a perception about Indian realities that Roosevelt appreciated a decade later, but, as his biographer, Farnsworth, suggested, Snow was not yet ready to grapple with. He remained preoccupied with the Chinese political struggle and reluctant to immerse himself in Indian nationalist politics as well.

During his years in China, Snow was a correspondent successively for the *Chicago Tribune,* the *New York Sun,* the *New York Herald Tribune,* and, from 1936, for the British Labour Party newspaper, the *Daily Herald*. He wrote some 30 articles for the *Herald,* which were the core of his *Red Star Over China,* published in 1938.[91] *Red Star* had a strong impact on informed British and American opinion, including Roosevelt.

Before Roosevelt and Snow discussed India in February 1942, Snow clarified his own views on America's global responsibilities and anti-colonialism. He argued that instead of being regarded in Asia as "a mere imperialist rival of Japan," the United States should be seen as a nation that treated all people equally. Thus, America's entry into the war, in part to defend British freedom, entailed involvement in what "Mr. Amery does with India"[92] and a clear choice of future direction. By entering the war, the United States could support undemocratic concepts of Empire or it could support democracy.[93] Snow considered that imperialism was destroying itself: that behind the war about Empires, moves toward social revolution were well advanced, and his arguments informed the American public.

Snow's analysis of Britain's Indian Empire is contained in *The Battle for Asia,* published in June 1941. His insights were thus well developed before the signing of the Atlantic Charter, although the Lend-Lease Act was passed before publication of his book. Snow questioned the Act's application to India and Britain's other Asian possessions. He argued that if Britain needed American aid to defend India, with its vast war potential in terms of manpower, it was a significant commentary on Britain's political weakness there.[94] Snow's analysis for the most part predated Roosevelt's pressure on Churchill to settle with India. It began during the Lend-Lease

negotiations, continued following the publication of the Atlantic Charter and the attack on Pearl Harbour, and escalated through Cripps' time in India. Snow was clearly ready to immerse himself in India's problems by 1941. He had familiarised himself with Britain's engagement there in terms of military preparedness, industrial development, and its value to British investors and Britons as a whole and also with the political impasse.[95]

On February 21, 1942, Snow requested a meeting with Roosevelt.[96] The subject of India preoccupied the President, and he opened their discussion by asking Snow what he thought about Chiang Kai-Shek's recent visit to Delhi. Roosevelt went on to say that he thought India might soon be an American problem, and he asked Snow for his views on how to form a new government there under war conditions. Roosevelt proceeded to explain the problem as he saw it: Churchill's determination to protect the minorities meant, in practice, not transferring power to any government whose authority was not recognised by all groups. The President proposed two options to apply to an independent India: either a government with guarantees for the rights of all minorities or equality under a democratic constitution.[97] Snow supported the latter, recording his opinion that India's problem was "how to get rid of outgrown feudal institutions not how to perpetuate them in elaborate constitutional guarantees."[98] For Roosevelt, private conversations about India were not unusual, nor, apparently, did they contravene his conception of loyalty to Britain as his ally or to Churchill personally.

Snow already knew Gandhi from interviews with him in 1931[99] and Nehru from their conversations during the same period. He was ideally suited to the role of unofficial informant for Roosevelt on India. Roosevelt, "the charming chief executive,"[100] recruited Snow at their first meeting. He was not, however, the only one. Other journalists served Roosevelt in other fields, although he failed to persuade CBS reporter Edward Murrow to join the Office of War Information.[101] For his part, Snow liked the idea of non-officials being used for gathering information, a method he had already encountered in China with Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, British Ambassador there in the 1930s and a key supporter of Snow's writing projects.[102]

Snow's first interview with Roosevelt and discussion about solutions for India ended with the President asking him to write when "you hear anything interesting," to report when he returned, and to "ask Nehru to write me a letter and tell me exactly what he wants me to do for India."[103] Roosevelt's message to Nehru was typical of his unorthodox methods of letting the Indian leaders know of his concern without using diplomatic channels open to him, such as his Mission in Delhi.

Nehru wrote to Roosevelt on April 12, the day that Cripps left Delhi. He sent the letter to Johnson for safe delivery and included a note to him: "As suggested by you I have written a letter to President Roosevelt and am sending this to you. I trust you approve of what I have written."[104] The text of Nehru's letter was published in his book, *A Bunch of Old Letters*.

After telling the President of his sorrow at the failure of Cripps' mission, he continued,

> . . . I only wish to say how anxious and eager we . . . are to do our utmost for the defence of India . . . our present resources may be limited . . . industrialisation has been limited by the policy pursued . . . by the British Government. We are a disarmed people. But . . . we shall do our utmost not to submit to Japanese . . . or any other aggressor and invasion.[105]

Although no reply from Roosevelt has been found, Nehru's letter armed the President against Churchill's later propaganda claims that the Congress Party could not be expected to oppose the Japanese should they invade India.

Following his interview with Roosevelt in February, Snow wrote to his sister that the President "showed a remarkable grasp of political and social forces in the Orient, quite beyond what I imagined he possessed."[106] But Snow assumed from the President's talk about Indian independence that there might be rapid action. However, this assumption did not eventuate. A report on India that he sent to Roosevelt in September 1942 was dismissed by the President as being "amateurish."[107] The President did not retain the report, which, like other news reports at the time, stressed the need to put India (and Asia) on a war footing. The timing of Snow's report may have influenced its reception. The Congress Party leaders had been imprisoned on August 8 as the Quit India Resolution passed the All-India Congress Committee, public opinion in the United States about India was volatile, and the President was vulnerable to renewed public pressure in support of India's claim for self-government. A poll taken on August 13 indicated that 43% of those surveyed now favoured complete independence for India, an increase from 37% on March 31 in favour of immediate self-government.[108]

Snow's unpublished report to Roosevelt was the basis for his *Saturday Evening Post* article, "Must Britain Give up India?," published on September 12. It was the article that attracted the attention of the Government of India censors. In it, Snow explored Britain's handling of Cripps' Mission and the repression following the Quit India movement. Snow estimated the possible outcome of those actions in an analysis based on extensive interviews with Congress Party leaders and members in June and July 1942, Muslim Leaguers, peasants, industrialists, the Viceroy, and what he referred to as the "antiwar socialists" and the "prowar communists."[109] This article also was the basis for another untitled chapter that appeared in G. N. Acharya's book, *They Speak for India,* published in February 1943. Snow's chapter was part of a collection that included articles by Pearl Buck, the novelist; Lin Yutang, an English-language Chinese author; Wendell Willkie, who had run in the presidential race against Roosevelt in 1940; Harold Laski, Professor of Political Science at the London School of Economics; and Louis Fischer, Gandhi's biographer. The work of each, compiled by Acharya, contributed to the continuing pro-Indian independence shift in American public opinion.

The President had asked Snow to send him information. In making an arrangement with Snow, Roosevelt had set up a mechanism to obtain information about India untouched by any British bias. In this instance, Snow's September 1942 report might have been used as a balance to British propaganda that was again strongly anti-Congress following its repression of the Quit India movement. The possible reasons cited earlier for rejecting Snow's report, its timing, and its coincidence with a new volatility in American public opinion scarcely justify the President's response to it.

Despite the time devoted to India, it should be stressed that Roosevelt had other priorities, both domestic and war-related, that demanded his attention. Indian nationalist concerns were simply less important. The British promise of a postwar settlement and the removal, by the advent of the monsoon and the war in the Pacific, of an immediate threat to India from Japan may have convinced him that there was no urgent need to take action. Old habits, nonetheless, died hard, and Roosevelt's appointment of Phillips to Delhi reassured nationalist India of his ongoing interest.

Snow used his "Must Britain Give up India?" analysis again, further refined and expanded, in the Indian section of his book, *People on Our Side*. Published in 1944, the book was highly acclaimed. The Council on Books in Wartime chose it as essential reading, and a special printing was done to distribute to the American armed forces.[110] In an interesting *volte face,* Roosevelt, in an interview with Snow in March 1944, said he greatly admired *People,* overlooking the origin of its arguments and his rejection of them in 1942.[111]

Snow's impression that Roosevelt's interest in India was sincere and lasting is explored in his "Fragments from FDR," in which he attempted to add to what he saw as scarce information about the President's personal sentiments about India and other Asian colonies.[112] The text was drawn from a manuscript that was not among Snow's papers, but there were references to his off-the-record talks with the President. The twelve thousand words that covered all Snow's notes about his conversations with Roosevelt are referred to at the start of the first part of "Fragments."[113]

Snow had observed at their February 1942 meeting that Roosevelt was ". . . irked by his own lack of personal contact with the real leaders of India . . . he was not above a little conspiring to get some private ammunition to use in his next argument with Winston."[114] At their next meeting on May 26, 1944, when Snow returned to America after several visits to India, interspersed with visits to other parts of Asia, he recorded that "India was still on the President's mind." The President said,

> Churchill really wants to do something about India . . . but he cannot overcome his old habit of thinking. He has that grandiose statement haunting him all the time—the one about not becoming the King's first Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the "empah."[115]

Because the Congress Party leaders had been imprisoned since August 1942, Roosevelt's theory that Churchill wanted to do something about India seems unlikely.

India was yet again on Roosevelt's mind when Snow last saw him on March 3, 1945, a little over a month before his death. *People on Our Side,* which they had discussed the previous year, was raised again. The President expressed interest in Snow's argument that the United States should sponsor a series of planned withdrawals of the imperial powers from Asia. Snow also recorded that Roosevelt criticised him for being "too easy" on the British in his analysis of Cripps' Offer and the Quit India movement in *People*.[116]

Snow's meetings with Roosevelt and the reports he sent him provide examples of the President's long-term interest in India and his continuing below-the-horizon gathering of knowledge about it. It also is of interest that he maintained contact with Snow following the rejection of Snow's September 1942 report and after the end of the year, when the likelihood of the President's direct intervention in India lessened. Roosevelt's awareness that he might, at some stage, however, have to assume responsibility for India, for " . . . the old Pax Britannica,"[117] remained with him, as did his anti-colonialist convictions.

Johnson's participation in Cripps' negotiations and his frequent reports at that time of crisis, along with Snow's infrequent but more analytical approach to information gathering, put Roosevelt under direct pressure to intervene in India. This pressure was added to by Chiang Kai Shek's reports to him and repeated by members of the State Department during 1942. Breckenridge Long and his co-members on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were greatly disturbed by British action and inaction in India. Members insisted that the United States Government, by virtue of the size of the aid package to Britain, should "require" the British to "make adjustments" with India.[118] Donovan's agency fuelled their concerns, and the State Department also had unofficial sources of information, particularly Louis Fischer, who reported to Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles after he returned from India in July 1942.

As a tool, Roosevelt's information gathering in India served several purposes. That he pursued unbiased information when he could more easily have left the situation in India unmonitored and in the hands of Churchill demonstrated, first, the President's awareness that public opinion could and did shift, and, second, his commitment to anti-colonialist principles. The question that remains to be answered, however, is what British action in India, level of Japanese aggression, or pressure from the American public would have convinced the President to intervene.

The outcomes of United States information gathering in India were twofold. The first was a strong attempt to influence Roosevelt to intervene in India in much the same way as he put pressure on Churchill to settle there politically. The second was to provide the President with uncensored information with which to make judgments about the level of political crisis in

India and its ramifications for both American security and American anti-colonialist ideals.

Despite the work of Johnson, Snow, and others, however, the larger proportion of public opinion in America was convinced by British propaganda that the Government of India should remain in its hands during the war. Roosevelt, with his eye on public reaction to policy initiatives, was persuaded that there was no demand to directly intervene, despite the depth and breadth of knowledge his information gathering had garnished.

6 What Britain Said about Cripps' Offer

Despite the depth and breadth of Roosevelt's intelligence about the failure of Cripps' Offer, the message that Churchill's information bureaux conveyed to the American people in 1942 had little regard for factual reporting of the collapse of Cripps' negotiations. Propaganda was thus "a careful process of selection and omission [which] never assumed the proportion of the whole truth."[1] Shaped by the Prime Minister's reaction to British–Indian policy since Halifax's (Viceroy Irwin's) October 1929 declaration that Dominion Status was the goal for India, propaganda reflected his opposition to reform and his desire for an earlier status quo.

Churchill's obsession with opposing political reform for India began in 1929, and it had isolated him from mainstream politics up to the start of the Second World War. He spearheaded the campaign against the Government's India policy from 1931, and the consequent breach with Prime Minister Sir Stanley Baldwin drove him into opposing reform for India for most of the next decade. Churchill, back in power at the time of the 1940 August Offer and Cripps' mission in 1942, demonstrated that his die-hard attitude of the previous decade remained unchanged. Although the way had been cleared for a possible partition of India, the communal divide remained a core argument in the new "Great Game," with propaganda as the dice that would be played against the United States.

Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for India from 1931 to when Baldwin came to power, made two comments about the effect of Churchill's opposition to India's passage toward self-government. First, his "formidable opposition" made the constitutional debate rancorous when it should have been free of recrimination, and it delayed the passing of the 1935 India Act, so compromising the chance of early settlement. Second, and more serious than the delay, was the atmosphere created by years of parliamentary wrangling when Churchill repeatedly attacked the bill, leaving Indian nationalists with the conviction that the British Government would never give them wholehearted support in attaining self-government.[2]

Churchill's reform initiatives, made under pressure during the war, did nothing to change their conviction. Indeed, Sir Reginald Coupland stated

that, in 1942, Indian nationalists felt British promises were neither straightforward nor unequivocal. All were conditional.[3]

The origins of Churchill's opposition lay in his devotion to the idea of the Raj and moved him to defend it against any threat. Political reform, moving India closer to independence, was such a threat. As a background to the slow pace of reform in India, Baldwin had approved the Halifax–Irwin declaration, setting in train Churchill's opposition. However, he had doubted quite rightly that the provincial autonomy recommendations contained in the next reform round, the Simon Report, which was released the following year, 1930, would satisfy Indian nationalists. It did not. The Simon Commission, appointed under the terms of the 1919 Government of India Act to review its operation 10 years later, seemed to negate the undertaking to consult with Indians, and their implied exclusion from decision-making processes provoked widespread protest in India.[4]

The 1919 reforms, introduced by Secretary of State Sir Edwin Montagu and Viceroy Viscount Chelmsford, undertook to increase the "association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions . . . ."[5] The next reform step after the Simon Report, the first session of the Round Table Conference, convened in London to discuss constitutional change, opened in November 1930, and included an Indian delegation. The Indian delegates demanded an All-India Federation, a call supported by Baldwin and Hoare. It became clear, at the second session of the Conference attended by Gandhi, that the communal question, upon which Churchill later relied, would impede the reform process. Without communal agreement, the then-proposed All-India Federation would not be workable. Churchill and his die-hard supporters were quick to take advantage, arguing that any constitutional reform should be postponed until Indians agreed among themselves about how it would work.[6] Churchill held to this argument. In a one-sided communication to Roosevelt a decade later and shortly before Cripps left for India, he made the President aware of his, Churchill's, duty to stand by the Muslims and other minorities who could not agree to a transfer of power to a Hindu-dominated government.[7] Communal agreement became the lynchpin of Churchill's conditions for Indian reform in the 1940s as stated and was a centre-piece of his propaganda to the American public.

Two organisations concerned with British–Indian politics emerged in Britain during the years of debate before Baldwin's India Act was passed into law in 1935. The first, the Union of Britain and India, formed in May 1933, was pro-reform, supporting the Government's bill. Its aim was to refute the "Ill-informed propaganda on Indian affairs" promulgated by the second organisation.[8] The Union of Britain and India was sponsored by people with long association with India, including Sir Edward Villiers, Sir John Thompson, and R. A. "Rab" Butler, who became Hoare's Parliamentary Private Secretary in 1931 and Under Secretary in 1932, succeeding Lord Lothian.[9] The post-World War I communication gulf between Britain

and the United States meant that this organisation found no audience in liberal America.

The second, die-hard organisation, the India Defence League, however, made the running in the propaganda struggle in Britain to persuade a wider selection of the general public to its opinion that the Government's reform bill for India should not succeed.[10] The India Defence League conducted a joint campaign with the Indian Empire Society against Baldwin's Government.[11] Churchill and other members of parliament also argued individually for the defeat of the India bill, and their opposition typified the controversy over India in the 1930s. On the one hand, the Government, including the majority of Conservatives, accepted that the Raj was not permanent. On the other, public opinion generally and the die-hard Conservatives specifically thought progress toward Indian self-government should be resisted.

It is impossible to determine clearly what drove Churchill into long-lasting opposition to substantial reform in India. Several views circulated about the reasons for his commitment to a cause that kept him out of office for almost a decade, from an altruistic view that Britain was "betraying a sacred trust," to personal political advantage in discrediting Baldwin. It also has been suggested that Churchill developed, between the Irwin Declaration and early 1930, a "sense of outrage" about the threat to the British Empire and thus to British power:[12] that Dominion Status for India was "the wrong goal; dangerous for India and enfeebling for Britain."[13] His views varied from the betrayal of India to the fear of loss of Britain's strength based on imperialism.

Whatever his reasons, the effect of Churchill's opposition to self-government for India delayed its realisation to the point where transition to a single Union of India was impossible. For a man who had not seriously questioned the Montagu–Chelmsford proposals for India in 1919, he developed his opposition rapidly in the 1930s and then played the communal card with a determination and tenacity that defeated the more moderate minds in his 1940s Coalition Government.

Propaganda in the United States to promote Britain's argument for retaining control in India was a most important element in the lead up to and failure of Cripps' Mission. Elaborate preparations were made in Washington and New York following Ronald Tree's recommendations in 1941 that a propaganda machine was necessary, and the volume of information exchanged among the Washington Embassy, the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Information, the India Office, and the Government of India testify to its importance as well as to America's increasingly vocal interest in India.

The propaganda developed for the American press, to be released during Cripps' negotiations, was a deliberate attempt to promote a particular understanding of the anticipated failure of the Offer and was different from the general publicity circulated about, for example, Britain's historical links with India, its obligations to different groupings within society, or the complexities surrounding India's cultural difference.

As early as February 12, 1942, following an analysis of American press comment on India by the Ministry of Information, a file note acknowledged that India was no longer just a question for Britain and anticipated continuing pressure to "make a gesture" to India "footling though most of the arguments are . . . ."[14] Minutes of a meeting on the following day between Butler (Foreign Office), Darvell (Ministry of Information), and Joyce (India Office) recorded a discussion about propaganda for publication that the United States would promote in the forthcoming statement on reform proposals for India, and stressed the need for the Washington Embassy to have a few days notice to properly stage manage it. A note attached to the file added a sincere hope that the effect in America would not be spoiled "in our hurry to make some declaration here . . . ."[15]

Joyce sent a "Guidance Note for Editors" to Hennessy at the Washington Embassy emphasising the communal problem: The question was not whether Britain was prepared to give India freedom, but when it could be realised under a new constitution "acceptable to the main political elements . . . ," and again, at the end of the note, "Subject . . . to the fundamental condition of a broad measure of agreement between the main political elements. . . ."[16]

Pressure from the United States Administration resurfaced, making a response a priority following Bajpai's report to the Foreign Office and the Government of India. He reported that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was pushing the State Department to ask the Whitehall Government for an immediate pledge on self-government for India. Also, "a vocal group of publicists" was trying to persuade Wendell Willkie, a former Presidential candidate, to demand Indian self-government.[17]

Further guidelines for discussions with the American press were issued by Hennessy to his publicity committee, emphasising again the communal question, described as a "deadlock" among the Indian parties.[18] This description was misleading because in mid-March no new reform offer had been made and no specific negotiations between the Indian parties were taking place. In 1940, for example, communal disagreement was raised in the context of the August Offer when the door was left open for a future Muslim state. The deadlock Hennessy referred to may have been on that Pakistan demand, abhorred by the nationalist Indians. Safeguards for Muslims in a future handover of power had thus already been guaranteed by Britain. Raising the communal question in any guise at that stage was therefore diversionary, but it kept alive the possibility of disagreement after the expected offer to India.

The guidelines served their purpose well. Churchill's announcement that Cripps would be sent to India received favourable notice in the American press. The *Hindustan Times* reported from Reuter in Washington that the difficulty faced by Cripps' Mission was the main theme of the American newspaper comment. The British urge to settle with India was recognised in its long-held intention to grant Dominion Status to India, and the stumbling

block was seen to be disunity in India.[19] The *New York Times* recorded that communal differences could wreck the offer and quoted Moderate leader, Sapru, as saying, " . . . if Sir Stafford fails India will have only herself to blame,"[20] and that if the proposals were rejected, Cripps' explanation could be that "India herself put her old quarrels ahead of freedom."[21] The scene was well set for nationalist India to take responsibility when the Offer failed.

Preparations for what Cripps would say about his Offer were stepped up in late March. Plans were developed for vetting Cripps' first press statement and the simultaneous release of the draft document in India and the United States to maximise the effect.

The India Committee approved the draft on March 26 and agreed with Cripps' proposal that it be published simultaneously in India, Britain, and the United States on Monday, March 30. It was also agreed that a statement of such importance should first be read at a press conference, rather than broadcast, and further arrangements were put in train to "prevent leakage in telegrams from India," following Cripps' planned press briefing on the afternoon of Sunday, March 29. A press briefing was considered necessary so that Cripps could "give a lead to the Indian press."[22]

Bracken, the Information Minister, cabled these decisions to Cripps on the evening of March 26 and instructed him that there were to be no references to the content of his Offer in broadcasts or press messages from India on Sunday. He assumed in any case that censorship could be arranged.

There were a number of Acts controlling the Indian press on the Statute Books, and the 1939 Defence of India Act boosted the Government's powers to control seditious material. In addition to the Chief Censor, there were censors and advisory committees in each Province who tended to follow their own policies. The Government found, however, that stricter control of newspapers caused more problems than it solved. The *National Herald,* for example, overstepped the boundary.[23] In 1940, the newspaper was asked to submit its proposed headlines for war-related news for what was called pre-censorship. To avoid complying with the order, the *Herald* simply printed its war news without headlines until the order was revoked. Similarly, the Government issued an order concerning editorial material. No more editorials were published until that order was lifted.[24] Prevention of designated material leaving India, as in the case of information about the draft Offer, was straightforward. The *National Herald* incidents, however, well illustrate the problems inherent in censoring opinion in the English-language Indian newspapers.

A copy of the information that Cripps intended to use at his press briefing was requested by Bracken so that the British press could be given the same guidance, and arrangements were made for the BBC to record Cripps' Monday press conference after publication of the Offer.[25] Cripps responded to questions the next day and asked that his explanation for the press be sent to Hennessy in Washington, along with the text of his Monday evening broadcast on All-India Radio.[26]

Cripps' press explanation for the Sunday, March 29, briefing was, predictably, conditional and made reference to the need for communal agreement.[27] The draft Offer was to be issued as a proposal and would only become a declaration if it met with general agreement across the Indian political sphere.

Communications on Saturday, March 28, began with a cable from the Washington Embassy to the Foreign Office and the Government of India, alerting both to a statement by Wilson, still the United States Commissioner in New Delhi, to the effect that, unless Cripps' solution gave India complete freedom, the outcome of the exercise would be disastrous.[28] Such a statement, made in India, was two-pronged: It warned Britain and reminded India of American interest in Cripps' negotiations. It also was evidence of a more direct interventionist style, to be extended further by Johnson, when he replaced Wilson one week later as Roosevelt's Personal Representative.

This intelligence was followed up by a request from Turnbull, Private Secretary to Amery and on loan to Cripps, asking that the text of the draft Offer be sent to Washington so that the State Department could see it before publication.[29] Information followed again about the timing of publication to coincide with its release in India and Britain and the instruction that it was " . . . imperative that no (repeat no) advance distribution[30] should be made. . . ."[31] Halifax forwarded the draft to Secretary of State Sumner Welles with a request that it be kept confidential until the simultaneous releases.[32]

While considering what Britain said in the United States press about the failure of Cripps' Offer, it is worth recalling how close it came to success. The Congress Party was ready to accept Cripps' assurances on a *de facto* Cabinet Government and was close to agreement on the Cripps–Johnson defence formula. The Muslim League indicated that it would agree to the Offer if Congress did. But Churchill's ingenuity in reining in Cripps' powers to negotiate at points when agreement seemed likely ensured that the negotiations failed.

What was said by British newspapers varied from agreement with the propaganda line to occasionally more independent opinion, but generally met Amery's hope that public opinion in Britain also would support the Government.[33]

Negotiations with the Indian leaders were underway before Cripps' press conference on March 29. The organisation of defence seemed the most likely stumbling block, and L. G. Pinnell, Private Secretary to the Viceroy, noted in this context, " . . . the desirability of presenting a firm and sound propaganda case should Congress try to back out . . . by using the Defence portfolio as an excuse."[34] Churchill agreed to an alteration to the final clause of the draft declaration to emphasise the responsibility of the Government of India and, thus, the Indian people for their role in the defence of their country.[35] Churchill's agreement to this change, for its propaganda value, gave him the opportunity for a further twist when it was explained to the American people that the Congress Party, in eventually rejecting Cripps' Offer, was not ready to assume responsibility for defending India.

Cripps' briefing notes impressed on journalists the need to treat the proposal and its publicity responsibly, points he reiterated in his opening remarks at the press conference. Some two hundred reporters, mostly Indian, and nearly all Congress supporters were there.[36]

Questions asked were generally straightforward and unambiguous, as were Cripps' sometimes tart replies. There were a number of questions on responsibility for the defence of India that Cripps clarified. He left some clear understandings:[37] Responsibilities for defence as defined in the final clause fell on both the British Government and the Government of India, and Cripps confirmed that the proposal contemplated joint responsibility.[38] He also confirmed that Britain wanted the Government of India to be fully Indianised.[39] In practice, this term meant that whatever defence role, apart from that of Commander in Chief, devolved to the Government of India, it would be held by an Indian. In those answers, he was drawing on the longer term proposals, rather than the immediate Offer.

Asked about the working of the Central Legislature of the Government of India, Cripps replied, "You cannot change the constitution. All you can do is to change the conventions of the constitution. You can turn the Executive Council into a Cabinet."[40]

This was the unambiguous message he had given to the Party leaders, Azad, Nehru, and Jinnah, in his initial talks with them. It was not until April 6 that Churchill, after Linlithgow raised the alarm, forced Cripps to back down.[41] Churchill undermined Cripps again when the Cripps–Johnson defence formula seemed close to gaining Congress approval. Both events contributed to the propaganda line disseminated in the United States. Azad's final demand that Cripps guarantee a *de facto* Cabinet Government, after Cripps refused on April 10 to restate his earlier position on the new form the Viceroy's Executivce Council would take, allowed Churchill's interpretation that the Congress had demanded constitutional change. Congress' refusal to go back to the original defence proposal, after Churchill rejected the Cripps–Johnson formula, facilitated his interpretation that nationalist India would not accept responsibility for its own defence.

Halifax cabled Cripps on March 28, indicating that he had to make a public speech on India in New York on April 7. He indicated his belief that his speech could help by "getting Indian realities better appreciated here . . ."[42] and asked for guidance so that he would not be out of step with what Cripps was saying. Cripps replied on April 5, before Churchill refused to concede a *de facto* Cabinet Government, that if his Offer were rejected, it would be primarily because defence could not be transferred to Indian hands. If that were the case, the important point would be to demonstrate to the American public the reasonableness of Britain's refusal.[43] Cripps gave this advice having read the Congress Working Committee's provisional, but unpublished, refusal of the Offer on April 2 on the grounds that a free India should take full responsibility for its own defence and that this was not offered. The Working Committee's resolution was given to Cripps in confidence and was

not released until April 11, when it was published after negotiations had collapsed. Cripps relayed the Congress Party's position to Churchill in confidence on April 2, although all his communications went via the Government of India and the India Office. Cripps pointed out that Azad and Nehru had handed him the provisional resolution rejecting his Offer, which they had no intention of announcing at that stage, and before he had made them aware that General Wavell would discuss defence with them.[44]

The negotiations were by no means over. Yet on April 3, Amery suggested to Churchill that Halifax should be informed of the state of play in India so that he could let the President know of the "possible" rejection of Cripps' Offer. In briefing Halifax, Amery suggested that the Congress Party must be aware that their claim for the transfer of defence to an independent Indian Government was "sheer bunk" and that they were determined not to take any [lesser] responsibility themselves, concentrating on an impossible demand for tactical reasons.[45] This communication was sent to Halifax with Churchill's approval and with no more than cosmetic changes. The word *bunk,* for example, was replaced by *pretence.* Thus, Halifax had advice from both Cripps and Amery before his April 7 speech.

Churchill was probably convinced by April 7 that Cripps' Offer would be rejected by the Congress Party. He had already destroyed Cripps' assurances that the new Viceroy's Council would function as a *de facto* Cabinet Government. Although negotiations on the organisation of defence continued, it seems certain that Churchill's decision to return to the original proposal had already been taken. His expectation was that a return to the restricted role for an Indian defence member of the Council, as set out in the final clause of the draft declaration, would be rejected. It also is probable that Churchill was aware of the content of Halifax's speech given its timing and importance.

An interesting footnote is Amery's denial, during the House of Commons Debate on India on April 28, that Halifax spoke after consultation with British advisers.[46]

Halifax's speech was well publicised, broadcast nationally by the CBS network,[47] reported enthusiastically in, for example, the *New York Times* on April 8, and reported critically in the *Hindustan Times* and the *Bombay Sentinel* on April 9. Cripps, still hoping for Congress Party agreement, signalled to Amery and Bracken that "Halifax's speech has done the greatest harm at a most critical moment . . ."[48] and that there should be no lecturing of Indians and no recriminations. Cripps' and Churchill's conflicting aims for the outcome of the Offer are most obvious at this point.

Halifax said that he took the opportunity to talk about India with some thirty columnists and commentators, cementing the British view. He advised them in the event of a breakdown not to take it "too tragically," but to use their influence to keep lines of communication "ajar."[49] He may well have had in mind advice that his Embassy had sent to the Ministry of Information a few days earlier. The advice was that reports reprinted in India that

were critical of the nationalist leaders' reluctance to "strike a bargain with the British" were alienating usually sympathetic sections of the American press and also might influence public opinion in India.[50]

On April 8, two important elements were in play. First, the outcome of negotiations on the Cripps–Johnson defence formula was unknown, and Churchill did not kill it off until the next day, April 9. Cripps' Offer was still alive. Second, Roosevelt and the State Department knew only the Halifax interpretation of events in India, which suggested the likelihood that the Congress Party would turn the Offer down. Roosevelt did not receive Personal Representative Johnson's critical reports of the breakdown of negotiations until April 11, when he interceded with Churchill in an attempt to save the negotiations.

Halifax's speech was calculated to anger nationalist India and, simultaneously, reassure the American public and Roosevelt that Britain had acted in good faith. The Ambassador probably contributed to the demise of the negotiations, but he certainly ensured the continued high regard among the American public for Britain's efforts to give India a measure of self-government. Roosevelt knew better, but the American public did not and demanded no action by him.

The *Hindustan Times*' report of the Halifax speech is an interesting example of the Government of India's failure to censor anti-British opinion in India. In this instance, it worked in the die-hards' favour. The report and comment alienated and angered nationalist India at a still-crucial stage in the negotiations, provoking familiar distrust with the reform process.

Nationalist disillusionment with Britain is well illustrated by Devedas Gandhi, the *Hindustan Times*' editor and son of the Mahatma, in his book, *India Unreconciled,* his account of political events in India in the lead-up to the Quit India movement. The *Hindustan Times* quoted Halifax extensively. His "in sadness rather than in anger" approach to Congress Party shortcomings, which were in contrast to Britain's good faith, came across strongly. Halifax's admission of Britain's 18th- and 19th-century mistakes in India was juxtaposed with the Congress Party's claim to represent all India, which he also presented as a mistake. He raised the question of communal disagreement. He emphasised the lack of reason in the Party's defence-related demands when Britain knew from experience how it should be organised. He referred to " . . . the cooperation and goodwill of millions of Indians, not less devoted than accredited leaders to the cause of Indian freedom,"[51] and he announced that Britain would do its duty without Congress cooperation if the talks broke down. The Congress Party was effectively isolated and positioned to take the blame, demonstrating his propagandist skills.

Devedas Gandhi commented in the *Hindustan Times* that it was unfortunate that Halifax felt compelled to make the sort of speech he did when negotiations were at such a delicate stage, asking why it was necessary for him to air his views in public. He concluded, however, that "Sir Stafford's

task is difficult enough . . .,"[52] and he reaffirmed the Congress Party's faith in Cripps' willingness to reach a settlement.

B. G. Horniman, editor of the *Bombay Sentinel,* generally critical of the Congress Party[53] was more forthright in his criticism of Halifax. Having identified his role at Munich, Horniman accused him of using the same language in his speech as he had used in India a dozen years earlier. He continued: "The British Government might have treated the Indian question in the same old way but for the persistent agitation . . . in America, despite subsidised British propaganda there."[54] Horniman's approach directed Indian anger toward Halifax and the British Government, although the *Sentinel* was powerless. The Indian media did not have a voice that counted in Britain or, at that time, in the United States.

Comment in the *New York Times* was typical of pro-British newspapers in the United States. Although dubbed a conservative newspaper by Lippmann,[55] it had supported Roosevelt in combating isolationist ideology, stating as early as 1938 that "No Neutrality Act can prevent the American people from favouring their natural allies . . . ."[56] This comment flagged the newspaper's interest in the survival of the democratic process in Europe and, by inference, its extension to colonial possessions. In its support for Cripps' Offer, the *New York Times* saw Britain extending the democratic right of self-rule to India, despite barriers such as nationalists' unreasonable demands for change in a time of war or for communal disagreement erected by Indians.

From Britain's point of view, the *New York Times*' front-page cover of the speech under the heading "Halifax Pledges Defence of India" was perfect propaganda. The paper devoted almost a page to the Ambassador's historical overview, Britain's good intentions, India's unreasonable demands, the communal problem, and the likelihood that negotiations would break down. Anne O'Hare McCormick,[57] in her "Abroad" column, followed the British propaganda direction by recording, first, that if India turned the Offer down it meant they could not agree among themselves and suggesting, second, that the Congress Party was not ready to assume responsibility for defending India. She reiterated the latter point in her column on April 13. She also stated on April 8 that India was America's concern because it was a battleground in the fight against Japan and that Churchill, "probably prodded by Mr. Roosevelt," was ready "to accept almost any compromise."[58] She was correct in the former, but not in the latter, analysis.

British newspapers, in what they said about Cripps' Mission, were guided more by divisions in local public opinion than by Government explanations. *The Times* reported Halifax's speech on April 8, but an article the next day ignored the Government's propaganda. Referring to the fact that negotiations were continuing, it concluded that the view that the Congress Party was likely to reject the Offer, which had "gained currency" following Halifax's speech, had been discredited.[59] *The Times* went on to report that Sumner Welles was keeping in close touch with the situation and that

American press reports from India claimed that Johnson was acting as a mediator,[60] a claim consistently denied by Churchill. The article continued with Azad's assurance of a strong Congress desire to prevent a breakdown and that a "fresh interpretation" of the defence proposals was being considered by the Party's Working Committee.[61]

The *Manchester Guardian* also was independent in its comment about India. Like *The Times,* it saw Halifax's speech as unhelpful, especially his criticism of the Congress claim to represent all India. In a far-ranging editorial on April 9, it stated that responsibility for present and future reform in India rested with Britain as well as India. It expressed surprise that "this great issue of Indian self-government, not to mention defence . . .," could depend on the definition of the precise functions of the Commander in Chief and the Indian defence member.[62]

Recalling that it was generally admitted by nationalist India that the role of Commander in Chief was not in dispute, a fact that did not surface in British propaganda in the United States, the editorial went on to deplore that there did not seem to be enough parallel and necessary functions in the portfolio to allow Indians to be confident that they were being made largely responsible for their own defence.[63] In an article on April 9 entitled "Influence of Mr. Roosevelt's Envoy," *The Times* praised Johnson's contribution to the negotiations on defence. On April 10 (from a report filed by their correspondent in Delhi on the previous day), the *Manchester Guardian* could report that there was great optimism about the outcome of negotiations and that the President's Representative and Nehru had had their seventh meeting, suggesting the high level of involvement that Churchill denied. The paper also mentioned the contribution of another intermediary, Sir Bertram Stevens, a former Premier of New South Wales and the Australian representative on the Eastern Group Council, whose knowledge of Dominion practice assisted the Congress Party in understanding it.[64] His role is not mentioned in the official documents.

Much less critical than *The Times,* the *New York Times* announced a "widely held belief" that the new proposals had been agreed to by the British.[65] When negotiations broke down, however, the *New York Times* (like the British newspapers) was unaware that the War Cabinet's message to Cripps, despatched at 4 p.m. (GMT) on April 9, had signalled no agreement and had instructed him to bring the matter of defence back to the original Cabinet plan.[66]

Linlithgow knew of this message because the cable had come through his office. But when a request was made on April 10 to the Viceroy by Aney, a Member of his Executive Council, that he call together Cripps and Nehru because there had been a hitch in negotiations, Linlithgow did not comply, saying that he would see Cripps that evening.[67] There is no indication that Cripps was advised to talk to the Congress Party leaders again before they finally rejected his Offer later on April 10 for a multiplicity of reasons, including failure to secure a *de facto* Cabinet Government and the exclusionary defence provisions.

On the same day, perhaps with the propaganda outcome in mind, Linlithgow accepted the Offer, telegraphing to Amery, as previously cited, that,

> Given all the circumstances and the importance of American opinion, Commander-in-Chief and I feel that we have no choice but to acquiesce in this and take the chance of subsequent trouble rather than the immediate certainty of very unfavourable propaganda position in America.[68]

The Viceroy's zero-hour acceptance was of what he described as "the best we can do with the Cripps-Johnson formula" and preceded Churchill's retreat to the original draft proposal on defence. Linlithgow went on to say that whether his acceptance would lead to difficulties in Government depended on how far those who "come in" intended to cooperate and resist pressure from their own caucuses.[69] The Viceroy was clearly referring to a mixed, rather than an exclusive, Congress Party National Government, described in later British propaganda. The communal bogey had been laid to rest by the readiness of other parties, including the Muslim League, to accept the Offer it the Congress Party did. It may be too Machiavellian to suggest that the Viceroy accepted an Offer that was no longer current, knowing that Cripps' negotiations with the Congress Party were in trouble and that the predicted breakdown was close.

The *Washington Post,* quoting the Indian nationalist press, hailed Johnson as a "super Cripp" for his role in the negotiations and, before news of the breakdown was received, praised India's military support of the war which had not diminished during the course of Cripps' negotiations, despite its disagreement with Britain.[70]

The *Hindustan Times* was very hopeful of agreement on April 10, but reported that the surprise rejection of the Offer by the Congress Party leaders that day rested with Cripps' failure to reassure them on points previously agreed, but finally negated or diluted by Churchill's interventions on April 6 and 9.[71] With access to Azad's statement, the *Hindustan Times* on April 12 pointed accurately to Cripps' apparent *volte face* on a National Government or *de facto* Cabinet Government and its implications. Cripps' broadcast on April 11 (promoted as "Cripps to state case to world by radio")[72] was a political exercise with American public opinion in mind. The Congress Party's objections were not seriously addressed, and their last-minute "demand" for Cabinet Government was presented as outrageous. In the final analysis, Cripps was not prepared to undermine British propaganda by revealing Churchill's contribution to the collapse of his negotiations.

The left-wing *New Statesman and Nation,* edited by Kingsley Martin, had no doubt about the action Britain should take a month before Cripps' press statement. India should have been given a "genuine" National Government, with no reservation of powers to Britain. In pointing out that America and China saw the need for the wholehearted participation of a free

India against Japanese imperialism, the spectre was raised of a traditional England expecting to retain its Empire at war's end. The editorial of February 28, following Chiang's visit to India, speculated that Churchill would yield "too little and too late" and that, in any case, all British offers in the past "were qualified by reservations which . . . enabled and even invited the minorities to put their veto on any advance."[73]

On March 14, the *New Statesman* also was critical of Churchill's statement on India and saw its timing as too late, but hoped "against all the odds" that Cripps might work a miracle. After the breakdown of negotiations, it lampooned Cripps' broadcast:

> To whom would this "Cabinet" be responsible—for the All-India Legislative Assembly would be a poor substitute for a parliament? It would be irremovable, and subject to no popular control: in short, it would be a "dictatorship."[74]

Then came the "painfully familiar" argument for Britain retaining government, the minorities and communal discord. Finally, the question was whether it was anxiety for India's future or just dislike for transferring power that motivated the British Government.[75] Interpretations critical of Churchill and his Government were also aired in the liberal American press for example, the Luce papers, but the influence of the British propaganda machine in Washington kept such criticism out of the pro-British press there.

What Britain said officially about Cripps' Mission appears in House of Commons debates, in speeches, and in the documents recording the negotiations, not at the time available to Roosevelt. Amery held a press conference on April 7, on the public record, to uphold the propaganda line. Questions from the press and his answers were similar to those given by Cripps at his press conference a week earlier, except that questions on the likelihood of failure had not been addressed to Cripps. Unlike Halifax, whose New York speech was on the same day, Amery did not predict a breakdown. On the question of the operation of the Viceroy's Council, Amery said that it was a corporate body, taking its decisions collectively as did the Cabinet, but subject to the Viceroy's authority when matters affecting India's interest arose. It was up to the Viceroy.[76] This notion was tantamount to admitting Cripps' assertion that the Viceroy's Council could operate as a *de facto* Cabinet. Mindful, however, of Churchill's response to Cripps on a Cabinet-style government and the rights and responsibilities of the Viceroy that he had supported, Amery was careful to stress that the constitution could not be altered "with the enemy at the gates" and, until constitutional change was possible, the ultimate responsibility for the governing of India rested with the British Parliament.[77] Acknowledging Cripps' powers to negotiate (which Churchill would curtail again on April 9) and in answer to a series of questions about the defence portfolio,

Amery said that if the Offer were rejected it would not be because the Indian defence role was unimportant, but because Congress leaders wanted agreement on their terms only.

Raising the issue of communal disagreement at that point, Amery again stated that Congress Party members wanted agreement on their own terms against Government, Muslim, and princely interests. Further emphasising disunity within India, he continued, "If the portfolio in connection with defence is occupied by a Hindu what will the Moslems get to balance it . . ."[78] and vice versa.

Amery was well briefed. On the day of his statement (April 7), Puckle, who led the Government of India's Information Office, circulated the post-Offer publicity plan to Joyce, Amery's publicity adviser. On the issue of disunity,[79] Puckle's guidelines were followed by the Secretary of State. This transfer of information between the players involved in developing the propaganda line had become a hallmark of their operation.

On the question of American interest, Amery, rather surprisingly considering the views expressed by the pro-British American newspapers, said that Americans generally accepted the view that the Congress Party spoke for the whole of India and that it should be a simple matter to "give India what she wants."[80] Amery may have been referring indirectly to the pressure to settle with India, which Roosevelt put on Churchill following Chiang Kai-shek's visit to India in February 1942 and when the President sent his plan for devolving power to Churchill a month later.

Amery gave a predictable answer about carrying on the government of India as before, if a breakdown occurred, to a reporter who asked, "What do you propose to do if Congress does reject the scheme, apart from putting the blame on Congress?"[81] The Secretary of State's central message had reached its mark: Nationalist Indian intransigence, not Cripps or the Viceroy being "sticky," would be the cause of the breakdown.

When the expected breakdown occurred three days later, Cripps broadcast his version of events within the propaganda requirements. Churchill, whose reactions to Cripps' negotiations were instrumental in the failure, was protected. The Congress Working Committee's resolution rejecting the Offer that was first handed to Cripps confidentially on April 2, but remained unpublished while negotiations continued, was officially released on April 10. Negotiations had, however, moved forward since it was drafted, and the reasons for the breakdown were discussed more specifically in a series of letters between Azad and Cripps on April 10 and 11[82] before Cripps' broadcast. The exchange deepened the gulf between them to such an extent that Azad could write in his final letter to Cripps:

> It seems that there has been a progressive deterioration in the British Government's attitude as our negotiations proceeded. What we were told in our very first talk with you is now denied or explained away. . . . [83]

In his broadcast, Cripps did not mention how close to agreement he and the Congress leaders were on both a *de facto* Cabinet Government operating by convention and on the final defence formula. Nor did he explain how the final breakdown had come about. Instead, he stated memorably that the Congress Party required an immediate change of the constitution and "to enter a true National Government with a Cabinet of Indian leaders untrammelled by any control by the Viceroy or the British Cabinet."[84]

Cripps went on to state that it was "easy to understand" that the "great minorities" would not accept this plan. In fact, the Muslim League had accepted the Cabinet Government proposal[85] and did not reject subsequent Congress proposals, delaying its own response until the Congress Party made its decision. Azad, however, categorically denied that a National Government was a Congress Party grab for power as suggested by Cripps. He wrote that their whole approach to the Cabinet Government question had been "that a mixed Cabinet should be formed and should co-operate together. We accepted this."[86] He had previously stated that the Congress Party had not asked for any legal changes, but for assurances that the new Government would act as a Cabinet.[87]

Accurate to some extent in essence, but not in substance, Cripps' statements became icons for pro-British propaganda in the United States. The *New York Times* reported that Cripps said that a Cabinet such as the Congress Party proposed would constitute "an absolute dictatorship."[88] It also re-raised the propaganda-inspired communal differences and reaffirmed its faith in Britain's reform proposal.[89]

The *Washington Post* recorded that the Congress Party would take office only in a "truly national government," Cripps' words, and went on to place responsibility for the breakdown squarely on the Congress Party: "Its leaders have made it clear . . . that they are men deficient in statesmanship, lacking in realism, petty when the situation demands largeness of spirit, confused . . . when straight-thinking is called for." For good measure, the *Post* also raised the communal question,[90] another demonstration of the success of the propaganda campaign.

Azad wrote quite rightly that Cripps had tried "most unjustifiably to side-track the real issue between us."[91] He might well have added that the American public would be similarly side-tracked, but Roosevelt was not.

Johnson, who had been in frequent contact with the President during the seven days he had been in India, cabled Roosevelt on the morning of April 11 before Cripps' broadcast. He reassured the President that Cripps was sincere and that he and Nehru could resolve the difficulties "in five minutes if Cripps had any freedom or authority."[92] Johnson went on to explain that, to his amazement, when a satisfactory solution seemed certain, Cripps had told him (with embarrassment) that he could not change the draft declaration without Churchill's approval and that Churchill had instructed him that no approval would be forthcoming unless the Viceroy and Wavell separately, using their own code cables, let the Prime Minister know of their

endorsement. Johnson recorded that he "never lost confidence until then" and made the revelation, obviously startling to him, that Churchill wanted a Congress refusal.[93] Linlithgow's cable to Amery accepting Cripps' Offer had not met Churchill's criteria for agreement. He required collaboration from Wavell, both men in India using their secret codes. Johnson ended his cable by informing Roosevelt that local feeling was that Halifax's speech, intentionally damaging and deliberately timed, added the *coup de grace* that finally "sabotaged" Cripps.[94]

Roosevelt had acted on April 12 to save Cripps' Mission, but without success. Aware of the version of the breakdown of negotiations that the American public would hear from official British sources, the President seemed to have been outmanoeuvred by Churchill.

However, the conviction that the British were to blame stayed with Roosevelt. Campbell, acting head of the Washington Mission, reported after a mid-July lunch at the White House that the President stated that, had his advice been taken on April 12, the breakdown need not have occurred. Hopkins, also present, said it was unfortunate that Cripps' Offer had been torpedoed by a change of instruction from the War Cabinet.[95] Campbell denied that there was any truth in Hopkins' assertion, which may, in fact, have been the first confirmation for the British of the extent of Johnson's reporting to the President.

Roosevelt made another attempt on May 15 to ascertain the War Cabinet's role in the breakdown of Cripps' Mission when he interviewed Graham Spry, Cripps' Personal Assistant. Cripps sent Spry to the United States on his way home from India so that he could be available "to assist in propaganda."[96] According to Spry, Roosevelt asked him whether Cripps had been restricted by Whitehall during the later stages of the negotiations. Spry denied this notion, relaying a message from Cripps that he had been loyally supported by the War Cabinet.[97] Roosevelt then raised Johnson's role in general terms, but his purpose in doing so is unclear. It may have been to indicate that he was aware of Whitehall's hand in the breakdown. Conversely, because the negotiations had failed, the President may have wished to emphasise that Johnson's activities were his own.

Spry, however, had had a conversation with the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs two days earlier, on May 13, when Johnson's role also was raised.[98] Spry volunteered that Johnson's activities had been helpful to all concerned, rendering the President's distancing remarks superfluous at that time. Churchill's suspicions about Johnson's role had been allayed by Hopkins on April 9,[99] and it was not until after Spry's interview with Roosevelt that Linlithgow could say that Johnson's role had "rather confused" American officials.[100]

Bajpai had suggested in April that Roosevelt should be told what had really occurred during Cripps' Mission, but was made aware that Churchill had contacted the President, covering the ground so far as the Prime Minister was concerned.[101] Following the breakdown of negotiations, Roosevelt

had intervened on April 12, asking Churchill to extend Cripps' time in India and proposing a solution.[102] Churchill's reply did not address the President's proposal except to say inaccurately that it was too late to recall Cripps.[103] In his private comments, Churchill was scathing, noting that the President's solution was back in the American War of Independence.[104]

In a letter to Linlithgow in which he expressed his satisfaction about the outcome of Cripps' Mission, Amery recorded his belief that the effect outside India was good: "For the first time America will have learnt something about the complexities of Indian affairs and of the intransigence of Congress politicians and their underlying refusal to face responsibility."[105] The propaganda line was thus utilised between its authors.

Amery may have been reassured that Cripps would follow the propaganda line after his broadcast on April 11 and the beneficial use made of it by the pro-British American press. Cripps' imminent press conference on April 22, back in England, was not a cause of concern for him. Cripps, however, did add some new information about the last days of his negotiations, raising the Viceroy's hackles. Cripps said for the first time publicly that a settlement had been close.[106] His impression only two days before the breakdown was that there would be agreement, but this idea changed in his final talks with the Congress leaders when he "took the view" that there would be no settlement.[107] The version broadcast by the BBC and repeated in all of the Indian broadcasts was different and began, "Right up to the last two days I thought that a settlement was possible when [*sic*] it seemed clear to me that Congress leaders would not negotiate with Viceroy."[108] It was further changed in the *Hindustan Times* on April 25 to read, attributed to Cripps, that the Congress Party was not willing to negotiate with the Viceroy.[109] Linlithgow demanded a retraction and an explanation, and Amery replied that the offending sentence had been drawn from more than one of Cripps' responses to several questions. He cited the relevant paragraphs.[110]

Perhaps as a consequence, Amery became concerned about Cripps' report to Parliament, to be made on April 28 when he would face probing questions about the failure of his Offer. Amery, nonetheless, was relieved to be able to let Linlithgow know that "the India Debate is happily over . . .,"[111] indicating that the propaganda message had not been compromised in this rerun of the events of the past month, after which public attention was expected to diminish.

Amery had worried about several matters in Cripps' draft speech, including a passage referring to "conventions," which Cripps agreed to remove.[112] The passage concerned the real possibility of operating the Viceroy's council as a *de facto* Cabinet. Cripps' part in raising this notion as a solution with the Indian leaders, and Churchill's disavowal, was omitted in official reports, although it exists in War Cabinet papers and Cripps' notes of his discussions with Azad and Jinnah. To acknowledge that a form of Cabinet Government was offered by Cripps would, on the one hand, implicate Churchill because it was withdrawn from the negotiations after Cripps had

raised it and, on the other hand, would explode the propaganda line that a Cabinet Government was a last-minute demand by the Congress Party.

During his speech to the House of Commons, Cripps reported on the issue that finally caused the breakdown. On this particular issue, Cripps is quoted at some length to provide a clear impression of the message he gave to the House and to a wider audience:

> The final question which was raised at my last and long meeting with the President of Congress and Pandit Nehru was as to the form of the temporary Government that should be in power until the end of the war . . . I had from the outset made it clear . . . that it was not possible to make any constitutional changes . . . but that the exact nature of its operation [here Cripps referred the power-sharing provisions in the final clause] could only be decided as the result of discussions with the Viceroy . . . ."[113]

Describing a discussion that had in fact begun at his first interviews with the Congress leaders and Jinnah as the "final question . . . raised at my last . . . meeting," although not inaccurate, leaves the impression that it was a new subject raised at the last moment by Azad and Nehru. Cripps' obfuscation was successful. When Sir Edward Cadogan, member for Bolton, spoke, he took up Cripps' pointer:

> I do not understand it . . . [the last-minute proposal to the Lord Privy Seal] but apparently it was to the effect that some kind of Cabinet should be established during the war on the model of the British Constitution.[114]

Cadogan went on to describe every difficulty he could conceive with the proposal, and he was the only speaker to address it at length. Richards, member for Wrexham, was left with the feeling that Cripps could not fully identify why the negotiations broke down, while Sorensen, member for Leyton West, thought that negotiations failed on the transfer of power issue, but suggested that the Congress Party was not actually asking for complete power for themselves at all.[115] Most speakers, and including the Secretary of State there were twelve, raised the communal problem, with opinion dividing along Party lines. Thus, the existence, although not the degree, of communal disagreement is the strongest impression left by the debate. Britain's retention of the war-related aspects of defence were raised by most speakers who agreed that it was necessary, but it was not emphasised that India had never asked for transfer of the Commander-in-Chief's function. There also was some critical comment from Labour Party members about the content of the draft declaration,[116] but there was no reason for Amery to be unhappy with the outcome. The Government's propaganda explanation remained intact, and the die-hard contribution to the Offer's failure remained hidden.

Amery was the final speaker in the debate. He reiterated the points most important to the India Committee, those that he wished to impress on

members and the public. He stressed, first, the sincerity of the Government's purpose in sending Cripps to India. Second, he sought to lay to rest any possible charge that the minority groups, especially the Muslims, had an effective power of veto. Under Cripps' Offer, the majority were free to achieve Government, and the minorities were free to opt out of the Indian Union if the post-war constitution was unacceptable.[117] In making this point so clearly, Amery and the India Committee may well have left themselves open to the charge of overstating communal disagreement, so prominent in the propaganda message, as a contributing reason to the breakdown of Cripps' negotiations.

Having laid to rest the veto threat, Amery made a third point: that Gandhi had said independence could not be achieved until Indians had solved the communal problem.[118] Gandhi's words were part of an article printed in *Harijan* on April 19 and were taken out of context by Amery. The article was reprinted in full in Menon's *The Transfer of Power in India* and in Tendulkar's *Mahatma*. Gandhi was writing about the possible creation of Pakistan. His argument was that, if it eventuated, "Each party will probably want British or foreign aid. In that case, goodbye to independence."[119] However, it was a useful propaganda point, one not disputed by members present.

Amery's fourth point was that, although the draft declaration had been withdrawn, the "door . . . remains open."[120] This point flagged British willingness to reopen talks if approached by India.

Finally, in an attempt to round up possibly the only loose cannon, Amery restated the case against the form of National Government "demanded" by the Congress. His explanation was far ranging, taking the issue back to the original proposal made by Sapru, Leader of the Moderates, at the start of 1942 that, he said, could not be considered because of minority dissention. He was not asked to return to the subject of the minority power of veto in subsequent questions, but S. O. Davies, Member for Merthyr, recalled a resolution passed by the Congress Party that gave the minorities the assurances they sought. Amery replied only that the minorities had not accepted the resolution,[121] which, of course, did not address the point made by the Member for Merthyr.

Amery's speech was reprinted in a book entitled *India and Freedom,* which included all of his speeches on India from the August 1940 Offer until the House of Commons debate. Published in 1942, it joined Coupland's *The Cripps Mission* in presenting the government's propaganda case against Indian independence at that time. Both are biased in favour of the imperialist, but neither is overtly outspoken. In contrast, Beverley Nichols' book, *Verdict on India,* which was written while he was in India in 1943, carried anti-Hinduism to extremes scarcely rivalled by Mayo's 1920s *Mother India*. *The Times Literary Supplement*[122] reviewed Nichols' *Verdict* in phrases designed to attract a readership. It also was printed in the United States, where Nichols was a popular author.

In his volume, the Secretary of State set out to put British policy on India in perspective and let his readers know that the next move must come

from the Indian parties, preferably acting together. Coupland's work presented the die-hard argument, at times omitting aspects of the negotiations. As Cripps' adviser on constitutional matters, Coupland was aware of the extent of Cripps' discussions with the Indian leaders. His study, *The Indian Problem: Report on the Constitutional Problem in India,* commissioned by the Nuffield Trust, contained more information than his popular version, *The Cripps Mission,* including a section on how Cabinet Government by convention could be worked.[123] On this issue, *The Cripps Mission* is misleading. Coupland suggested that the Congress Party rejected an offer of Cabinet Government in which the Viceroy " . . . would make it a custom to deal with his Council *as far as possible as if it were a Cabinet.*"[124] Such an offer was never made according to the propaganda account.

As seen, Cripps discussed the ways in which a *de facto* Cabinet Government could work in initial discussions with Azad and Jinnah. However, Churchill, as a Member of the India Committee (in a telegram drafted by Amery), compelled Cripps to back away from that as a possible solution.[125] He did so when Azad asked him to restate the Cabinet Government option on April 1.[126] The Congress Party's subsequent rejection of the Offer referred to the fact that there were " . . . no vital changes in the present structure contemplated."[127]

The impression created by Coupland that the Congress Party rejected a form of Cabinet Government suggests that his writing was, for the most part, completed before the India Debate in Parliament on April 28. This notion was possible because *The Cripps Mission* was first published in June and was reprinted in September 1942. It further emphasised, nonetheless, the general propaganda message that the Congress Party, and not the British Offer, was unreasonable. A review of *The Cripps Mission* saw it as a frank account of the "formidable" problems and undercurrents that contributed to the Mission's failure, a "strong" report in which Coupland gives the first "coherent" description of the negotiations without "disclosing any secret history."[128] The history that Coupland, as a historian, did not disclose was Churchill's role in the breakdown of negotiations.

Nichols' book, *Verdict on India,* was blatantly anti-nationalist. In a chapter entitled "Heil Hindu," for example, he pilloried Gandhi and called the Congress Party fascist.[129] In an investigative chapter about what was clearly the Hindu press in India, he accused it of corruption and labelled its journalists "duds," recruited from among the "failed B.A's."[130] Written during a visit to India, it was a series of personal impressions calculated to reinforce imperialist views about India's unsuitability for self-government. Nichols' admiration for Jinnah, whom he saw as a giant, emphasised his bias. Although its propaganda value is unknown in terms of copies sold, it was listed among British propaganda material circulating in the United States following the repression of the Quit India movement.[131]

V*erdict's* review in *The Times Literary Supplement,* headed "Indian Stumbling Blocks," stated that there had not been such a comprehensive

and "penetrating examination of social and economic ills deriving from the Hindu system." Also, "The book abounds in unfavourable verdicts . . . holding a gigantic series of negatives."[132] Nichols' publication reinforced the worst of the die-hard attitudes to India, and, as a caricature, it gave colour to the official propaganda message.

Britain's objective in running a propaganda campaign in the United States was to convince American opinion, and so Roosevelt, that only nationalist India's intransigence, and not Britain's failure to compromise, caused the breakdown of Cripps' negotiations. It followed, therefore, that the President had no cause to intervene in India or to force Britain to reach a political settlement there. The War Cabinet, however, under pressure from several quarters to give India self-government, remained fearful that America might still intervene for reasons of national security, as a bargaining tool in the ongoing Lend-Lease debate, or even on the basis of popular anti-colonial philosophy.

In summary, the propaganda argument was developed by Amery, Linlithgow, and their staff with support from Foreign Office and Ministry of Information officers, and it was most effectively disseminated in the United States by Halifax and his publicity group. All were aware of the President's susceptibility to public opinion and his preference for being guided by it in policy matters.

Sir Anthony Eden, who became Foreign Secretary when Halifax was sent to Washington, had commissioned a position paper in March 1941 on the future of Anglo-American relations that focused on the influence of public opinion on United Staes foreign policy. The paper recognised the inherent problem for an Administration that depended on public opinion for policy in finding consensus in a population of the size and heterogeneity of the United States.

His paper noted that Britain could not expect American collaboration to be anything other than a "switchback affair" during the crucial war years.[133] It was impossible to think of America speaking with one voice, and the paper concluded that incompatible policies representing diverse groups of Americans were in constant competition, and it was always uncertain which would gain the Administration's support at any given moment.

Britain had observed such shifts, first, in the dominance of isolationist policy when the President attempted to water down the Neutrality Acts in amendments from the mid-1930s and, second, in the President's manipulation of the press and, through it, public opinion before he put the Lend-Lease scheme to Congress. In this way, he undermined isolationist opposition and contrived the public support he needed to take action supportive of Britain.

To win the propaganda argument against the liberal press, which was strongly in favour of self-government for India, Britain recognised the need to target a larger and more influential group of Americans who were unlikely to consider or doubt the media's analysis. With support for Britain increasing and America drawn into the war by Japan, the branches of government

concerned with retaining British control in India targeted the pro-British press, primarily in New York and Washington, with propaganda crafted to achieve their objective.

The first British move, albeit under pressure from Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-shek, the Indian nationalists, and the Labour Party, had been to draft an Offer that promised present involvement in the governing of India and future independence. This draft was given maximum publicity. The communal problem in India was, as usual, given prominence. Cripps was (rightly) portrayed as the ideal messenger, and the ways of indicating the likelihood that negotiations would break down, and the reasons for it, were systematically fed to the American press. It was successful.

Roosevelt, however, was fully aware of pro-nationalist opinion and of the reasons that Cripps' Offer failed. Britain's propaganda success in the United States in March and April 1942 did not last, and the Government was forced to renew its propaganda campaign in mid-year, when the Quit India movement forced its hand. For the period of Cripps' negotiations, however, Britain successfully persuaded either the majority of public opinion or the most influential sections of public opinion that nationalist India was intransigent, concerned only with a grab for power, careless of the concerns of "great minorities," and unwilling to take responsibility for its own government within the terms offered to it. The first round of the propaganda game had been won.

7 What America Heard about Cripps' Offer

American information gained from Roosevelt's formal, official sources was generally not available to the British, and reports were based in behind-the-scenes knowledge of Cripps' negotiations. The British need to know what America heard was revealed by Halifax when he offered the State Department copies of telegrams from Linlithgow. They would give the Viceroy's account of conditions in India from his somewhat biased perspective. Halifax then inquired whether similar material from the American Mission in Delhi could be made available to him. The answer he received was not encouraging.[1]

Material gained informally from Americans in India in 1942 and reported to the President or Secretary of State became public knowledge when published in American journals from September that year. Meticulously researched, these articles added to British uncertainty about the likelihood of swings in United States public opinion. Thus, the President had two flows of information from India.

Official sources included the American Mission in New Delhi. The information passed on was both political and war-related. The emerging political crisis was documented by repeated interviews with political leaders until they were imprisoned in August 1942 following the passage of Gandhi's Quit India resolution.[2] After Cripps' negotiations collapsed, information from the Technical Mission, which went to India in April at the same time as Johnson took over the Mission in Delhi, was the basis for decisions about the temporary suspension of Lend-Lease supplies to India. This situation was a matter of concern to the British not only because of the implications for the defence of India, but because Lend-Lease and Indian self-government were linked by the Americans from 1941.

Information sent by American official sources in India frequently contradicted statements made by Halifax, Bajpai, and other representatives of the Washington Embassy during interviews with the Secretary of State. There were few points of agreement with British analyses of the failure of Cripps' negotiations, events surrounding the Quit India resolution, and the repression of the disorder that followed.

Unofficial accounts also based on interviews in India confirmed and added to the State Department's understanding that the British, rather

than Indian nationalists wrecked Cripps' negotiations. The investigations undertaken by Edgar Snow and Louis Fischer were particularly important, although there were other American writers and correspondents in India. Both had an interest in India that predated 1942, and both reported their findings to the United States Government: Fischer to Vice-President Wallace, Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles, and Snow to Roosevelt.

Fischer's interest was based on his view of India as a test case for the type of peace that would follow the war. In an interview with Welles in February 1941, both spoke favourably about Nehru whom Fischer had known since 1938 as had Cripps. Their discussion included American and British attitudes toward India, and Welles commented on the high level of sympathy in the United States for a liberal approach to India.[3]

Fischer, who had been a volunteer in the British Army in 1918, revisited England in 1941. He found in an interview with the Prime Minister that Churchill had little interest in a future influenced by different values. He was bound to the past by ideals based on Empire, royalty, and class. India was a part of Britain's greatness, and he found no problem in the contradiction between Britain's freedom and India's subservience.[4]

Fischer also talked to Anthony Eden, whose father had been a Governor of Bengal; Brendan Bracken, whom he saw as Churchill's disciple; and Harold Laski, Professor of Political Science at the London School of Economics and, at that time, Attlee's adviser. Laski and writer J. B. Priestley were among left-wing rebels banned from broadcasting in Britain. Priestley, addressing Churchill in *Out of the People,* pointed out that he had no right to use "the real Britain" to fight a war to preserve a "quite different and much less real Britain."[5] Fischer described Laski as "emaciated and wasp-tongued . . . demolishes opponents" such as Churchill "with facility."[6] Churchill informed Laski that their broadcasts were stopped because "the England you want is different from the England I want."[7] The BBC, flouting its independence, invited Laski and Priestley, and later Fischer, to broadcast ideas that they could not express in Britain to the Empire and North America.[8]

Fischer began a lecture tour in the United States at the end of 1941 to inform the public about issues for the immediate postwar period. "Winning the peace" was Fischer's aim, and freedom for India became his symbol for a world that turned its back on imperialism. India was front-page news at the beginning of 1942 and, in Fischer's view, caught the public's imagination.[9]

Fischer devoted 1942 and beyond to the pro-independence cause, petitioning both the Government and the public in much the same way and with the same objectives as Snow. Snow also gave public lectures across the United States in 1941, following publication of *The Battle for Asia,* in which he argued against "undemocratic concepts of empire" and for the need for America to make a choice about its future direction. He used Churchill's continued domination of India to argue that Britain's weakness there stemmed from its failure both to mobilise political support and

to develop industrial modernisation policies.[10] Snow and Fischer went to India in April 1942. Both evaded British censorship in India, but attracted unfavourable attention from the India Office.

In a moment of hope, a summary of Cripps' broadcast to India on March 29 was sent to the State Department from the New Delhi Mission. It touched on British sincerity and Britain's responsibility to the minority groups, as well as describing the immediate and postwar steps to be taken if the proposal was accepted.[11] Within days, the image he presented had changed.

In an interesting sequence of events, Linlithgow informed Amery on March 31, quite correctly, that it was too early to predict the outcome of Cripps' negotiations.[12] On the next day, April 1, Cripps informed Churchill that negotiations were likely to break down; and on April 2, the Congress Party submitted their initial rejection of his Offer to Cripps in confidence and subject to further negotiations.[13] On April 1, in the United States, however, Welles, then Acting Secretary of State, called Halifax in to explain what he thought would happen now that negotiations had broken down.[14] Halifax showed no surprise, but said that, although he had "no direct word," the situation was turning out much as he had envisaged. Embarking on the propaganda line, Halifax added that it was "inconceivable" to him that the Congress Party would accept any plan to share government because they could not reach agreement with the Muslim League and were not prepared to take responsibility for its failure when they did not have minority support.[15] The time difference between India and North America, eleven and a half hours,[16] might have made such a date discrepancy possible, but there remains the strong possibility that an American intelligence operative in India[17] had learned of the breakdown before the British, before the Congress Party's written but confidential rejection of Cripps' Offer had been submitted.

Despite its confidentiality, formal notice of the Congress Party's rejection of Cripps' Offer was received by the State Department too on April 2, a day after Welles had spoken with Halifax. The rejection was, however, clearly not expected to be the last word. Johnson, at the New Delhi Secretariat, reported his view that if a satisfactory defence formula could be drafted, acceptance was still possible.[18] Chances of a satisfactory conclusion were still considered good on April 3,[19] but Johnson's first report to the President on the following day suggested that Cripps' efforts were doomed to failure. "Unless the President feels that he can intercede with Churchill . . . Cripps so believes too."[20]

The last remark suggests that Cripps and Johnson discussed the likelihood and possible outcome of Presidential intervention. Welles' reply to Johnson let him down gently, but left open the possibility of action: Roosevelt did not feel, "at least at this juncture," that he should take any further part in the discussion.[21] Only three weeks previously, he had offered a solution in the form of an interim government that was rejected by Churchill.[22] The President also may have assumed that, because Cripps' Offer was presented as a sincere attempt to settle politically with India, the Prime Minister

would not let it collapse so rapidly. To some extent, he was correct, but the prolongation of the negotiations was because of efforts in India, not Britain. Johnson's hope of a settlement rose again on April 7, and he informed the President that he had been acting as a go-between at the express, but separate, requests of Cripps and Nehru.[23]

Churchill, concerned about Johnson's role in the negotiations, was reassured by Hopkins on April 9 about the limited extent of Roosevelt's instructions to Johnson, called a halt to the negotiations, and again ordered Cripps to return to the terms of the draft proposal (discussed in Chapter 3).[24] Churchill cabled Cripps to the effect that Johnson's task in India was connected only with the Technical Mission, which was clearly not the case, and that the President's message to the Prime Minister, passed on by Hopkins, was that he "was entirely opposed to anything like United States intervention or mediation."[25] It is not clear whether the assurances on Johnson's role given to Churchill by Hopkins were Roosevelt's or an attempt by Hopkins to defuse a potential diplomatic incident of the sort that had occurred between the Prime Minister and the President in Washington at the end of 1941.

The *Transfer of Power* editors' documents note that no such message from Roosevelt was traced to the Prime Minister's office. Thus, it is more likely that Hopkins' response was to an unexpected probe by Churchill about Johnson's role at their meeting early on April 9 and was to protect what he judged to be the President's interests.[26] Hopkins' intention was clarified by Sherwood in *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History,* which was not published until 1950. Hopkins' message to the President about his conversation with Churchill recorded that Johnson's role should be "played down." He reasoned that one possible outcome of Johnson's intervention could be a proposal to the British Government that the public might think came from Roosevelt. If such a proposal were rejected, the President would be embarrassed.[27] Hopkins' choice of words leaves Johnson's instructions open to question, but the latter idea that a proposal by the President might be rejected by Whitehall was inspired by Churchill during their conversation.

For Johnson, hope for the Offer's success was still alive. With Cripps' approval, he convinced Wavell of the merits of the Cripps–Johnson defence formula. Wavell, in turn, convinced the Viceroy, who accepted Cripps' last proposal. Nehru and Cripps appeared to be in agreement.[28] On April 11, however, Johnson informed the President that the Congress Party had rejected the Offer. Johnson realised that Churchill wanted a Congress refusal,[29] and he reiterated this view in Washington when he returned.

Johnson's formal assessment of the Offer that Cripps took to India and its failure was made to the Division of Near Eastern Affairs. Members of the Division present recorded that other sources, which included Snow and Fischer, had also considered that Cripps' Offer had been wilfully sabotaged. Their conclusion was that, although Johnson and other members of the American Secretariat may well have been correct in their judgment that Cripps was denied the necessary discretionary powers, it could not be

proven that "Cripps was denied necessary discretionary powers *in order that* the Mission should fail."[30]

The President reacted immediately to Johnson's April 11 message, cabling Hopkins in London that every effort must be made to prevent a breakdown. He attached a message for Churchill warning him that if the negotiations were allowed to collapse for the reasons presented in America, public reaction would be unfavourable.[31]

This warning was clear. The reasons surrounding the Mission's failure referred to by the President were not those raised in British propaganda. The President was making Churchill aware that he possessed another version of the reasons for the breakdown.

Fischer repeatedly urged the American Government to help India to achieve independence during 1942. His analyses released to the Washington Embassy prior to their publication[32] led to an exchange of anxious cables at a ministerial level among Halifax, Amery, and Linlithgow.[33] Fischer discussed his analysis of the failure of Cripps' Mission with Halifax on August 29, a month before his first article was published, and was the subject of the Ambassador's cable to Amery. Despite Halifax's attempts to refute Fischer's arguments, which, he recorded, "made little impression," the most problematic interpretation for Britain appeared in Fischer's first article about Cripps' Mission.[34] In it he stated that Cripps withdrew a promise made to the Indian leaders about immediate National Government for the country. He went further in his second article, stating that "Apparently matters were being taken out of Cripps' hands."

Instructions from the War Cabinet received by Cripps on April 9 had warned that " . . . he could not go beyond the text of the British Government's draft declaration unless he obtained the consent of the Viceroy and Wavell."[35]

After some days, Butler at the Foreign Office requested any information to "rebut [the] story that Cripps withdrew offer of immediate self-government," and Amery suggested a solution. The Secretary of State referred him to his categorical denial in the House of Commons on September 11, still two weeks before Fischer's first article appeared, that Cripps had exceeded his brief and was "pulled up by last minute instructions from here"[36] without regard for the statement's accuracy. Fischer's precise knowledge about the content of the War Cabinet's cable to Cripps on April 9[37] suggests either indiscretion within the British group or excellent American intelligence work. Cripps, who confided in Johnson about Churchill's last-minute intervention, was the most probable source of the information.[38]

Fischer, however, also interviewed Linlithgow, Wavell, and Coupland, whose work he referred to in both of his Cripps' Offer articles. References to his conversations with the Viceroy and Wavell are included in his September 3 *Statement on India,* which is held at the Roosevelt Library. Although frank, the conversations did not depart from the propaganda line. The interviews are undated, but Fischer arrived in New Delhi in May, some four weeks after Cripps left. Coincidentally, however, at a stop in Cairo on his

way to India, Fischer met Johnson at Shepheard's Hotel. They had known each other in the 1930s, and Fischer had a letter from the State Department asking for Johnson's special assistance.[39] Johnson had informed the State Department on April 11 of Churchill's part in the collapse of the Mission. At the unplanned meeting with Fischer in Cairo, he may have met the State Department's request to assist Fischer by relating to him the full story of the Offer's failure.

Fischer's articles on the failure of Cripps' Offer left his readership with an analysis that was different from the British propaganda account. His statements were supported by British documents included in the *Transfer of Power* documents, by Azad's and Nehru's accounts,[40] and probably unwittingly corroborated by Wavell. Roughly disguised as "a very high military man in India," but named some paragraphs later, Wavell answered Fischer's question about Cripps' promise of a National Government not subject to the Viceroy's veto, and his subsequent protest cable to Churchill, as follows: Cripps " . . . did not have the authority to propose a National Government with responsibility."[41] Cripps had actually proposed a *de facto* national government in which the Viceroy might choose not exercise his veto powers.

Linlithgow's protest to Churchill about Cripps' National Government proposal, which Fischer also knew about and mentioned to Wavell, was dispatched on the same day as Wavell's cable.[42] There remained little doubt that such an offer had been made. It was, however, denied in British propaganda, and it was most specifically denied by Amery, the Secretary of State for India, in his speech to the House of Commons.

Quoting from Coupland's *The Cripps Mission,*[43] Fischer reiterated that the decisive factor in the breakdown was the clash about the character of the proposed National Government. He indicated that Coupland went on to say, during an interview, that Cripps had agreed to a *de facto* Cabinet Government, but "British views" prevailed.[44] In his book, however, Coupland compromised to meet British propaganda requirements and came to a quite different conclusion based on what he claimed to be the Congress Party's demand for immediate independence.[45] Historian Robin Moore, who may have had access to his diaries, noted that Coupland "knew the inside story,"[46] on which, for the most part, he remained silent.

Fischer concluded that the Offer Cripps took to India was inadequate. The Offer missed the fundamental point that Indians were much more interested in the present, whereas the Offer concentrated on the future. Fischer argued that the best time for Britain to begin transferring power was during the war, when British and American armies were using India as a base for the Asian war theatre. Thus, Britain would retain substantial power. Instead, India was offered a postwar settlement, rejected by all groups, and immediate participation in a Viceroy's Council, where the Viceroy's veto meant that power remained with him and was not transferred to the Indian members. Furthermore, in defence of their country, Indians were offered only limited tasks.[47]

The American public thus read in Fischer's articles most of what Britain had tried to prevent them from hearing.

British propaganda had repeated the threadbare arguments about communal disagreement, British responsibility to the minorities and the princes, and the promise of future freedom. It also introduced some new arguments centred on the Congress Party's impossible demands, its failure to agree on power-sharing with the Muslim League, and its unwillingness to take responsibility for governing India.

Fischer's interpretation, which also was the American Government's understanding, left Roosevelt in September with the possibility that a strong swing in public opinion might require him to intervene in India. Snow's assessment of Cripps' Offer and the broader political situation also was published in the United States in September, adding to the President's difficulties. The coincidence of the publications also put the British propaganda organisation under pressure to renew its campaign. From mid-year, public opinion had moved toward support for India, and, after initially regaining the propaganda advantage following the Quit India resolution and the arrest of the Indian leaders, Britain's handling of events in India made it as vulnerable to American intervention as it had been the previous February.[48]

Snow thought that Britain's problems in India in 1942 originated in outdated notions of Empire, no longer shared, in his opinion, by the majority of Britons. His argument stemmed from the premise that if Britain were forward-thinking in India politically, economically, and industrially, it should not, in 1942, still be dependent on American aid to hold its position in India and Asia.

In the January 1941 issue of *Asia,* Snow began to inform American readers about conditions in India and the freedom movement. His liberal-democratic and anti-colonial convictions led him to examine Indian issues in a broader frame than simply newsworthy events, and he repeated and refined his arguments in a series of articles and books.[49] He came to see Roosevelt as symbolising the United States at its democratic, anti-imperial, reforming best,[50] and he tracked the President's interest in India in "Fragments from FDR."[51] Snow's assessment of Roosevelt may have been naive and his political speculation occasionally more wishful thinking than realpolitik; nonetheless, his analysis of the root cause of problems in India was the product of his experience as a journalist well respected for his interpretative studies of Asia.

In geopolitical terms, Americans heard from Snow that India was the Allies' last stronghold in southern Asia. If India fell to the Japanese, then the supply route to China would be lost.The Middle East would be vulnerable without India as a base and source of supplies.[52] Churchill used the same argument to Roosevelt in the Lend-Lease negotiations, but Snow added an idea for the American public: If Britain had the support of India, it could mobilise the country for war,[53] and thus release for direct war

purposes forces held in India whose main role was enforcing law and order there.[54]

Politically, Snow recognised that Indians had substantial freedom: freedom of assembly, association, and, for the most part, of speech. Yet he acknowledged that Indian nationalists had struggled against British rule for so long that they failed to see the value of what they already possessed. The accumulation of frustration that culminated in the failure of Cripps' Offer left a deep distrust of Britain. British prestige and faith in its ability to defend India disappeared in the wake of Japanese victories. British race-related prejudice and all forms of imperialistic discrimination were, in Snow's view, abhorred by Americans. Snow cited the preferential treatment given to Britons and Europeans during the retreat from Burma.[55] In explaining that India was not on a war footing in mid-1942, Snow reported that there was added economic hardship because of the war.[56] Snow argued that this hardship stemmed from Britain's failure to industrialise India, increasing the workforce. He also pointed out, in a second failure of responsibility, that there was no food rationing.

There was no rationing because the Government of India did not have effective mechanisms in place to control the distribution of food until mid-1943, when the Bengal famine forced action. Essential foodstuffs, primarily rice, were frequently in short supply, and the cyclone of October 1942 in the Bay of Bengal started the new cycle of starvation and death that was not relieved until Linlithgow's Viceroyalty ended and Wavell took over. In mid-1942, the effect of the loss of Burma on India's rice supply and other signs of approaching famine were not a factor in government planning.[57] That the Government of India had no measures in place to cope with food shortage, while letting military forces stationed in India draw on local food supplies, bordered on negligence.

In his examination of industrial development in India, Snow repeated and built on his argument in four successive publications from January 1941 to February 1943.[58] This method reminded his readership of the underlying problems in India that British propaganda ignored. Such background problems were usually discussed by Snow in the context of newsworthy events. For example, in "Must Britain Give up India?," he also looked at Cripps' failure and the reasoning that led the Congress Party into the Quit India movement and incarceration.

Snow first alluded to Britain's obligation to introduce a program of industrialisation in "Britain's Weakness in India," and he went on to demonstrate his findings in *The Battle for Asia*. They included the Government's failure to develop a coal industry despite large reserves and the similar failure to develop steel production despite India's iron reserves being surpassed at that time only by the United States and France. Steel production had not increased since 1935 and remained, even in war-time, at under one million tons per annum. Snow compared this figure most unfavourably with Russian and Japanese production from lesser resources.

Production of electricity also was extremely low because of under-utilisation of water resources.[59]

In interviews with Indian industrialists, including Sir Homi Mody, the Supply Member of the Viceroy's Council, Snow established that there was dissatisfaction with the Government's policy for war production. Output could be greatly increased with proper coordination, planning, and supply and without the "bureaucratic obstruction" that frustrated all efforts to improve Indian self-sufficiency. Industrialists did not believe that Britain intended to give up India after the war, citing as their reason instances of developments blocked because they clashed with British postwar interests.[60] Murray, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, expressed the same concerns when he noted that it might be difficult to persuade Britain that India should be industrially efficient because of its fears of losing Indian markets after the war.[61]

The Grady Report on the findings of the Technical Mission group that came to India with Johnson, gave substance to Snow's analysis. In listing production and transport problems that could be overcome if "directed by a competent American," a summary of the mission's broad findings stated that,

> . . . the Government of India had taken few if any positive steps to deal with these problems . . . The Government of India and the industries of India, with few exceptions are not yet organized on a war basis.[62]

Linlithgow thought that the report handed to the Government of India was "thin," but saw Grady as a friend of Britain.[63] The part of the report seen by the Viceroy did not include the Technical Mission's more critical findings.[64] The report written by Grady was a valuable addition to what America heard about India, but its recommendations were not implemented as planned because of continued political unrest.[65] The decision not to proceed was conveyed to the Government of India on October 29, 1942.[66] The message was diplomatic. It referred only indirectly to the political unrest and suggested that the decision against implementing the Mission's recommendations was taken because of critical demands for material elsewhere. The formal British response was in the same vein. It hoped that there would be no change in policy regarding the Grady Report's recommendations and Lend-Lease supplies.[67]

Britain had continued its governing of India with less hostile press comment in the United States as political confrontation died down. Part of Britain's agenda in America, to maintain and increase aid to Britain, however, received a severe setback with the decision to suspend Lend-Lease aid to India. Although the threat from Japan had faded, this was a strong message to Britain about its ability to control India and, consequently, that the United States was no longer prepared to risk the security of the resources it supplied.

The American public thus gained background information from Snow that balanced British propaganda and provided a framework from which to

make decisions about the British case against Indian independence in 1942. Because Cantril's organisation at Princeton University did no survey on an Indian question between August and October, it has not been possible to establish whether public opinion on independence, at 74% in August, increased in the following months. Compared with American accounts, however, the reasons given by Britain for the failure of Cripps' Mission became increasingly unconvincing following the suppression of the Quit India movement and wide circulation of Fischer's and Snow's writing.

Snow analysed Cripps' Offer from a different perspective than Fischer. He examined the effect of the breakdown on nationalist Indians and the Congress Party, rather than the causes of the breakdown in a series of publications. In the first of these, "Must Britain Give up India?," he argued that Indian Liberals, including Sapru, the Moderates' Leader, and the pro-British nationalists, who supported Allied war aims, were particularly disillusioned.[68] It was important for Britain to retain the support of these groups. Cripps was regarded highly in Indian nationalist circles, and the discovery that even he could not offer India immediate Dominion Status was especially damaging. Like Fischer, however, Snow concluded that Cripps miscalculated, thinking that a guarantee of postwar independence was adequate, overlooking the possibility that Japan might still threaten India.

Snow presented a similar analysis of nationalist Indian reaction to the failure of Cripps' Offer in *They Speak for India,* but enlarged his interpretation considerably in *People on Our Side.*[69]

In *People on Our Side,* Snow questioned the reasons for the failure of Cripps' negotiations. He had read British propaganda and could say that the reasons "vouchsafed" by them in a barrage of explanation, directed mainly at the United States, had left a general understanding that Indians had been offered postwar independence and an immediate place in Government. Both had been rejected because Indians could not agree among themselves and because the Congress Party "did not want responsibility."[70]

After interviews with Azad, Snow also reported the withdrawal of the offer of a *de facto* Cabinet.[71] In a discussion about the same issue with Cripps a year later, Cripps told Snow that, although constitutional change was impossible during the war, he had advised Nehru and Azad to accept the Offer as a whole, rather than focus on the immediate previsions. Cripps had assured them that if they accepted, the Cabinet would have met their demands for the equivalent of a new National Government and shared responsibility for defence. "It would have done what I said."[72]

Snow gave Cripps a further opportunity to explain aspects of his Offer. He came to the conclusion that Cripps had gambled on reaching an understanding with Nehru. Cripps never conceded the explanation for the breakdown known to the State Department and supporters of nationalist India, but he moved away from the propaganda line to say that, in the final analysis, Nehru could not fight Gandhi for control of the Congress or cause a revolt within the Party.[73] This reasoning provided an explanation for Nehru's support of

the Quit India movement, but not for the failure of Cripps' Offer. Although *People on Our Side* was not published until 1944, there was renewed American interest in India at that time, as Wavell, then Viceroy, endeavoured to gain Churchill's agreement to reopening negotiations with the still imprisoned Congress Party leaders.

Fischer's and Snow's analyses of the political situation in India, representative of American liberal views, and that of the American administration were similar. The congruence between Fisher's and Snow's views and those of the American Government is reflected in Roosevelt's pressure on Churchill and Hull's on Halifax. Their shared objective, self-government for India, differed only in the manner of approach in 1942. The pressure for political change in India was maintained after William Phillips took over as Roosevelt's Personal Representative there in January 1943.

Thus, although 1942 was the year that Churchill, the India Office, and the Government of India began to use propaganda as a tool to hold onto the Indian Empire, it also was the year that Roosevelt and his administration began to challenge Britain's India policy. India's independent future was not resolved before the President's death in 1945, yet the propaganda game continued despite the war-related constraints that restrained official American responses.

Other American publications also examined Cripps' Mission closely and, a month after its failure, a United States "newsfront" was created in New Delhi.[74] It was a rapid reaction by American news agencies to a country and an issue that had suddenly become newsworthy. It drew journalists to staff the newly opened offices of the Associated Press, United Press, International News Service, CBS, and NBC.[75] An American news bureau in India was, however, a matter of concern to the India Office. Amery, in a personal note to Halifax in March, reported that, "American overseas propaganda authorities . . ." in a proposal believed to come from sources "very near to the President" planned to open a news bureau in India.[76] Its object was to arrange local broadcasts and publicity material to illustrate the importance of American "participation." The meaning of *participation* in this context is left unclear. Amery's failure to report that Bracken supported the idea was to draw some resistance to the idea from Halifax. Bracken's support had put pressure on the Government of India, which "welcomed the proposal in principle," but imagined something akin to the British Library in New York. The "newsfront" idea, as it was developed in the Government of India's Information Department by Puckle, was for a small office to distribute material from the United States and organise a weekly radio commentary.[77] The American idea was different and ran into Government of India censorship.

Reports of events as they occurred, primarily those surrounding the Quit India resolution, appeared or were heard regularly in the United States after they had run the gamut of Government censorship of material leaving the country. The American Secretariat in New Delhi alerted Hull to the

problem, recording that the Government of India was attempting, by suppression of the news, to convince overseas opinion that political unrest was under control.[78]

The *Far Eastern Survey,* a fortnightly research service published by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, compiled two major reports on India in April and October 1942. The first, "India: A Political Primer" by Miriam Farley, a member of the journal's board of editors, covered in brief the history of Britain in India. It included the Hindu–Muslim conflict, British arrangements with the princely states, constitutional progress up to the 1935 India Act, Japan's advance toward India, and the breakdown of Cripps' negotiations. It was factual, providing a political context for Snow's wide-ranging views, but the material is clearly drawn from British, rather than Indian, sources.[79]

The second article, "Essentials of an Indian Settlement," was written by T.A. Raman, an Indian correspondent for United Press who visited America in July 1942. While there, Raman interviewed Grady about the findings of the Technical Mission to India.[80] The Washington Embassy's report of Raman's interview included Grady's opinion of the likelihood of American intervention and Johnson's actions during Cripps' negotiations,[81] suggesting that Raman also held discussions with Bajpai or Sir Gerald Campbell, Acting Head of the Mission because Halifax was away. Historians Venkatarmani and Shrivastava claimed that Raman worked for the British.[82]

Raman's analysis of the post-Cripps months, however, which appeared in the *Far Eastern Survey* on October 5, was without obvious bias, although it advocated Indian nationalist rather than British compromise as a prerequisite for reopening negotiations.[83] In the same issue of the *Survey,* two new books about India were reviewed: Coupland's *The Cripps Mission* and Mitchell's *India without fable*. The former, as had been discussed, followed the British propaganda line, the latter was pro-nationalist India and mildly anti-British.[84]

The New Republic published three articles in April, May and June 1942. The first, "Cripps Must Not fail" written during the negotiations, believed that Cripps ought to stay in India until a settlement was reached. It argued from two perspectives: firstly, that Indian nationalism should prevail and that the days of white Empires in Asia were over and, secondly, that the primacy of war-related matters, including manpower and production, necessitated gaining Indian cooperation.[85] In the second, "Is Churchill's Star Setting?" it was suggested that there was a growing distrust in Britain of what the Prime Minister represented, embodied in conservative party politics and the maintenance of a "far-flung" Empire. A question was raised about Churchill's motives in sending Cripps, a political opponent and a man most sympathetic toward Indian aspirations, to India. Finally, it argued that British opinion "always apathetic and misled about India" did not understand all the ramifications of the failure of Cripps' negotiations.[86]

The third article, by English historian and Labour back-bencher, H. N. Brailsford, explored the reasons for the Offer's failure. No apologist for Britain, he maintained that a "less propitious background for a mission of reconciliation could hardly be imagined,"[87] and argued that the Offer lacked appeal, was timid, and relied on inference. It failed to mention "that magic word," independence, and was silent when it should have offered India its own army. The promise of Dominion Status roused no great enthusiasm and, "for an enlarged Viceroy's Council will any man risk his life?"[88]

Brailsford anticipated no communal difficulty. Had the Congress Party accepted the Offer, the Muslim League would have come in too, albeit bringing its own conditions. He saw that the proposals for defence were deficient and stated that the Viceroy should have been instructed to treat his Council as a National Government.[89]

Brailsford's points cut across the difficulties raised by Cripps on India Office instructions, and clearly indicated to his American readership that the problems put forward in British propaganda were not insoluble. His article coincided with the Washington Embassy's appreciation that public sympathy in America was moving toward India.[90] This was substantiated in July 1942 opinion polls that set awareness of the issue of freedom for India at 69%, with 43% supporting complete independence.[91] A renewed propaganda drive was indicated and the debate on the Quit India resolution in the Congress Party provided the material.

Snow had earlier observed that the Congress Party needed to reconcile internal differences which, in the aftermath of Cripps' Offer, threatened to divide the nationalist movement. The publication in the United States of a draft of the Congress Party's Quit India resolution in July, with emphasis on sections that could be deemed anti-British or pro-Japanese[92] was part of the renewed propaganda drive. Snow's exploration of the forces operating within the Congress Party and the development of the resolution, however, provided the American public with a counter balance.

Snow argued that one bloc of opinion within the Party, led by Subhas Chandra Bose who later led the Indian National Army operating with the Japanese, preferred a policy of neutrality toward Japan, a point that the British attributed to Gandhi and utilised in propaganda to further discredit the nationalist leadership. Another, led by Party Secretary Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, favoured settlement with the British and Congress Party unity as the best way to mobilise against Japan. Rajagopalachari was supported by the small Indian Communist Party and by Nehru until he swung toward Gandhi to avoid a split. Gandhi himself favoured a civil disobedience movement if his Quit India resolution failed to convince the British to leave India.[93] Nehru, who had corresponded with Johnson since his departure, and Azad held Gandhi back for some months while they waited hopefully for American intervention. When this did not eventuate, they reluctantly supported Gandhi.[94] Although public opinion in the United States had swung back toward the Indian position, the presentation of the

Quit India resolution and the arrest of the Congress leaders briefly regained for the British the propaganda advantage.[95]

In what he interpreted as a bid for American intervention, Snow reported that the passing of the Quit India resolution, had been intended to " . . . make the deepest impression on the United Nations,"[96] and was a call for support. Gandhi had informed Snow that he expected to proceed slowly, and his letter to the Viceroy after his arrest attested to this. "The Government of India should have waited at least till the time I inaugurated mass action. I had publicly stated that I fully contemplated sending you a letter before taking concrete action . . . ."[97]

Snow wondered at the speed with which the Viceroy had acted to arrest Gandhi and the other leaders without waiting to hear their proposal.[98] Thus, Snow made his readers aware that, as with Cripps' Offer, there was more to consider in this case, too, than British propaganda.

Vincent Sheean, who had been interested in Gandhi during the protests of the late 1920s and early 1930s, was critical of him in 1942. As a correspondent in India, he later wrote that nationalist Indians were obsessed by the British occupation, which was no more than a small episode in their history.[99] Writing with the Quit India movement as his frame of reference, he argued that if the British left tomorrow, their historic function would have been only to open India to "some slight traffic" with the west. Sheean deplored Gandhi's action in triggering "a disgraceful campaign of sabotage and violence which the Mahatma disowned after having started it off."[100] No mention here of Gandhi's arrest, which removed him from control of the protest movement he had inspired. Sheean appreciated the Indian people in general as his writing suggests, but his judgment of the nationalist movement as a whole was harsh. As he moved backward and forward between India and China over the Hump in 1942, he was relieved to escape from "the consciousness of India, its tragic eyes and helpless, brooding eternity."[101]

Fischer claimed that India was America's business. He argued this point in his interviews with Hull and Welles after he returned from India in August 1942. Neither disagreed, but both saw the danger of a breach with Britain at the height of the war.

Fischer prepared a statement on India for Roosevelt and the State Department that set out his findings.[102] He argued that British officials serving in policy areas had recorded their belief that 95% of Indian people were ignorant and therefore did not count, although most of the others could not be persuaded to the British view. This he saw as the root of the British–Indian problem: the British had never sought to court or enlist the Indian people in the war. Halifax encapsulated the British attitude for Fischer when he said that it was necessary to suppress problems and not negotiate with Indians.[103] Fischer thought that this approach simply made the Indians more anti-war and more anti-British.[104]

Fischer's statement covered his analysis of the political parties and their leaders, the Princes, the Muslims, the Untouchables, and the communal

differences that he saw as almost exclusively a city-based problem. Like Brailsford, Fischer argued that the Congress Party and the Muslim League would enter a National Government if the British offered it.[105]

On his return from India, Fischer sought an interview with Roosevelt to pass on messages from Gandhi.[106] It was a provocative idea and instead the President advised him to see Hull. On the question of American intervention in India, Hull said that, "The difficulty is that when the other party is immovable we cannot interfere. It is just as if some foreign country tried to tell us how to implement the Monroe Doctrine."[107] He went on to say that, although the President was not missing any opportunities to push Churchill, not much could be done while the British remained "immovable." Fischer noted that he repeated this in various ways several more times.

His interview with Welles was more informative for Fischer.[108] Welles also was adamant that no break with Britain over India could be considered at that stage in the war. He strongly agreed with Fischer, who also had told Gandhi that the political crisis in India had matured a year too early for the United States. If America was ready to produce double the number of planes it did at that time, and greatly increased its army, Britain would have been compelled to follow American directions on India.[109] Welles admitted that if the situation got much worse, America might have to resolve it but, with political caution, he added "we can do nothing before the elections."[110] This point was crucial. Britain's propaganda campaign had, if it had achieved nothing else, won a reprieve. Welles' statement confirms that, although public opinion was moving toward the Indian position, Roosevelt was not convinced that, in the run up to an election, he would have majority support for a move against Britain in India.

Fischer recalled an earlier conversation in which Welles told him that the success of any move on India depended on the approach and method used. He and Welles then discussed a plan for immediate self-government that Welles said was as constructive as any proposal that had come forward thus far. Not dissimilar to the Cripps–Johnson formula for defence, they envisaged an Indian Defence Minister and an Allied Commander-in-Chief. To minimise conflict, a detailed list of functions for each office should be drawn up. Such a list had been promised by Cripps, but the first attempt left the Indian Defence Minister without real responsibility, and the second list did not materialise as his negotiations collapsed. If conflict occurred, the Fischer–Welles plan envisaged that the Allied commander would take precedence by prior agreement. They next discussed to whom a National Government would be responsible, a problem made much of by Cripps. Welles concluded that the difficulty of responsibility could be overcome if the Indian parties initially appointed a Legislative Body that would, in turn, appoint a Cabinet, subject to Party orders.[111] Although their plan may have been no better than those that were raised during the Cripps negotiations, it is interesting that Welles and Fischer looked for ways to surmount earlier problems and considered their exercise a worthwhile task.

Articles written by Fischer in August and September reflected much of the material he covered in his *Statement on India*. He argued that India was America's concern, and he pointed out that the Quit India movement was not merely a matter of whether the police or the nationalists were the stronger. It raised the much bigger question of what America was fighting for, a moral question posed by Gandhi.[112] Referring to British propaganda, Fischer wrote that the British implied that Gandhi was pro-Japanese. This only made a settlement with India more difficult. If Gandhi's movement was crushed, what had the British achieved? A more "bitter, sullen, and resentful" India, easier prey for the Japanese.[113] Fischer argued that Britain saw India in terms of maintaining the face of authority, and that authority meant crushing the civil disobedience campaign that followed Gandhi's arrest. The stated objective was to consolidate the defence of India, but Fischer thought that the opposite was in fact the result.[114]

Fischer argued that, although Americans intuitively support anti-colonialism, he warned India that an outcome of continued civil disobedience if it appeared to threaten the Allied war effort could reduce public support in America for their freedom struggle.[115] The renewed British propaganda drive, with its emphasis on what could be interpreted as pro-Japanese in the Congress Party's Quit India resolution[116] briefly produced this result.

Other journals followed Fischer's lead in stating that India was America's concern. *The New Republic* restated the importance of India to allied global strategy generally and as the base for supplying China specifically. It argued that a compromise solution should be offered by Roosevelt personally, and it proposed grounds on which both Britain and India could make concessions.[117] In its next issue, *The New Republic's* opening sentence in "India and the War for Freedom" read, "India today is America's problem."[118] The article was written by Lin Yutang, a Chinese writer who also contributed to G. N. Acharya's *They Speak for India*. In "India and the War for Freedom," he argued that India's problem was peculiarly the responsibility of the American public. The grounds for such an argument were that the British Government would not act as it did in India without American approval, and, in the absence of any contrary indication, Britain assumed that it had America's tacit approval.[119]

Lin Yutang's argument left out one step: that Roosevelt would not act without American public approval, and the British Government knew this. The importance to the President of public support, together with effective targeting of their argument, were pillars of British propaganda strategy.

American public opinion, however, reacted favourably to the liberal journals. The number of people who had heard about or read about plans to give India greater freedom from Britain increased from 69% on July 29 to 74% on August 13.[120] This change represented the highest point in American interest in India since the previous March, when 78% of people sampled were aware of Cripps' Offer.[121] The latter poll also was

the point where the British reoriented their propaganda campaign with Quit India material.

In the first public displays of support for the Indian position, however, two rallies were held in New York in September. The first, advertised in *The Nation* as a Mass Rally "Towards a Free India through an Indian Government of National Unity in a fighting alliance with the United Nations," was held on September 2 at the Manhattan Centre. Paul Robeson was the keynote speaker; other speakers were C. H. Tobias, Michael Quill, and Max Yergan. The rally was organised under the auspices of the Council on African Affairs,[122] demonstrating its support for Indian freedom, a venture with which the Council shared objectives.

The second was preceded by a full-page advertisement in the *New York Times* on September 28 and was held with the support of J. J. Singh, President of the India League of America. The League saw it as part of its ongoing campaign following Churchill's anti-Congress Party speech in the House of Commons on September 10. Fifty-five people, including writers Pearl Buck, Louis Bromfield, John Erskine, John Gunther, William L. Shirer, Upton Sinclair, Freda Kirchwey, and Lin Yutang, were listed as publicly answering in the affirmative the question, "Is India America's Business?" Other signatories were academics; church leaders; Roger Baldwin, a journalist and member of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU); Walter White of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; and many other friends of India, listed by the *New York Times*. A statement under the heading "India: The Time for Mediation Is Now" declared that,

> We need India's millions on our side against Japan. The people of India do not want Japan . . . They want freedom. The Indian readiness to negotiate is unchanged. We therefore urge upon President Roosevelt and upon Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that they recognise the interest of the United Nations in the Indian dilemma and that they use their good offices to ask the British Government and the National Congress of India and other leaders to open new conferences, with mutual determination to find a way of action which will most speedily bring India into the ranks of our allies by beginning now the program of her independence.[123]

The rally was held on September 29 at the New York Town Hall, sponsored by the India League of America. The *New York Times* reported that more than 2,000 people attended, and many more were turned away. It also reported that the crowd at the rally supported the speakers who demanded freedom for India.[124]

Although some of those asked to sign the statement declined,[125] the writers, academics, church leaders, and representatives of various liberal-minded groups who did sign were committed to their cause and were therefore not targets of the British propaganda campaign. The *New York Times,* which

generally supported Britain's India policy interestingly did not record any opposition to the rally.

Herbert Matthews, the *New York Times* correspondent in New Delhi, reported on October 1 that wide publicity had been given to the newspaper's September 28 advertisement of the rally, but that Indians held little hope of American intervention on their behalf. Matthews reminded readers that all the Congress Party leaders were in prison, and that no solution in the form of self-government was possible without their involvement. He then stated that the British in India were making no concessions and showed no sign of changing that attitude.[126]

Historians Venkataramani and Srivastava examined several public meetings providing a further indication of the level of protest in America about British action in India. During October, for example, rallies were held in Boston where Professor Hocking of Harvard University adopted a resolution that proposed mediation between Britain and the Indian leaders. A rally at the National Press Club in Washington attracted a crowd of some 1,700 people, and similar meetings were held in other major cities.[127] Two discussion programs presented debates on the Indian question. Louis Fischer and Pearl Buck debated the issue with Bertrand Russell and T. A. Raman on the "American Forum of the Air," broadcast from Washington, while the "Town Meeting of the Air," carried by numerous radio stations, presented a discussion on "What Should Be Done About India?" An Allied tribunal to make recommendations was proposed.[128]

Although rallies, protests, and broadcasts reinforced pro-Indian independence counterpropaganda, it also sought to recruit from among the ranks of those who normally supported the British line on India, but may have been alienated by the repression of the Quit India movement. Since Fischer's and Snow's visits to India and the setting up of an American press bureau in New Delhi, pro-Indian groups now had material with which to counter-attack British propaganda. Cantril's organisation did not conduct a poll on the Indian question in September or October, but liberal propaganda was clearly making an impact if Halifax's evident alarm is any indication. The "Town Meeting of the Air," for example, relayed across America not only reached an audience accustomed to receiving the British propaganda message by radio, but it proposed a tribunal to work its way through the impasse, involving both Britain and the United States.

As early as mid-September, Halifax had become alarmed by the trend in American public opinion and reported to the India Office that the general feeling "even in friendly quarters" was that if the British Government continued to appear indifferent about making constructive efforts to find a solution, it would indicate that rallying Indian support for the war was not a priority.[129]

Halifax increased his visits to the State Department. In a conversation with Hull on September 17, he told the Secretary of State that, although the British Government considered "going forward" along the lines of Cripps'

Offer, this would not happen until all violence had stopped. At that stage, the British would carry out their intention to resume "peaceful and normal conversations."[130]

Halifax added that the situation was quietening down, and a similar message also was given by Bajpai to the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs on September 4.[131] Hull, however, was in possession of different information about British intentions and action from the United States mission in New Delhi. Reminding Hull on September 5 that it was almost a month since the arrests, Haselton, the Officer in Charge,[132] reported that it was not possible to form a complete picture of the Quit India movement's progress or British repression of it, especially in rural India, "because of severe muzzling of [the] press and obvious disinclination of Government to allow the true situation to be known . . . ."[133] Haselton concluded with his conviction that the Government of India had no desire to reach a settlement with the Congress Party.[134] Hull, in turn, warned Halifax that British inaction was likely to provoke an American backlash that favoured Indian independence.

It is probable that Halifax sought that interview with Hull to be reassured that the American Administration would not take action over India. His concern that this might happen was raised by the content of an article by Ernest Lindley in the *Washington Post* on September 14. Lindley suggested that the United States Government would be remiss in its duty not only to Americans, but to the Allies, if it did not exert its influence to resolve the situation in India. Lindley stated that no British solution was likely with the type of officials who dominated the India Office and the Government of India, and he proposed American mediation. He mentioned as possible mediators a former American Ambassador to Japan, or William Phillips who became Roosevelt's Personal Representative in India in January 1943.[135]

Fearing that the article, offering a reasoned solution, was officially inspired, Halifax reported to Foreign Secretary Eden that there was general press agreement that America should be involved in a political settlement and cited Lindley's article.[136] Hull, at their interview, did not reassure the Ambassador that America would not intervene in India, but instead proposed that the British announce that resistance had ended in India and that talks along the lines of Cripps' Offer would be resumed.[137]

Halifax next requested an interview with Welles on September 24. He reported that he had urged his Government and the Viceroy to state that British policy in India was not one of repression, but that it was necessary "under present conditions to prevent disorder and interference with the war effort," and that "every opportunity be taken by the British authorities publicly to make it clear that official promises for the ultimate independence of India after the war would be maintained. . . ."[138] Halifax's compromise elicited no response from Welles.

Bajpai, at his request, called to see Adoph Berle at the State Department on October 2 to inform him of a difference of opinion with his Ambassador.[139]

Halifax had reported to Hull on September 17 that political unrest was easing in India, but Bajpai told the Ambassador of his belief that "they were at the beginning, not the end, of the long road of Indian resistance."[140] Bajpai said that in his position as Indian Agent General, he to be "very quiet and careful," but he had been talking off the record to editors and journalists around the country about conditions in India.[141]

This conversation indicated that Bajpai was undermining Halifax's propaganda. Bajpai also reported to Berle Linlithgow's advice that the Ambassador should "pass from the defensive in the United States to the offensive." This meant, in Bajpai's view, that there should be a reinvigorated propaganda campaign justifying British action.[142]

Bajpai continued discussion of his relationship with Halifax in mid-October with Murray, adviser on political relations, and admitted that he had become discouraged about trying to defend British policy toward India. Consequently, he had told Halifax that he "refused to continue his earlier efforts as an apologist of British policy,"[143] which was the way he had been labelled by the Indian media when first appointed. Bajpai concluded the interview with Murray by saying that in view of his stance and his official position he had deliberately not sought interviews with the President, Hull, or Welles, but was willing to consult with them if asked to do so. Referring to the American diplomatic position in New Delhi, unfilled since Johnson had left in May, Bajpai said that if it became clear that Britain did not want the post filled, he hoped that the administration would respond by saying that an Indian Agent-General in Washington was no longer required. He would be "happy" to relinquish his post.[144] William Phillips was invited to be Roosevelt's new Personal Representative in New Delhi shortly afterward,[145] so the situation envisaged by Bajpai did not eventuate and he remained in the same post until 1947. His disaffection was not raised officially again. What the American Government learned from its official and unofficial informants, however, was evident in Phillips' briefing before he took up his post in India at the start of 1943. From the time that he took up the post, America would "listen to both sides and endeavour to see both viewpoints . . . always keeping in mind our general course and attitude toward freedom for dependent peoples."[146]

The United States' war-related compromise with anti-colonial principles was over. Although not a commitment to intervene in India, Hull's statement, informed by what America had heard independent of British propaganda, marked a turning point in Anglo-American relations over India. India became less newsworthy while its leaders remained incarcerated and incommunicado, but the State Department's new understanding of Britain's India policy, based on sound research rather than the old acceptance of "glittering generalities" and other propaganda ploys, posed a threat that required ongoing vigilance by the die-hards who continually renewed propaganda in defence of the British position. What America heard had upset Churchill's certainties about a postwar imperial continuum.

8 Quit India

Gandhi's Emergence

Within weeks of Cripps' departure from India, Gandhi began to discuss a counterplan for India's freedom, first disturbing his nationalist leadership team and then drawing them into support for his plan to convince the British that they should leave India. Gandhi's step back to centre stage and the Working Committee's reluctant arrival at the decision to support his Quit India movement unified the leadership, which had fractured over the issue of non-violence, advocated by Gandhi, as a response should the Japanese invade.[1]

Gandhi had been noticeably absent from negotiations with Cripps, leaving most direct contact with him and a decision on acceptance of his Offer primarily to Nehru and Azad. There was precedence for his stepping aside and leaving decision making to the Congress Working Party.[2] Nevertheless, his behind-the-scenes influence allowed blame for the rejection of the Offer to fall on Gandhi in some propaganda messages and on the Congress Party as a whole in others.

Blaming Gandhi for the failure of Cripps' negotiations became a useful tool, raised formally by Cripps in his "Report on Mission to India," delivered on July 6.[3] In his concluding remarks, Cripps argued that, although Nehru and Azad, among prominent Congress Party leaders, were anxious to arrive at a solution that would involve Indians meaningfully in their own defence, "Gandhi exerted his influence against any agreement." Cripps deduced that his opposition to violence made this inevitable, in the event of defending India should Japan invade. Cripps went on to say that, on April 9 (when the Congress leaders indicated acceptance of the Cripps–Johnson formula), a two-hour telephone conversation with Gandhi, who was in Wardha and not present in Delhi, effected "a complete change in the Congress attitude," their vote changing from 7–5 in favour of acceptance of the defence proposal to 8–4 against.[4]

In his later book, *India: A Re-Statement,* published in 1945, Coupland also drew Gandhi in, stating that it was "rumoured" that Gandhi had "thrown all his weight" against Cripps' Offer. He had returned to his Ashram at Wardha during the negotiations, telling the Congress Working Committee to make up its own mind. His opposition to the Offer was well known.[5] The Viceroy concurred, saying that the Congress Party must have

been affected by "Gandhi's implacable refusal even to consider the declaration beyond calling it a blank cheque on a crashing bank."[6] There are, however, documented contrary views: that Gandhi had deliberately withdrawn from the Working Committee's deliberations and that he had done so on previous occasions. The most recent had been when he stood aside in 1940 and 1941, accepting that the question of non-cooperation in India's national defence was not an option for the Working Committee.[7]

What was not evident in the propaganda messages in the American press about the failure of negotiations was that the Congress Working Committee was concerned that the power devolved to a National Government would not be adequate for the responsibilities to be assumed by it.[8] Thus, although Cripps laid the blame for the collapse of his negotiation at Gandhi's door, he may have misread his friend Nehru's concerns about the powers an incoming *de facto* Cabinet Government might expect to control. Either way, the rejection of the Offer had been represented by Halifax in his nationally broadcast speech on April 7 and in Anne O'Hare McCormick's "Abroad Column" in the *New York Times* on April 8 and 13 as the Congress Party's unwillingness to take responsibility for governing their country in a time of crisis.[9]

Much has been made of an argument that the Congress Party's demand for a *de facto* Cabinet Government (despite the fact that Cripps had offered this) was, on the one hand, unreasonable in a time of war and, on the other, would involve constitutional change that was impossible at that time. In the way offered, no constitutional change was envisaged (see discussion in Chapter 3). The Viceroy would be asked to observe the "convention" that he would not use his power of veto, as he had not in his Executive Council during the previous two years. The Viceroy's powers were not to be constitutionally removed, and he could, had a *de facto* Cabinet Government been installed, use his power of veto should he perceive the need to do so. This retention of constitutional power, even if not used, may have been the basis for Nehru's concerns about the possible limits on the power a new National Government could exercise if the Viceroy saw proposed action as not in the national interest.

During the hiatus following Cripps' departure and the flow of information from early May about Gandhi's plans, and despite the State Department's new awareness and understanding of Britain's India policies, the propagandists were self-congratulatory: "The Cripps negotiations did a successful propaganda job . . . we were able to exploit the situation."[10] The sense of achievement expressed in that India Office file note, however, did not last long. Changing American opinion on the question of independence for India from mid-1942 forced the British to renew their propaganda campaign. Although public opinion polling was not a clear indicator of a pro-nationalist swing as questions varied from poll to poll, the trend was discernible between late March and late July polls.[11] Further evidence of the need for a renewed propaganda push came from the Washington Embassy's

and the Ministry of Information's reading of the United States press. The readings between April and June quoted in a summary to the Government of India and the India Office included statements such as, "Exasperation with the Indian leaders has, however, been accompanied in the press by a growing uneasiness over the whole Indian situation" and "there have been growing signs of a reviving belief that the British cannot afford and in some instances, should not be permitted to let the matter rest in the present unsatisfactory and unsettled state . . . ."[12]

Safeguarding their stance that there could be no constitutional change until after the war in the weeks following Cripps' departure, Linlithgow distanced himself from the Offer. He pointed out to Amery discrepancies between Cripps' statement of what had been offered to the Congress Party and what he insisted was his understanding at the time. Linlithgow anticipated being under some pressure from the Indian members of his Council to agree to "conventions," that is, that he might allow his council to act as a *de facto* Cabinet, in line with Cripps' discussion with the Congress Party leaders. What Cripps had discussed with Azad was known to the Executive Council members and was assumed to have been approved by Cabinet. Linlithgow was caught in a bind: He felt constrained from admitting to his Council that such approval had not been given by the Cabinet,[13] indeed, that Churchill had pulled the rug from under Cripps when acceptance of the Offer looked close.

Doubts about the security of Britain's position in the American press viz-à-viz India had resurfaced with the publication of critical reviews about the lack of political progress there despite some positive signs in May.

One indication that opinion would continue to support British rule in India, however, was the publicising of an early copy, attributed to Gandhi, of a "war" resolution drafted at an All-India Congress Committee meeting at Allahabad and intercepted by the governor of Bihar, Sir Maurice Hallett's staff in early May. Although this was not the first indication that an antagonistic Congress Party response to increasing nationalist disillusionment was brewing, Gandhi's intentions were not then clear. His resolution was followed on May 10 by an article in *Harijan,* explaining to his readers his decision to convince the British to leave India,[14] one of his many evolving arguments on the subject. An article, again published in *Harijan* and addressed "To every Briton," was published on May 17. In it, Gandhi asked for support for his "appeal" to the British to "retire" from its imperial possessions, particularly India. His argument was, in essence, that the withdrawal of Britain would "confound all military plans of the Axis powers," leaving them without an enemy on Indian soil. He went on to cite some war-time hardships faced by Indians as a result of the British military presence in India: Evictions for occupation by British troops and removal of boats from the eastern parts of Bengal to prevent the Japanese using them were among his concerns.[15] In fact, boats and bicycles were removed to a distance of thirty miles from the southern coast in case of a sea-borne invasion, but Gandhi's key argument attacked a straw man: that the Japanese

had no right to invade India. In answer to one of several question posed in *Harijan,* he said that India was not in the hands of Indians, but foreigners "who can do what they like with it," encapsulating in a few words the essence of the Quit India call:

> If Japanese have enmity against your masters they have every right to attack what your masters possess. . . . Proper course for you is to ask wrongful possessor to vacate your country. British do not want help on your terms, as witness failure of Cripps Mission.[16]

Although Gandhi intended a nonviolent approach to both the British and future Japanese invaders in India, his statements could be and were presented as threatening, regaining the propaganda initiative. Indeed, use of the leaked "war" resolution was flagged by Amery on May 6, when he hoped that the "final resolution of Congress at Allahabad, telling us to clear out bag and baggage will have opened the eyes of most people here [in Britain] and America."[17] It did, albeit briefly.

Another indication that public opinion in the United States would approve the continuation of British rule in India, despite the reported press comments, was the Viceroy's plan to expand his Executive Council with the addition of three new Indian members. This notion was much discussed during May with Amery and the India Office, but raised as early as the previous February, thus demonstrating that reform had not been born with Cripps, nor died with the failure of his negotiations. On May 25, Linlithgow wrote, "The sooner we can get the expanded Council together the better. . . ."[18] In this iteration, however, there was no suggestion that party leaders might be included. Rather, "representative" Indians and no resumption of discussion with political parties was intended.

A further indication that British prestige would not be undermined was Graham Spry's interview with the President on May 15, when he clarified some issues that remained unclear for Roosevelt. Spry had been Cripps' Personal Assistant, accompanying him to India in March 1942, and he had been sent to the United States following the failure of negotiations to reinforce propaganda there.[19] At his interview with Roosevelt on May 15, the President posed a number of questions: first, whether the Prime Minister had read his telegram, sent within days of Cripps' departure, in which he drew some similarities between the problems an Indian constitution-making body would face, and those faced before the adoption of the American constitution. Spry responded that the Prime Minister had indeed read his telegram and had passed it on to Cripps: that his advice was considered.

Roosevelt then asked a second question about whether Cripps' instructions had been changed during the later stages of the negotiations. This notion clearly troubled him. Despite the fact that this had been the case,[20] Spry assured the President that there was no truth in any such assertion. Spry noted that the President had not indicated whether he accepted his assurances.[21] The

third question sought to clarify Johnson's position and revealed some concern by the President, who said that he had wanted Johnson to be helpful, but not to interfere. Again Spry could reassure that it had been Nehru who had first approached Johnson, that he had acted properly and helpfully, and that Cripps had been grateful for his help. The President quipped, "Perhaps some of your people over there thought he was interfering," probably a reference to Hopkins' playing down of Johnson's role to Churchill.[22] Roosevelt next commented that Nehru seemed to wish that the negotiations could succeed and that Gandhi's "resurgence" had been a surprise, a reference to the draft of what became his Quit India plan,[23] which was uncovered in early May. The President then queried whether there was any hope of further negotiations, and Spry noted that it seemed more like a comment than a question directed to him. He did not record that he had answered, despite the positive news, the intention to increase Indian membership of the Viceroy's Executive Council, and said that the President moved on to a discuss a further concern: what the Indian population might do if there were a Japanese invasion. Finally, he outlined a proposal for India's defence under Indian officers in the coastal areas before the interview closed.[24]

Much of their discussion had been covered, and Spry had responded more fully, in an interview two days earlier, on May 13, also in Washington, with the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs as discussed in Chapter 6. Spry, following the propaganda line, laid the blame for the failure of Cripps negotiations on Gandhi and members of the Congress Party Working Committee, who were, he recorded, opposed to Cripps' plan due to their unwillingness to accept political responsibility during war-time.[25] Gandhi's new viewpoint about nonviolent resistance, referred to in his draft resolution, allowed Spry to suggest that there was little possibility of a solution to the political impasse in the near future. Asked whether the acceptance of Cripps' Offer would have contributed to the defence of India, Spry asserted that Indian independence had little to do with its defence, which was a military matter. This allowed him to volunteer that Johnson had been helpful and, perhaps, lay to rest again the question of Johnson overplaying his hand in the development of the Cripps–Johnson defence formula, referred to obliquely again by Roosevelt two days later.

Through the many channels such messages followed, Linlithgow was able to let Amery know that Spry had informed the Viceroy's Private Secretary of his view that "Colonel Louis Johnson's despatches on Cripps' negotiations have tended to confuse officials here."[26] Halifax was informed of this in a telegram from the Foreign Office on June 3, laying to rest the idea that Churchill may have rejected the Cripps–Johnson defence formula that had the President's support. Clearly, Johnson's role and their reactions to it disturbed both leaders' sense of propriety. Nonetheless, Johnson continued to be heard.

Despite Gandhi's draft, the Quit India resolution, and Spry's seemingly successful interviews in Washington in mid-May, there was good reason

for the India Office's concern about falling public support in the United States as the political stalemate in India continued. On April 28, Johnson had forwarded to Hull a Congress Party resolution condemning what was described as the collapse of the civil administration in Burma (Myanmar), leaving the citizens of Rangoon and Lower Burma unprotected. The resolution predicted a similar collapse and disregard for the population should the Japanese push through to India. Johnson reported that the Government of India had prohibited publication of the resolution and had not publicised the continuing Japanese advance. He predicted that when the news reached the public, "we will be sitting on a powder keg."[27] About the retreat from Burma, Linlithgow commented to Amery that there were conflicting stories and that accurate comments could only be made by those who had been there.[28]

At a meeting with the Division of Near Eastern Affairs in Washington on May 26, Johnson and other members of the Division reported that the political situation in India had deteriorated further and that dislike and distrust of the British had increased to such an extent that many Indians were starting to look favourably at the Japanese.[29] Should the Japanese attack Ceylon (Sri Lanka) again, Johnson assessed that they would be successful. Allied planes lost in an earlier Japanese attack had not been replaced, the naval base at Trincomalee had been abandoned, and ground-based forces were inadequate.[30] Merrell, the officer then in charge of the New Delhi Secretariat and Donovan, now the American Consul in Bombay, were in constant communication with the State Department during May, June, and July.[31] Berle, Sumner, and the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee also periodically advised the President to take some action to ensure India was defended.

Gandhi's timing of his Quit India resolution is of interest. As discussed in Chapter 2, any question of an attack on India through Burma between the onset of the Bay of Bengal Branch of the South West Monsoon, usually in June, and its retreat back to the south from September leaves North East India, Assam, West Bengal (now Bangladesh), and Burma impassable until late in the year. A Japanese advance would be halted by the rains, flooded rivers, impassable roads, and damaged infrastructure. Thus, there were some four months from the well-orchestrated British repression of the Quit India movement and imprisonment of its leaders and followers before the Japanese could attempt a land-based attack, and air strikes coming out of Burma had a long distance to travel before Calcutta could be damaged.

Gandhi and other Congress Working Committee members were aware that the passage of the resolution would provoke the British into retaliating forcefully. Rapid repression would, in theory at least, free up law enforcement officers to consolidate the military position in East India before the onset of drier weather. Suppression of the mass movement that erupted following the arrests of the Congress Party *en masse,* however, "snapped the overextended line of British authority," in many areas, leaving Bengal, for example, with virtually no resources to deal with the profiteering and rice distribution crises

that accompanied the famine that struck the province from early in 1943[32] and in no better position to resist a Japanese attack.

Johnson had raised the possibility of a sea-borne attack at his meeting with members of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs on May 26, but earlier that month the Philippines had fallen to the Japanese, and a month later their fleet was engaged at Midway Island. It appeared unlikely that they would advance west at that time. However, Churchill kept the threat of a Japanese invasion of India alive to explain the continued imprisonment of the Congress Party leaders, Party members, and followers—close to 92,000 prisoners in all.[33]

Much had been written about Gandhi's emergence to take the lead in what became a united call by the Congress Working Committee for the British to leave India.[34] This account will sketch an outline and focus on the propaganda surge in the United States that represented the movement as a grave threat to the Allied cause.

The Quit India resolution called for "a mass struggle on non-violent lines on the widest possible scale"[35] should the British not leave and, upsetting all the old alignments of Congress Party members, finally passed at the Working Committee meeting at Wardha on August 8. After months of debate, Gandhi's intractable line was backed by a mix from the right wing, including Patel, Prasad, Kripalani, and the Socialists, while Nehru initially found himself in "the strange company" of "arch moderates" who, from early in 1942, had sought recognition for the right of Muslim majority provinces to opt out of a future Union of India, a stance that the communists supported, creating another alignment.

To illustrate the depth of the division, Rajagopalachari,[36] a member of the Working Committee since 1922, mounted a campaign in Madras, where he held a seat in the Provincial Legislative Assembly, to forge a national front in favour of establishing a National Government to mobilise the country for its defence. The split his campaign revealed was deep and was resolved in a move back to the position that the Congress Party represented all-India at a Working Committee meeting at Wardha on July 14. A previous Madras resolution recognising the Muslim League's claim for a separate state was rescinded on July 15 in Madras. This was followed by Rajagopalachari's resignation from both the Congress Party and the Madras Legislature to be free to continue his campaign. Nehru and other Working Committee members regrouped around this threat to the long-held Congress Party credo that it represented all-India.

The Muslim League leader, Jinnah, made a statement denouncing the Congress Party's demand for what would amount to a Hindu Raj (although the Muslim right to opt out of a future unified Indian had already been granted), while other Indian Parties appealed for the resolution in favour of nonviolent noncooperation to be dropped. In the interests of Party solidarity, Nehru, as he had done before, supported Gandhi and moved the Quit India resolution.[37] The resolution, passed on August 8, demanded the

immediate end of British rule; if this demand was not met, it endorsed a mass, nonviolent civil disobedience campaign.

The text of the Quit India resolution as framed at the Working Committee's meeting at Wardha, dated July 14, was acquired by the Government of India,[38] which released parts of it considered to be damaging to the Congress Party. Bajpai could note in a message from Campbell at the Washington Embassy, to the Foreign Office, the India Office, and the Ministry of Information on July 22, that publication of the resolution had, in a sense, killed two birds with the one stone: The publication had been "fully justified by the reaction to it in the press in the United States which has been critical," and it had met the "probable damaging effect" of strict censorship of messages from American correspondents in India in past weeks.[39]

A summary of the resolution as it stood on July 14 was sent by the Government of India to the India Office and contained seven points: The first was the demand that the British Government "clear out"; the second, that India was a war zone because of British imperialism; the third, that no foreign assistance was needed for freedom; the fourth, that India had no quarrel with any country; the fifth, that if Japan invaded India, it would be met with nonviolent resistance; the sixth, the form that noncooperation was to take was set out; and the seventh, that foreign soldiers were a menace to Indian freedom.

For propaganda purposes, the third point was interpreted to mean that the Congress Party wanted freedom to negotiate with the Japanese. If this goal failed, it would be met with the fifth point: that there would only be nonviolent resistance. On the fourth point, the Government of India was able to say that discussion in the Working Committee revealed the majority as appeasers, whereas the minority was anxious that the "resolution should be phased so that [the] Congress position before world opinion would not be compromised."[40]

An American view from Merrell, the Officer in Charge in New Delhi on May 21, after the initial release of Gandhi's plan earlier that month, which Roosevelt had referred to in his interview with Spry on May 15, saw it as spelling the end of India's use to the Allies. He went on to note that the only possibility of "thwarting" Gandhi's move would be an agreement among Nehru, Rajagopalachari, and Jinnah to form a National Government against which Gandhi could not then launch a civil disobedience movement.[41] The possibility of agreement between Nehru and Rajagopalachari had, as discussed, been dashed at the Congress Working Committee at Wardha on July 14.

On July 14, the date that the Government of India had acquired a copy of the resolution and had passed it on to Merrell in New Delhi, his appraisal was, after reading it, that "it is considered comparatively moderate and bears witness to the efforts of Nehru and Azad." He went on to say that, in places, the wording of the resolution was "identical to Gandhi's letter to Chiang Kai-shek" (which Roosevelt had been alerted to, and replied to, on

August 1). The appraisal then suggested that, although the resolution set out Congress' grievances and demands for a complete transfer of power, "it is nonetheless replete with conciliatory passages and gestures." It was also noted that if Gandhi followed his past practices, he would formally send the resolution to the Viceroy, after its ratification by the Working Committee, with the request that it be forwarded to London, delaying the onset of any action. The appraisal referred to a part of the resolution on the future convening of a constituent assembly to prepare for a government acceptable "to all sections of the people" as a gesture to the Muslim League. In summary, the American officer suggested that the "majority of press opinion will approve substantive parts of the resolutions but there will be opposition . . . to launching civil disobedience at this time."[42]

Daily telegrams from New Delhi assessed Gandhi's answers to questions put to him on the pages of *Harijan,* ostensibly from Muslim readers for example, Jinnah's and Gandhi's clashes over prospects for the future, and analysed a lengthy account of a press conference held by Nehru on July 16 and his subsequent conversations with Berry, a member of the Indian Technical Mission. Nehru argued convincingly that Jinnah and the Congress leadership could "come to terms immediately upon [the] withdrawal of British power."[43]

Roosevelt replied to a letter from Gandhi, dated July 1, on August 1 and gently stated his hope that "our common interest in democracy and righteousness will enable your countrymen and mine to make common cause against a common enemy."[44]

Chiang Kai-shek's letter to Roosevelt, dated July 25, stated that, "for a long time the Indian people have been expecting the United States to come out and take a stand for India on the side of justice and equality." After a comprehensive weighing of the debate that had led to the release by Britain of the July draft of the Quit India resolution, he concluded with his hope that the President would "lose no time in adopting a correct policy towards the Indian situation . . . so that our entire war effort will not suffer a major setback."[45] The message was forwarded to the Prime Minister and responded to by Amery in a conversation with Winant on July 30. Amery restated the British Government's position with regard to India, drawing again on its history, Britain's responsibilities, and the communal problem. He let Winant know of the expansion of the Viceroy's Executive Council and proceeded to attribute to Gandhi an unlikely view that Gandhi realised it would not be possible to reconcile the minorities under the Indian proposals without "a continuance of Great Britain's stabilising influence."[46] It was, in essence, a reiteration of an unchanged British position. Chiang Kai-shek's constant interest in India's political future since his February visit and his ongoing concern about its implications for an allied victory illustrate again the global impact of the unpopular British imperial agenda.

Three days before the passage of the Quit India resolution, Donovan, the American Consul at Bombay, forwarded comments from a British reporter who had interviewed Nehru who was in a "white hot rage" and "bitter"

about the publication of what were described as the "secret minutes of [the] Congress Working Committee." Nehru took this to mean that there was no British desire to come to a settlement and that there was therefore no alternative but to proceed with civil disobedience.[47]

The publication of the "secret minutes" that Nehru referred to included parts of the Congress Party's still-draft resolution of July 14, released in the United States on July 20, 1942, and the Working Committee's discussion at that time, more than two weeks before the resolution was finally passed by the All-India Congress Committee. It had regained for Churchill the propaganda ground lost in June. Earlier in July as described, the Ministry of Information reading of American press comment recorded growing indications that Britain should not let the present unsettled state in India continue, but should resolve the political impasse.[48] Publication of the Congress draft resolution, with emphasis on anti-British aspects of it, suggested the impossibility of achieving a political settlement[49] and, indeed, demonstrated the power of propaganda. Campbell, Acting Ambassador in Washington, could inform the Foreign Office, the India Office, the Ministry of Information, and the Government of India at the end of July that, "Allowing publication of the Congress resolution has been fully justified by the reaction to it of the press in the US."[50]

The resolution's publication was supported by a well-timed broadcast by Cripps in the United States on July 27. During the broadcast, he conveyed "standard British propaganda,"[51] increasing Nehru's bitterness and pushing him closer to complete support for Gandhi's Quit India plan. In his broadcast, Cripps failed to include Gandhi's qualifying statements and ignored Nehru's opposition to the plan. In Nehru's opinion, Cripps deliberately misinterpreted the Quit India resolution as it had been debated by the Working Committee in mid-July.

It has been argued that the American press was initially uninterested in the Quit India resolution[52] and, alternatively, that press criticism of the Congress Party began to grow only following the publication of parts of the resolution.[53] Both assessments are reasonable. If at first disinterested, press criticism of the Congress Party grew after the British Embassy in Washington published the full text on July 20. As has been noted, Bajpai informed the Government of India on July 22 that allowing publication of the resolution had been fully justified by the hostile press reaction to it.[54]

Cripps' broadcast on July 27 reinforced the American public's disapproval of the Indian nationalist cause. Prior to the release of the Quit India resolution and Cripps' broadcast one week later, a Washington Embassy summary of American press comments between April 15 and June 30 had indicated a shift in opinion toward the Indian position, galvanising the British propaganda teams into a renewed campaign. The press summary had sounded two warning bells as noted: exasperation with the Indian leaders accompanied by "a growing uneasiness" about the Indian political situation and an emerging strong opinion that the situation should not be allowed to continue.[55] Quit India provided the ammunition.

If publication of the Quit India resolution and Cripps' broadcast regained for Britain the propaganda edge it needed, it also gave Nehru an opportunity to place his opinion of Cripps on record in a press statement at Allahabad:

> Like a clever lawyer Sir Stafford [Cripps] had picked out phrases from Mahatma Gandhi's statement without reference to their context and tried to prove the British imperial case. . . . Sir Stafford talks lightly of anarchy and chaos. He should know that anarchy and chaos are likely to be the consequences of the policy that he and his government are pursuing. It is sad beyond measure that a man like Sir Stafford Cripps should allow himself to become the devil's advocate. He has thus injured Indo-British relations more than any other Englishman could have done.[56]

What Nehru saw as Cripps' further collaboration in British propaganda on July 27 may well have influenced him not to seek to reopen negotiations with the British, which was an option. Both Nehru and Azad had canvassed possible declarations, similar to Cripps' Offer, Nehru with Berry, a member of the American Technical Mission on July 18, and Azad with an Indian journalist described as a friend of the Mission on July 21. In reporting the conversations, Merrell argued with conviction that if a declaration were drafted "with great care," it would be accepted by the main groups in India. He drafted a possible statement for Roosevelt to consider and proposed timing: An offer should be made before the meeting of the Working Committee Meeting scheduled for August 4 or, at the latest, before the meeting of the Indian Congress Committee on August 7. Merrell urged action and said, in a clear indication of American exasperation, that, "if it is unacceptable to the British at this stage of the proceedings, then they are more diehard, obtuse and reactionary than even the Congress leaders suspect."[57] Roosevelt, corresponding with Chiang Kai-shek and Winant, took no action. The possibility of reopening talks in 1942 appeared to end then.

In summary, the British regained a brief propaganda advantage after the release of a draft of the Quit India resolution in late July.[58] The President had not intervened in May or June, and three months had elapsed since the collapse of Cripps' negotiations. Roosevelt was not pushed to act by strong anti-British public opinion, nor was he convinced to do so by Chiang Kai-shek or his officials in India. He had not intervened when advised of the seriousness of both the political and military situations by Johnson on May 26. Berle, Sumner, and the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee also periodically advised the President to take some action in the interests of Allied vulnerability to a Japanese attack should it occur. Arguably, Roosevelt assumed that, with sufficient and justifiable provocation, Churchill would react to suppress Indian opposition.

Amery reported to Churchill on August 8, at 5.45 GMT, that the All-India Congress Committee was in session and likely to endorse the Quit India

resolution. He set out the plan of action. First, Congress leaders, including Gandhi, would be arrested immediately if the resolution was passed. Second, Provincial and All-India Committees would be declared illegal, their offices and funds taken, and all "potential organisers" would be arrested. Third, if these measures failed to suppress any civil disobedience, the Congress Party as a whole would be declared unlawful, and emergency powers used to deal with all forms of Congress activity.[59]

On the morning of August 9, Merrell reported that about twenty-three Congress leaders, including Gandhi, Nehru, and Azad, had been arrested early that morning. He noted that Gandhi had stated his hope that he could talk with the Viceroy before launching his nonviolent civil disobedience movement, "but the Government was apparently unimpressed by this statement."[60]

Linlithgow was aware before the passage of the Quit India resolution that Gandhi planned to suggest a discussion. The Viceroy determined not to wait for this discussion and proceeded with his plan to arrest the Congress Party leaders, assessing that it would be a "profound mistake to allow the Working Committee to disperse over India . . ."[61] if he did not authorise arrests at once. Devadas Gandhi cites an exchange of letters between the Viceroy and Gandhi that were published in February 1943.[62] In the first written by Gandhi on August 14, less than a week after his arrest, he regretted the fact that Linlithgow had made his arrests before the mass action had been inaugurated. The Viceroy replied on August 22, rejecting Gandhi's remarks. A letter from Gandhi on September 23, in which he condemned violence, reaffirmed his faith in nonviolence, and claimed that the Congress Party was also unequivocally nonviolent, was suppressed. Hence, the public in the United States and Britain were unaware that Gandhi had repudiated the accusations against him, whereas Churchill's propagandists painted him as responsible for what took place after his arrest.[63] An attempt by Rajagopalachari to meet with Gandhi to discuss a softening of Jinnah's attitude was met with a Viceregal statement: "special facilities could not be accorded for discussions with persons under restraint for revolutionary activities, whose expressed and published aims were wholly inconsistent with the maintenance of peace and order in India . . . ."[64] The door to a negotiated settlement was closed.

Gandhi's intention when he emerged to take the lead in his Quit India movement, unifying the fracturing Congress Party and orchestrating a nonviolent movement of noncooperation against the British, was to stand at the head of his mass protest, but his arrest and that of Congress Party officials left the Party and its supporters leaderless. Into this vacuum surged lower level, regional leaders acting independently. Without Gandhi's influence and that of the other Congress Party leaders and adherents of nonviolence as a means of protest, violence frequently erupted in assaults on "key links of the Raj's hold over India." Communications in the form of post offices, railways, and police stations scattered across the provinces were the main targets of what was seen as the most dangerous uprising since 1857.[65]

The Raj was never threatened by the Quit India movement or the rebellious direction it took after Gandhi's arrest. With the threat of war on the subcontinent and an expanded army at its command, retaliation was quick and severe. The number of arrests, the punishments inflicted, the estimates of damage to property across provinces, and cases of sabotage attest to the Linlithgow's power to eliminate opposition and, as discussed previously, may have left the British free to prepare for an unlikely invasion by Japanese.[66] The prisoners remained incarcerated until after the end of Linlithgow's Viceroyalty in October 1943, not charged, but detained under provisions in the Defence of India Rules. The extent of the repression and its severity were suppressed as far as possible under censorship so as not to alert the Axis powers or Allied nations to the dimensions of Britain's problems in India, nor the actions taken, nor to contradict the propaganda account. There the matter uneasily rested.

Two questions may be raised without definitive answers: If Linlithgow had not acted so precipitately to prevent the Congress Party leaders from "dispersing" across India, would Gandhi's movement, however disruptive, have remained nonviolent? Had Linlithgow, with Churchill's and the India Office's support, conceivably been waiting for a reason to crack down on the Congress Party since the war started and nationalist Indian demands for independence escalated?

Support for the nationalist cause increased in America in August and September following British repression of the Quit India movement and, in parallel, anxiety about its reputation also increased with the publication of Snow's and Fischer's articles. It was clear that Roosevelt, with public support, again had strong reasons to act indirectly or to broker an agreement between Britain and India on the basis of continuing political unrest. This came particularly from the leaderless Hindus and had clear implications for the defence of India. There was the still the possibility that, with the ending of the monsoon, the Japanese might make a land-based thrust toward India, although the likelihood of a naval attack diminished as their fleet engaged in the Pacific. The possibility of an attack, however, remained high, and the Lend-Lease arrangements to supply India allowed for American intervention in the security interests of its personnel and material there. Clauses detrimental to Britain's retention of control in India contained in the Lend-Lease Act had been one of the concerted points of pressure on Churchill in late 1941 and the early months of 1942, leading to the plan to send Cripps to India to negotiate, and then rein in his powers, to make acceptance of the Offer he brought unlikely.

Political unrest continued through the last months of 1942. But, ironically, India became less newsworthy in the United States. The Indian leaders were in prison. Apart from the continued repression of supporters of the Quit India movement, there was no high-level confrontation with the British to report, nor did Japan attack.

Polling on Indian political issues became less frequent in the United States, and the July–August poll was not repeated until November. A different question was then asked: Should Britain reopen negotiations with Indian political leaders? Only 45% of those sampled answered positively.[67] A cartoonist in *The New Yorker* caught the changed American attitude in a scene showing two fashionable women at tea. The remark of one was, "It makes me so mad when I think how long I've been patient with India,"[68] illustrating the mood that led to the bounce in the polls in the Prime Minister's favour.

The British had been vigilant. Halifax visited every state during the first nine months of 1942. His first-hand experience of India and his willingness to answer questions and correct misconceptions in popular ideas about the country engendered a feeling in his audiences that they were not equipped to contradict British arguments about their rule there.[69] In propaganda terms, Halifax had the means to be heard, and the propaganda tests, especially "Name calling" and "Glittering generalities," were unlikely to be called into question by the audiences he addressed. A poll result, however, reflected another shift in public opinion.

Halifax was not the only person who carried the British propaganda message to the American public during the latter part of 1942. Bajpai, as Representative of the Government of India in the United States and a former member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, demonstrated Indian involvement in their Government as did speaking tours by other, mostly Muslim, members of the Viceroy's Council. Hodson, who had been Director of the Empire Division of the Ministry of Information from 1939 to 1941, when he went to India as Reforms Commissioner, and Puckle, who headed the Government of India's Information Department, were regularly published in *Foreign Affairs*. Other journals published Coupland and Bajpai.[70]

The propaganda effort did not end there. The Ministry of Information made reprints of speeches and articles on India available through the now extensive British Information Service in the United States, and propaganda material was published in popular magazines, including *Harpers*.[71] The *Readers Digest* published a condensed version of Nichols' pro-die-hard *Verdict on India*.

Having regained the propaganda ascendancy in July with the publication of parts of the Quit India resolution, British propaganda was challenged once more in 1942, in September and October, during the rallies, radio debates, and public protests that coincided with the publication of material by Snow and Fischer.

Snow's and Fischer's reports to the President and the State Department contributed to and confirmed official information received from the New Delhi Mission. They strengthened the United States Government's hand in the continuing dialogue with Churchill about India, increasing alarm about an intervention by Roosevelt. Snow's and Fischer's revealing articles also informed the American public and inspired the pro-independence resurgence.

Both continued to write about Indian freedom during the 1940s, and Snow extended his work in the 1950s to probe the questions that had engaged him during his lengthy research in India.

While pro-independence arguments continued in the liberal American press, public interest in India generally waned. The State Department, however, was well prepared to keep up its monitoring of the political situation there and started the process with the appointment of a new Personal Representative to the President in India in December 1942 with the rank of Ambassador, William Phillips. His appointment was Roosevelt's second intervention in India: the first had been the appointment of Johnson in April that year, with a rank equally unacceptable in a colonial possession whose foreign policy and international relations were controlled by an imperial power.

Phillips was a career diplomat, and he took up office during the first week of January 1943, with instructions that struck him as naive: to talk bluntly to British officials, but not to give an impression that a settlement might be imposed. In his few months in India, he toured widely and talked to Indians from all political persuasions, including Churchill's minorities, those "pillars of the Raj," and communicated his understandings to Roosevelt in a series of letters. He spoke of the growing feeling there that America and Britain were at one on Indian policy, the strong criticism he received for not visiting Gandhi—access was denied by the Government of India—and his certainty that the British position would not change especially as the country remained quiet following the repression of the rebellion following Gandhi's incarceration. One of the last, dated May 14, 1943, reiterated his view that America should have a voice in India's immediate political future.[72]

The strongest stance that the United States took in relation to Britain's refusal to negotiate further with the jailed Indian leaders was its cancellation of a program of installations proposed by the American Technical Mission on October 29, 1942, realising one of Churchill's fears. The Mission's recommendations were examined by the Office of the Lend-Lease Administrator, the Board of Economic Warfare, the War Shipping Administration, "and similarly interested agencies" before a communiqué tactfully conveying the decision was despatched. The Government of India responded on November 14, hoping that there would be no change to the delivery of materials already ordered or under negotiation.[73] Despite this setback, there was no concession in British propaganda.

In the light of the range of propaganda material available in the second half of 1942, it has been argued that the post-Cripps period was the beginning of British propaganda in favour of their retention of Government in India.[74] It has been suggested here, however, that this had been the objective all along. That British propaganda in the United States began with contextualising the complexities of understanding India and arguing against immediate Indian self-government, then segued into predicting the

failure of Cripps' Offer for a raft of reasons, leading to the conclusion in early April that the retention of the present government system was the only decision available. That propaganda direction fitted with and expanded the complexities argument in the early months of the year. Propaganda in the second half of the year built on and consolidated the advantage Britain gained from the favourable Cripps' Offer publicity and attempted to repair fences during the pro-nationalist swing following the Quit India movement's suppression. This task was not easy. Up against public statements that India was America's business, arguments that it did not pay to "impugn the good faith of Gandhi" by assuming that he would accept the Japanese, and "shedding Indian blood in the name of Indian defence"[75] were difficult to rebut.

The propaganda campaign's success up to late 1942 was driven by events in 1941: first, Roosevelt's end-of-year pressure on Churchill to settle with the Indian leaders; second, the threat implicit in the Lend-Lease Act, now part realised and the Atlantic Charter's aims; and third, the potential influence of the liberal press. The basic message from Churchill's propaganda was that no alternative government was possible while communal divisions remained, run in tandem with the projected and then realised failure of Cripps' Offer, and had continued acceptance by a substantial core of public opinion. The planning for the propaganda campaign lies revealed in official British government files and documents.

Despite the shifts in polling and the swings and roundabouts of liberal and conservative writing on India, Roosevelt remained on the sidelines, not pressured by public opinion to act, demonstrating again the success of the propaganda campaign. Messages delivered outside the formal diplomatic process, through Johnson or Snow and Fischer, had become the President's way of assuring India of his interest while maintaining his position with Churchill. British propaganda was kept alive by Churchill, a firm believer in intrigue and never fully confident that Roosevelt, gathering information clandestinely outside diplomatic communication norms, would not intervene in India at some juncture.

It has been suggested that the apparent acquiescence by Roosevelt in Britain's imperial policy slowed political development in India. In particular, it encouraged the increasing importance of the Muslim League as a collaborator at the expense of the Congress Party.[76] This outcome was arguably desired by Britain and facilitated by its obviously anti-Congress stance in relation to political reform.

Following the Quit India arrests, however, Churchill's anti-Congress Party speech in the House of Commons on September 10, 1942, and Amery's less-than-welcome remarks on the following day[77] led Halifax to inform Eden that the effect on British prestige in official Washington circles had been detrimental.[78] Support among the pro-British newspapers held, however, with the *New York Times* recording that the American public approved of much of what the Prime Minister had said. In

what may have been a sense of fair play following some uncertainty about the Quit India arrests, it added, on the one hand, a slight reproof about Churchill's failure to make any constructive suggestions for the future.[79] Kirchwey, editor of *The Nation,* argued, on the other hand, that Churchill's attitude demonstrated a failure to offer India the appeasement that it had been prepared to offer its Germany before the start of the war. Appeasement "would be political wisdom in India, not weakness, . . . magnanimity, not cowardice."[80] Churchill had chosen instead to be ruthless, and Kirchwey described his speech as one of an "unreconstructed, unrepentant imperialist," concluding that Churchill had declared war on the Congress Party.[81]

Opinion generally was by no means uniform, but Halifax also was notably disturbed in September by a report he received from Bajpai. Newspaper editors in New York and Chicago, paraphrasing what they called informed public opinion (in this case also including pro-Indian independence Senators and Congressional Representatives), suggested that means should be found to set up a Provisional Government in India.[82] During September, at the height of the suppression of Gandhi's movement, editors also suggested to Bajpai, implicating the Administration, that it might welcome wide pro-nationalist agitation on a scale that demanded intervention.[83] In briefing the Foreign Office, Halifax also reported that Hopkins had told him about the strength of both official and unofficial pressure on the President to act on India's behalf. Halifax added his own view that Britain could well lose the support of the American press.[84]

Despite Halifax's view that the support of the press could be lost, the editor of *The Christian Century* considered that seldom had the American press "given such a shabby performance as in its treatment of recent tragic developments in India."[85]

In the *Christian Century*'s view, only the "Lucepapers," which included *Time, Life,* and *Fortune,* had examined the Quit India resolution with Indian aspirations and frustrations in mind.[86] This was somewhat disingenuous because general support for the Indian position was significant across the media in August and September, the months when Fischer's and Snow's articles appeared.

It serves, however, to underpin an ongoing argument: that public opinion was vital to Roosevelt in policy decision making, and the flow-on benefit to Churchill was broad public support for continued British rule in India, which demanded no action by the President. The volatility of press opinion was demonstrated in the mid-1942 swings, although none decisively changed the majority pro-British view. In terms of Britain's objectives, its case against immediate Indian independence won the propaganda battle.

In winning the mainstream propaganda battle, there is no evidence to show that Britain directed any of its effort at the journals that addressed the problems of India and Asia as a whole for example, *Asia and America, Amerasia,* and the Luce publications, whose readership was interested and well

informed.[87] Britain did not attempt to influence this critical minority, concentrating instead on its established support base.

Britain, nonetheless, never assumed it had gained a permanent advantage. Halifax, therefore, continued his propaganda program, which involved large measures of personal and public diplomacy. For example, Halifax met with Roosevelt on September 15 and left the President with a copy of a letter from Amery to Eden, explaining the British attitude to a so-called renewed effort to settle with the Congress Party, in prison and barred from negotiations. In his letter, Amery emphasised the virtues of the Viceroy's Council, positions on which were not offered to political party leaders, but was enlarged after Cripps left India. It was now a predominantly Indian Council, "working together without prejudice to a future constitution."[88] The Council, however, was not representative, as indicated, and Amery's remarks did not satisfy the State Department. Two days later, on September 17, Halifax requested a meeting with Hull who asked him whether there was any progress between Britain and India. The answer was again negative. In unusually strong diplomatic language, Hull informed Halifax that there was every prospect of an American backlash against Britain and in favour of Indian independence. The Secretary of State recommended that less "blunt" speeches in London might indicate the willingness of the British Government to move forward once law and order were re-established. Hull concluded his record of their conversation by noting that, "The ambassador expressed himself as whole-heartedly and unreservedly in agreement with the statements and implications of what I said."[89]

Arguably, Halifax did agree and that this was not just diplomacy at work. He had been the source of much of Churchill's ire over the 1930's reform proposals for India that had stemmed from the Gandhi–Irwin Pact when Halifax was Viceroy. Halifax reported the general points of the conversation to Eden and the Viceroy, stressing the importance of convincing United States public opinion that constructive efforts were being made to find a solution.[90] The mantra "no constitutional progress until after the war," however, did not change.

As the political crisis in India escalated following the Quit India arrests, Britain's anti-Gandhi, anti-Congress Party propaganda campaign sought to swamp liberal opinion. It was successful in that Roosevelt remained inactive, but *Current History* argued that the wisdom of such a campaign should be questioned because it increased animosity toward the British in India and did nothing to solve the impasse.[91]

The belief in British Government circles that the President might intervene at any time, and another in place of a view that Roosevelt acquiesced in British imperial policy, raises a further question for examination: Was Roosevelt's anti-colonialism, freely expressed until Japan drew the United States into the war, more rhetoric than commitment, important primarily to his relationship with his electorate? Clearly, the British did not think so, with justification as anti-colonialism underpinned American foreign policy.

Roosevelt's attitude to colonialism was discussed by his son in *As He Saw It* and left no doubt about the President's views. Elliott Roosevelt discussed his father's anti-colonialism both philosophically, in terms of the American experience, and morally, in terms of the damage done to development in colonies by restrictive trade agreements and practices. He recalled his father stating that the United States would not help Britain in the war in order to preserve its imperial position.[92] Elliott Roosevelt also recorded that the President and Churchill first divided sharply over Empire during the discussion initiated by Roosevelt at Placentia Bay in August 1941.

The Atlantic Charter, at the President's insistence, was drafted at that meeting. Having signed it, Churchill denied that it had any application to India in the House of Commons on September 9, 1941, but at no stage did Roosevelt resile from his commitment to free all subject people. Throughout 1942 and beyond, the British Government remained uncertain about the President's intentions in Asia generally and India specifically. In subsequent discussions about India with Churchill and in letters after their conversations stopped, the divide deepened and the pressure on Churchill to grant India self-government increased. Britain's propaganda success in the first part of 1942 was the result of careful planning and unlimited access to newspapers supportive of its plight in the war generally and its Indian problem specifically. Propaganda in the second part of the year operated from a well-established base.

Successful propaganda campaigns generally originate from strong, centralised authority.[93] This is what the British had in the Ministry of Information following Bracken's appointment, with decision making about the propaganda line to be followed vested in the India Office and the Government of India.[94] Selecting the correct target audience presented no problem. Newspapers, journalists, and radio commentators who supported Lend-Lease and aid for Britain also were receptive to Britain's "problems" with India and supportive of Britain's much-publicised attempt to solve them.

In Halifax, Britain had "source credibility."[95] He was both figure of authority and expert, perhaps the most important element in the British propaganda lexicon, and the American public was, for the most part, seduced by it.

The Indian demand for political independence in 1942 became part of an Anglo-American power play that largely excluded it. Despite nationalist Indians' limited influence on their own political future, they had the support of Chiang Kai-shek, the Attlee Labour Party and, at least on paper, Roosevelt. The international aspect that drew the President and the Chinese leader into discussions about how to proceed prior to the passage of the Quit India resolution saw only another warning letter to Churchill. The Congress Party leadership, with limited options to exercise, chose not to attempt to reopen negotiations with Britain, although Johnson sent the President the text of a declaration to which the Congress Party had agreed.[96] The text of another declaration, which had Nehru's and Azad's

support as noted, was sent to the State Department by Merrell, Acting Head of the New Delhi Mission, after Johnson's departure.[97] Neither declaration moved far from Cripps' proposals on a *de facto* Cabinet Government and defence formula before they were retracted on Churchill's instructions in early April.[98] Nehru's post-Cripps letter to the President, sent through Johnson on April 13, did not attract State Department support, nor did Gandhi's review of the political situation written on July 1 and delivered by Fischer,[99] emphasising their powerlessness.

The arrest of the Indian leaders on August 8 also brought no assistance from Roosevelt and any prospect of American intervention at that time collapsed following a discussion between Bajpai and Berle on August 12. During their conversation, Berle acknowledged that his Government was unable to act on the outcome of the Quit India resolution: As he saw it, the British were fighting for their lives, and the Congress Party endangered their safety.[100]

The State Department's substantial, but unpublished, knowledge of the events taking place in India made no difference. The influence of British propaganda on public opinion remained paramount.

Two views of the Cripps' Offer as an exercise in propaganda from opposite sides of British politics illustrate its success: Harold Laski wrote that the rapid conclusion of Cripps' negotiations made it look as though the aim was not freedom for India, but a "*coup de main* in the propagandist's art . . . ."[101]

The Ministry of Information, led by Bracken, was satisfied. The propaganda campaign had depended on the support in the United States that it had successfully generated, making it comparatively invulnerable to counter-propaganda from nationalist supporters and the liberal press in America. The campaign, in the sense of the strategic game that Churchill so loved, also depended on Cripps' loyalty to Britain and on the right mix of censorship and press freedom in India. Bracken was able to let the India Office and the Government of India know that "The Cripps' negotiations did a successful propaganda job . . . because . . . we were able to exploit the situation."[102]

The result of that "successful propaganda job" meant that, in the end, there were no winners.

Nehru and Gandhi came out of prison to an India in which there was no longer the prospect of a transfer of power to a united country. Churchill saw his dream of an eternal Raj disintegrate, ending in Hindu–Muslim violence and a divided nation. His dogged determination meant that a watershed moment in April 1942, when Hindus and Muslims agreed to form a National Government on the terms that Cripps without authority had offered, passed in recrimination.

Roosevelt's conflict between America's international commitment to ending colonialism was over-ridden by his country's war-related national interest. His loyalty to his British counterpart, Churchill, demonstrated in his endeavours to give military support to Britain since the start of the war, pushed India and its interests into the political wilderness. Without going

so far as to demand that negotiations with nationalist Indians continue or resume, he intervened twice: His appointments of Johnson and then William Phillips to India as his Personal Representatives with diplomatic ranks were, first, outside normal diplomatic practice and, second, conveyed to Churchill that he monitored events in India and received reports not subject to British censorship. Roosevelt intervened a third time, when a halt was called to Lend-Lease supplies to India, the strongest signal for Churchill that American aid could not be counted on in all circumstances. Churchill did not give way, and the President let the matter lie.

Gandhi's emergence as the Congress Party leader unified the Party, giving him the support to lead it into the strategically disastrous Quit India resolution and the rebellion that followed, bestowing on Churchill the opportunity remove his Indian *bete-noir*.

That Gandhi and Churchill were alike in any way seems at first unlikely, but both were committed to a single cause, India. They were in years' long conflict over its future. Although Churchill disappeared into a political limbo over the question of the slow and cautious moves toward self-government that he vehemently opposed, the Indian masses for some twenty-five years had followed no one but Gandhi. Gandhi was an immovable challenge for Churchill, still, in part, the end-of-century subaltern in the Hindu Kush, and their devotion to different solutions for India brought for neither the desired end.

Their conflict, embroiling Roosevelt and engaging Chiang Kai-shek and numberless supporters and detractors, illustrates how a British propaganda case against immediate Indian self-government could impinge on global strategy, as well as in an imperial political environment, during a world war.

Appendix A
The Atlantic Charter, 1941

The President of the United States (of America) and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other;

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned;

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further enjoyment of all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field, with the object of securing for all improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security;

Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other

practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

Franklin D. Roosevelt
Winston S. Churchill

Source: Rosenman, Samuel. (Ed.). *Public papers and addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 10 (1938–1950),* 314.

Appendix B
The Lend-Lease Act, March 11, 1941

[PUBLIC LAW 11—77TH CONGRESS]
[CHAPTER 11—1ST SESSION]
[H.R. 1776]
AN ACT

Further to promote the defense of the United States, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as "An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States."

SEC. 2. AS USED IN THIS ACT—

(a) The term "defense article" means—

(1) Any weapon, munition, aircraft, vessel, or boat;
(2) Any machinery, facility, tool, material, or supply necessary for the manufacture, production, processing, repair, servicing, or operation of any article described in this subsection;
(3) Any component material or part of or equipment for any article described in this subsection;
(4) Any agricultural, industrial or other commodity or article for defense.

Such term "defense article" includes any article described in this subsection: Manufactured or procured pursuant to section 3, or to which the United States or any foreign government has or hereafter acquires title, possession, or control.

(b) The term "defense information" means any plan, specification, design, prototype, or information pertaining to any defense article.

SEC. 3.

(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may, from time to time, when he deems it in the interest of national defense, authorize the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government—

(1) To manufacture in arsenals, factories, and shipyards under their jurisdiction, or otherwise procure, to the extent to which funds are available therefore, or contracts are authorized from time to time by the Congress, or both, any defense article for the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States.

(2) To sell, transfer title, to exchange lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of, to any such government any defense article, but no defense article not manufactured or procured under paragraph (1) shall in any way be disposed of under this paragraph, except after consultation with the Chief of State of the Army or the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy, or both. The value of defense articles disposed of in any way under authority of this paragraph, and procured from funds heretofore appropriated, shall not exceed $1,300,000,000 The value of such defense articles shall be determined by the head of the department of agency concerned or such other department, agency or officer as shall be designated in the manner provided in the rules and regulations issued hereunder. Defense articles procured from funds hereafter appropriated by any department or agency of the government, other than from funds authorized to be appropriate under this Act, shall not be disposed of in any way under authority of this paragraph except to the extent hereafter authorized by the Congress in the Acts appropriating such funds or otherwise.

(3) To test, inspect, prove, repair, outfit, recondition, or otherwise to place in good working order, to the extent to which funds are made available therefore, or contracts are authorized from time to time by the Congress, or both, any defense article for any such government, or to procure any or all such services by private contract.

(4) To communicate to any such government any defense information, pertaining to any defense article furnished to such government under paragraph (2) of this subsection.

(5) To release for export any defense article disposed of in any way under this subsection to any such government.

(b) The terms and conditions upon which any such foreign government receives any aid authorized under subsection (a) shall be those which

the President deems satisfactory, and the benefit to the United States may be payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory.

(c) After June 30, 1943, or after the passage of a concurrent resolution by the two Houses before June 30, 1943, which declares that the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection (a) are no longer necessary to promote the defense of the United States, neither the President nor the head of any department or agency shall exercise any of the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection (a); except that until July 1, 1946, any of such powers may be exercised to the extent necessary to carry out a contract or agreement with such a foreign government made before July 1, 1943, or before the passage of such concurrent resolution, whichever is the earlier.

(d) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or to permit the authorization of convoying vessels by naval vessels of the United States.

(e) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or to permit the authorization of the entry of any American vessel into a combat area in violation of section 3 of the Neutrality Act of 1939.

SEC. 4.

All contracts or agreements made for the disposition of any defense article or defense information pursuant to section 3 shall contain a clause by which the foreign government undertakes that it will not, without the consent of the President, transfer title to or possession of such defense article or defense information by gift, sale, or otherwise, or permit its use by anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of such foreign government.

SEC. 5.

(a) The Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government involved shall, when any such defense article or defense information is exported, immediately inform the department or agency designated by the President to administer section 6 of the Act of July 2, 1940 (54 Stat. 714), of the quantities, character, value, terms of disposition, and destination of the article and information so exported.

(b) The President from time to time, but not less frequently than once every ninety days, shall transmit to the Congress a report of operations under this Act except such information as he deems incompatible with the public interest to disclose. Reports provided for under this subsection shall be transmitted to the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, if the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, is not in session.

SEC. 6.

(a) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated from time to time, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such amounts as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and accomplish the purposes of this Act.
(b) All money and all property which is converted into money received under Section 3 from any government shall, with the approval of the Director of the Budget, revert to the respective appropriation or appropriations out of which funds were expended with respect to the defense article or defense information for which such consideration is received, and shall be available for expenditure for the purpose for which such expended funds were appropriated by law, during the fiscal year in which such funds are received and the ensuing fiscal year; but in no event shall any funds so received be available for expenditure after June 30, 1946.

SEC. 7.

The Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the head of the department or agency shall in all contracts or agreements for the disposition of any defense article or defense information fully protect the rights of all citizens of the United States who have patent rights in and to any such article or information which is hereby authorized to be disposed of and the payments collected for royalties on such patents shall be paid to the owners and holders of such patents.

SEC. 8.

The Secretaries of War and of the Navy are hereby authorized to purchase or otherwise acquire arms, ammunition, and implements of war produced within the jurisdiction of any country to which section 3 is applicable, whenever the President deems such purchase or acquisition to be necessary in the interests of the defense of the United States.

SEC. 9.

The President may, from time to time, promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out any of the provisions of this Act; and he may exercise any power or authority conferred on him by this Act through such department, agency, or officer as he shall direct.

SECT. 10.

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to change existing law relating to the use of the land and naval forces of the United States, except insofar as

such use relates to the manufacture, procurement, and repair of defense articles, the communication of information and other non-combatant purposes enumerated in this Act.

SEC. 11.

If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any circumstance shall be held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act and the applicability of such provision to other circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Approved, March 11, 1941.

Notes

NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

1. Taylor, 1981, p. 299.
2. Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986, p. 37.
3. Hess, 1971, pp. 29, 123.
4. *New York Times,* 1940, August 10; Hess, 1971, p. 29.
5. *New York Times,* 1940, November 10 & 15.
6. Atlantic Charter, 1941, August 21, and Parliamentary Debates (hereafter PD), 1941, September 9. The terms of the Atlantic Charter are discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.
7. Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986, p. 117.
8. Brown, Judith, 2006, April, pp. 69–73.
9. Nehru, 1941, *Towards Freedom,* p. 353.
10. Oliver, 1989, p. 93.
11. Oliver, 1989, p. 67.
12. Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986, pp. 97–98.
13. Walter Lippmann cited in Georges Seldes, p. 9.
14. Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986, p. 100.
15. See Chapter 1, p. 2.
16. Lee & Lee, 1939, p. viii. A. Lee and E. Lee were founding members of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis. The Institute was funded by a philanthropist Edward A. Filene, and the Chief Executive Officer was Professor Clyde Miller, Columbia University.
17. Lee & Lee, 1939, pp. viii–ix, 23.
18. Lee & Lee, 1939, pp. 23–24.
19. See Chapter 4 for analysis of the Churchill–Halifax relationship and Halifax's appointment to Washington while British Foreign Secretary.
20. Cantril, 1951, p. 327. In January and April 1942, 41% of those polled favoured postwar independence. Thirty-one percent favoured independence now, whereas 26% were undecided.
21. In answer to the question "Should England give India dominion status now or after the war?," asked on March 31, 1942, 37% of the sample were in favour of dominion status now. On July 29, 1942, and August 13, 1942, 43% of those polled were in favour of giving India complete independence. No time was specified (Cantril, 1951, p. 327).
22. FO 371 A 7429, No. 325, MoI to GoI & IO, July 8, 1942. United States press comments.
23. FO 371 A 1893/18/45, Note on the Future of Anglo-American Relations, para. 10, March 27, 1941.

24. The files mentioned are examined throughout the book. It is interesting to note that in the Transfer of Power Documents, Volumes 1 and 2 (hereafter TP), the word *propaganda* is frequently used by Sir Leo Amery, Secretary of State for India, and the Marquess of Linlithgow, the Viceroy of India, to describe their explanations of British–India policy to officials in the State Department and other branches of government.
25. Beloff, 1975, p. 211.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. Churchill, 1989, p. 28.
2. Lord Linlithgow, Viceroy of India 1935–1943.
3. Larres, 2002, pp. xv, 1, 14.
4. Aldritt, 1995.
5. Stafford, 1999, pp. 3–5. I am grateful to the author for colourful information about Roosevelt's entrée into the world of intrigue.
6. Stafford, 1999, p. 4.
7. Stafford, 1999, pp. 6–7.
8. Black, 2003, pp. 90–91. Black writes in detail about Roosevelt's meetings and impressions during this first visit to England.
9. Stafford, 1999, pp. 8–9.
10. Stafford, 1999, pp. 61, 154–161; Mahl, 1998, p. 16.
11. Mahl, 1998, p. 13.
12. Stafford, 1999, pp. 217–218.
13. Churchill, 1989, p. 190.
14. The latest work in this field is David Stafford's *Churchill and Secret Service,* 1997.
15. Berlin, 1949, p. 40.
16. Cripps' Offer, its ramifications and outcome are fully discussed in Chapter 3.
17. Aldritt, 1995, pp. 26–30.
18. Stafford, 1999, p. xiii.
19. The terms of the Atlantic Charter are attached in Appendix A.
20. The Lend-Lease Act is discussed in Chapter 2.
21. Hickman, 2005, p. 131.
22. Harriman & Abel, 1976, pp. 129–130.
23. Morton, 1943. Full lists of the British and American contingents appear on pages 41 and 99. H. V. Morton, a newspaper columnist, and the novelist Howard Spring had also had accompanied Churchill to record the proceedings, despite his and Roosevelt's agreement that no rapporteurs were to be present.
24. Morton, 1943, pp. 84–86. Morton graphically described the physical scene as Roosevelt and Churchill met: "the grey and lonely land" . . . "hills touched with mist" . . . "the dramatic sight of the waiting American war-ships."
25. Roosevelt, 1946, p. 37.
26. Jenkins, 2001, p. 665. In his book *Franklin Delano Roosevelt,* Jenkins (2003, p. 126), while making the same points about the Charter's objectives, noted that the most valuable part of the meeting may have been the establishment of relations between the two countries' service chiefs.
27. Aldritt, 1995, p. 14.
28. Churchill, 1951.
29. Berlin, 1949, pp. 35–44.
30. Sherwood, 1948–1949, Vol. 1, p. 202.

31. Berlin, 1949, p. 39. Berlin, writing in 1949, may have described Roosevelt's awareness of the movement of public opinion and its significance as uncanny as because studies of his methods of canvassing public opinion through his media interviews and fireside chats would not have been developed.
32. Berlin, 1949, p. 44.
33. James, 1974, p. 63.
34. Ryan, 1988, pp. 36, 144–145.
35. Louis Fischer, Gandhi's biographer, spent a week with the Mahatma in mid-1942 and also sought information for Roosevelt and Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. Edgar Snow's classic work, *Red Star over China,* published in 1938, strongly influenced the American view of the Chinese Communists. In early 1942, he offered his services as a war correspondent to the President and, although reluctant to take on a subject as large as India, agreed to Roosevelt's request that he accept a posting to India.
36. The Government of India was represented by the British Foreign Office, and, theoretically, the President of the United States and his Administration could not approach Indian political leaders outside the diplomatic frame.
37. Mahl, 1998, p. 57.
38. Bridge, 1988, p. 4.
39. Mahl, 1998, p. 60.
40. Cantril, 1951.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. Proposed by Kimball (1991) in *The juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as wartime statesman.*
2. Kimball, 1991, p. 127.
3. In the first footnote to his chapter, "Roosevelt and Colonialism," Kimball (1991) quoted from the *Stettinius Diaries.*
4. Colonialism, "which would soon become a thing of the past," was discussed uneasily by Churchill and Roosevelt at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, and Churchill remained preoccupied with the maintenance of the British Empire at the Yalta Conference at the start of February 1945, shortly before Roosevelt's death in April.
5. Kimball, 1991, p. 128.
6. Beard, 1948, p. 5.
7. Sheean, 1947, The four principles, February 11, 1918, p. 375; The four ends, July 4, 1918, p. 375; The five particulars, September 27, 1918, p. 376.
8. The Atlantic Charter, August 21, 1941.
9. Balfour, 1979, p. 232. It also was aimed at Germany, but was regarded by the German press an "empty document," Hitler and Goebbels concluding that it was issued only because Churchill and Roosevelt had nothing more practical to announce.
10. The Atlantic Charter, August 21, 1941.
11. Mitchell, 1942, p. 37. Under the system of imperial preference imposed on India, British producers had a competitive advantage over both non-Empire and Indian manufacturers in the Indian market, while India was given favoured rates for the sale of raw materials and sem-manufactured goods on the British market.
12. Aldritt, 1995, pp. 34, 63.
13. Thorne, 1978, p. 102.

14. Aldritt, 1995, p. 52. Aldritt made the point that Churchill antagonised the President by breaking their agreement not to alert the press to their meeting and by including the British writers and journalists Howard Spring and H. V. Morton in his party.
15. Roosevelt Library (hereafter RL), OF 48-H India 1940–41, Sarkar to Roosevelt, August 28, 1941.
16. Louis, 1977, p. 126. See also pages 125–129 for Louis' discussion about the Atlantic Charter.
17. PD, September 9, 1941.
18. Cantril, 1951, p. 327.
19. Watt, 1984, p. 223.
20. Johnson, Snow, and Fischer. Their contribution to the President's understanding of political events in India is discussed in subsequent chapters.
21. Clark, 1957, p. 71. Between 1942 and 1946, Clark worked with the British Information Services in Chicago and as a Press Attaché at the British Embassy in Washington.
22. Clark, 1957, p. 70.
23. See Louis, 1977, *Imperialism at bay 1941–1945,* Part 1, for an examination of the American notion of trusteeship.
24. See Watt's (1984, pp. 226–228, 250–252) discussion of the meaning of "popular support" for independence movements.
25. Hess, 1971, p. 5. From 1874 on, the United States had most-favoured-nation status in East Indian trade.
26. Hess, 1971, p. 4. In discussing school texts on India that concentrated on its contact with the West, Hess recounts that the chief characters who emerged in Indian history as taught in American schools included Alexander the Great, Vasco da Gama, and Robert Clive.
27. Hess, 1971, p. 3; Palmer, 1984, pp. 14, 15.
28. Hess, 1971, p. 3; Hope, 1968, pp. 11–17.
29. Hess, 1971, p. 18.
30. Palmer, 1984, p. 16; Hope, 1968, p. 12.
31. Hope, 1968, p. 51.
32. Hope, 1968, p. 29.
33. See statements by Breckenridge Long, Welles, Berle, and Murray cited below.
34. Brands, 1990, p. 5.
35. Hope, 1971, p. 7.
36. Brands, 1990, p. 5.
37. Clymer, 1988, p. 14.
38. Thurston, 1947, July, p. 294.
39. Gilbert, 1986, p. 83; Jones, 1954, p. 403.
40. This point and the reasons that Japan was unlikely to menace India again are argued by Snow in "The Japs missed the boat in India," in *Saturday Evening Post,* August 21, 1943.
41. Jones, 1954, pp. 368–369.
42. Thurston, 1947, July, p. 295.
43. Goodwin, 1994, p. 194.
44. Thurston, 1947, July, p. 293.
45. See Chapter 3.
46. The Lend-Lease Act, March 11, 1941.
47. See, for example, statements by Breckenridge Long, Welles, Berle, and Wallace below.
48. Kimball, 1969, p. 159.
49. Churchill's phrase is cited in many works about the lead up to, the negotiations, and the administration of the Lend-Lease Act and the economic

bargaining surrounding it; for example, Kimball (1969) and Dobson (1986), among other books and journals.

50. Lend-Lease Act, March 11, 1941.
51. Thurston, 1947, July, p. 293.
52. My emphasis.
53. Kimball, 1969, pp. 68–69.
54. Louis, 1977, pp. 7–8.
55. *New York Times,* 1942. See Anne O'Hare McCormick's "Abroad" columns on March 30, April 6, and April 13. Also editorials on March 31, April 2, April 9, and April 13.
56. Kimball, 1969, p. 147.
57. Dobson, 1986, pp. 2–12.
58. Dobson, 1986, p. 5.
59. Cantril, 1951, p. 966.
60. Kimball, 1969, p. 3.
61. Hachey, 1974, p. 3.
62. Cantril, 1951, p. 968.
63. Welles, 1944, pp. 41–77.
64. Kimball, 1969, p. 57.
65. Kimball, 1969, p. 3.
66. Although historians have often focused on the debate between the isolationists and those who advocated aid to Britain "short of war," both groups were also involved in a debate with the interventionists, who were prepared to send troops as well as arms to the Allies. The interventionists formed two main pressure groups: the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies and the Century Club Group. Their commitment, which at least at times assisted the President, is examined by Tuttle (1969–1970, pp. 840–858).
67. Cantril, 1951, pp. 409–410. Roosevelt was provided with weekly reports on moves in public opinion by the Division of Press Intelligence. Although it does not appear to have been a contributor to Cantril's Office of Public Opinion Research, the reverse may be true.
68. White, 1979, p. 86.
69. Thurston, 1947, July, p. 293.
70. Herring, 1971, June, The United States and British bankruptcy, 1944–1945: Responsibility deferred, *Political Science Quarterly, 86*(2), p. 261.
71. Kimball, 1971, June, Lend-Lease, and the open door: The temptation of British opulence, 1937–1942, *Political Science Quarterly, 85*(2), p. 241. In this article, Kimball examined the idea that, during the Second World War, Britain and its Empire may have been the victim of American economic imperialism. It is of interest that both Kimball's and Herring's articles were published in the same issue.
72. Kimball, 1971, p. 238.
73. Welles, 1944, p. 411.
74. Beloff, 1966, p. 165.
75. Kimball, 1971, p. 242.
76. Herring, 1971, p. 263.
77. *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Paper, 1942, Vol. 1, The British Commonwealth and the Far East* (hereafter FRUS), Hull to Winant, January 30, 1942.
78. FRUS, Winant to Acheson, February 3, 1942.
79. FRUS, Winant to Acheson, February 3, 1942.
80. FRUS, Winant to Acheson, February 3, 1942.
81. Dobson, 1986, p. 37.

82. Mansergh and Lumby (Eds.), 1971a, *The transfer of power* (hereafter TP) (1) No. 5, Amery to Linlithgow, January 5, 1942.
83. Examinations of these talks and the agreements eventually reached are to be found in Kimball's (1971) and Dobson's (1986) works, frequently cited above, and in Herring, 1971, pp. 260–265.
84. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (hereafter RL) OF 48-H India 1942, Beyster (member of the Technical Mission) to Vice President Wallace, June 12, 1942.
85. RL OF 48-H, Vice President to President, August 7, 1942.
86. RL OF 48-H, Vice President to President, August 7, 1942.
87. Mitchell, 1942, footnote, p. 220.
88. FRUS, Memorandum from Berle to Hull, December 20, 1941.
89. RL OF 48-H India's War Resources, also reproduced in the *Economist,* May 2, 1942.
90. Mitchell, 1942, pp. 222–223.
91. RL OF 48-H, Berle to Hull, December 20, 1941.
92. RL, 48-H India 1942, Berle to Hull, December 20, 1941.
93. FRUS, Memorandum from Roosevelt to Berle, February 2, 1942.
94. FRUS, Memorandum of Conversation, Parker, Division of Near Eastern Affairs.
95. FRUS. This doubt also was expressed to Snow by Indian Industrialists. See Snow, 1942, September 12, p. 11.
96. Mitchell, 1942, p. 223.
97. FRUS, Press Release issued by the State Department, March 6, 1941.
98. *Far Eastern Survey,* March 23, 1942, pp. 70–71.
99. FRUS, March 9, 1942.
100. FRUS, Consul at Bombay (Donovan) to Hull. Text of press release, May 20, 1942.
101. RL OF 48-H India, Beyster to Vice President, June12, 1941, pp. 1–5. See also Chapter 6.
102. RL OF 48-H, 1942, p. 5.
103. FRUS, Memorandum of Conversation by Oakes, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, May 26, 1942.
104. RL 48-H India, Vice-President to President, August 7, 1942. Enclosure: An economic program for India.
105. Brown, 1994, p. 320.
106. For a discussion of the changing Anglo-Indian relationship, see Brown, 1994, pp. 307–347.
107. This is the title of Aldritt's (1995) study of the Roosevelt–Churchill relationship during the Second World War.
108. Thorne, 1978, p. 103.
109. Singh, 1993, p. 1.
110. Clark, 1957, p. 3.
111. Beloff, 1966, p. 153. Professor Beloff's argument that the "special relationship" was a myth explored the premises on which British assumptions about her relationship with the United States rested. Beloff suggests that, although Churchill played on the sentiment of the relationship in public, he was fully aware of American seniority in the partnership.
112. Watt, 1984, p. 22.
113. James, 1974, p. 6695.
114. Clark, 1957, p. 77.
115. Watt, 1984, p. 22.
116. Thorne, 1978, p. 241.
117. Thorne, 1978, p. 241.
118. Thorne, 1978, p. 240.

119. FRUS, Memorandum from Berle to Welles, February 17, 1942.
120. FRUS, for example, Memorandum of Conversation between Hull and Campbell, the British Minister in Washington, August 8, 1942, and Memorandum of Conversation between Hull and Halifax, September 17, 1942.
121. Information from D. Baldwin, an American correspondent in India in the 1940s. Interview in New Orleans, December 1995.
122. Sherwood, 1950, p. 208.
123. Thorne, 1978, p. 241.
124. Thorne, 1978, p. 241.
125. Hope, 1968, p. 60.
126. See record of Snow's interview with Roosevelt in March 1942 in Snow (1958, pp. 253–257). This meeting (and others) is referred to in RL, PPF 7979, Edgar Snow, and in Edgar Snow's Papers, University of Missouri, letter to his sister, Mrs. Claude Mackey, April 1, 1942. See also Louis Fischer Papers, RL, letter to the President, August 6, 1942, and Fischer (1954, p. 134), Gandhi's letter to Roosevelt, July 1, 1942.
127. Hope, 1968, p. 51.
128. Hope, 1968, p. 51.
129. Foreign Office (hereafter FO) 371 A 2514, No. 1474 Washington Embassy to India Office (hereafter IO), MoI, & FO, March 13, 1942. The plan was put forward by Hennessy, Publicity Officer at the Embassy, and Puckle, Secretary of the Government of India's Department of Information. A file note doubted whether the scheme would work.
130. For example, see FRUS, Roosevelt to Winant, February 25, 1942.
131. Cantril, 1951, p. 327.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. Estorick, 1949, p. 296.
2. Brewer, 1997, p. 145.
3. The Congress Party had first been formed in 1885, when Lord Dufferin was Viceroy, as a Hindu debating group.
4. First formed in 1906.
5. The members of the Committee on India were Churchill, Attlee, Amery, Cripps, Sir John Anderson (President of the Council), Viscount Simon (Lord Chancellor), and Sir James Grigg (Secretary of State for War). Anderson had been Governor of Bengal in the 1930s, Simon had been Chairman of the Indian Statutory Committee, 1927–1930, producing the Simon Report on the progress of reform in India, and Grigg had not served in India.
6. TP (1), No. 223, Annex to War Cabinet Committee on India. I (42) fifth meeting, March 3, 1942.
7. Brewer, 1997, p. 145.
8. Brewer, 1997, p. 144.
9. Brewer, 1997, p. 144; Thorne, 1978, p. 235.
10. Churchill, 1951, p. 179. After an acrimonious discussion on India with Churchill in Washington in December 1941, Roosevelt did not again publicly speak about India.
11. Moore, 1975, p. 208.
12. See discussion in Taylor, 1972, pp. 513–515.
13. Moore, 1979, p. 146.
14. Low, 1997, p. 2. The Quit India Movement was the largest uprising the British had faced in India since 1857. The Quit India Movement is discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.

15. Nehru Papers (hereafter NP), Pt. 1, Vol. 14, Cripps to Nehru, March 3, 1937. Other letters in this vein were dated March 14, 1937, May 19, 1937, and October 11, 1939.
16. NP, Cripps to Nehru, March 14, 1937.
17. NP, Cripps to Nehru, March 27, 1942.
18. Interview with Edgar Snow in Snow, 1944, p. 26.
19. A full discussion on a *de facto* or quasi Cabinet can be read in Coupland, 1942, pp. 226–229.
20. Azad, 1960, pp. 57–62.
21. NP, Pt. 1, Vol. 37, Nehru to Johnson, confidential note, May 11, 1942.
22. The Offer that Cripps took to India is set out in TP (1), No. 229, March 3, 1942.
23. TP (1), No. 456, Draft Declaration for Discussion with the Indian Leaders, Clause (e), March 30, 1942.
24. TP (1), No. 456, Clause (e), March 30, 1942.
25. Coupland, 1942, p. 79.
26. TP (1), No. 536, War Cabinet Committee on India, Annex A, April 6, 1942.
27. TP, No. 456, Draft Declaration for Discussion with the Indian Leaders, Clause (e), March 30, 1942.
28. TP (1), No. 586, Linlithgow to Amery, April 10, 1942.
29. Moore, 1979, p. 111. In addition to TP, Professor Moore's work provides a clear account of Cripps' Mission.
30. Moore, 1979, p. 36; Jenkins, 2001, p. 629.
31. TP (1), No. 23, Linlithgow to Amery, January 21, 1942.
32. TP (1), No. 23, Linlithgow to Amery, January 21, 1942.
33. TP (1), No. 25, Linlithgow to Churchill, January 21, 1942; No. 33, Amery to Linlithgow, January 24, 1942.
34. The third clause of the Atlantic Charter is quoted in Chapter 2.
35. Kimball, 1991, p. 133.
36. Kimball, 1991, p. 133.
37. Barnes & Nicholson, 1988 (hereafter *Amery Diaries*). Amery commented in mid-August 1941 that "We shall no doubt pay dearly in the end for all this fluffy flapdoodle."
38. Hess, 1971, p. 27.
39. *Hindustan Times,* 1941 September 15, 1942, January 6; *Bombay Sentinel,* 1942, February 12.
40. Churchill, 1951, p. 179.
41. Sherwood, 1948–1949, Vol, 1, p. 202.
42. Harriman & Abel, 1976, p. 3.
43. Loewenheim, Langley, & Jonas, 1975. The following letters were exchanged between them during the Cripps Mission: Documents 101, 106, 117, and 118. The letters also are cited in Churchill, 1951, pp. 179, 181, 185, 187.
44. This observation also has been made by Moore (1979, p. 47) and Kimball (1991, p. 133).
45. TP (1), No. 5, Amery to Linlithgow, January 5, 1942.
46. *Bombay Sentinel,* February 12, 1942. The *Hindustan Times* somewhat sarcastically printed "Bajpai's View," February 14, 1942.
47. *Hindustan Times,* January 6, 1942.
48. *Amery Diaries,* April 7, 1941.
49. TP (1), No. 42, War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 42, January 28, 1942.
50. Low, 1996, p. 206.
51. *Amery Diaries,* February 5, 1942.
52. *Amery Diaries,* December 20, 1941.

53. TP (1), No. 35, Attlee to Amery, January 24, 1942.
54. TP (1), No. 60, February 2, 1942. War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 59: The Indian Political Situation. Memorandum by the Lord Privy Seal.
55. See Moore, 1979, pp. 32–38.
56. See discussion about fluctuations in American press support for India and Britain in Chapter 1.
57. *Amery Diaries,* commentary by the editors, p. 729.
58. *India Office Library* (hereafter IOL), MSS EUR F 125/11, Linlithgow to Amery, February 9, 1942.
59. TP (1), No. 62, Churchill to Chiang Kai-shek, February 3, 1942.
60. Churchill, 1951, p. 176.
61. Coupland, 1942, p. 31.
62. Azad, 1960, p. 52.
63. Azad, 1960, p. 53.
64. Moore, 1979, p. 62.
65. Kimball, 1991, p. 134
66. Moore, 1979, p. 62
67. Kimball, 1991, p. 134.
68. FRUS, Chiang Kai-shek to Roosevelt, July 25, 1942.
69. FRUS, Roosevelt to Churchill, July 29, 1942.
70. Harriman & Abel, 1976, pp. 129–131.
71. Moore, 1979, p. 63.
72. Harriman & Abel, 1976, pp. 129–130.
73. Harriman & Abel, 1976, p. 130.
74. Churchill, 1951, pp. 181–182.
75. Churchill, 1951, pp. 182, 186. Churchill wrote of Roosevelt's proposal, "I was thankful that events had already made such an act of madness impossible. . . . The President's mind was back in the American War of Independence."
76. *Bombay Sentinel,* March 31, 1942.
77. *Amery Diaries,* March 7, 1942. Amery offered himself as the messenger, but he did not have Churchill's support. Churchill wanted Cripps to go, and the Cabinet agreed. Amery also recorded that "Cripps and Winston have got the bit between their teeth and I don't feel that either of them realise what they are getting at," March 8 & 9, 1942.
78. *Amery Diaries,* commentary by the editors, p. 729.
79. Glendevon, 1971, p. 225.
80. TP (1), No. 536 War Cabinet Committee on India, I (42), Annex A, April 6, 1942.
81. TP (1), No. 567, War Cabinet to Cripps, April 9, 1942.
82. India Office Library (hereafter IOL), MSS EUR F125/11, January–December 1942, Amery to Linlithgow, April 3, 1942. Also cited in Clymer (1988b).
83. *New York Times,* 1942, April 8. Under the heading "Halifax pledges defence of India," the paper gave almost a page to the Ambassador's historical overview, to Britain's current good intentions, and to India's weakness. The idea that Congress was not prepared to take responsibility for the country's defence also was picked up by Anne O'Hare McCormick in her "Abroad" column on the same day and again by her on April 13, 1942.
84. See, for example, *Amery's Diaries,* September 9, 1942; Cameron, 1974, pp. 99–100; Thorne, 1978, p. 5.
85. Callaghan, 1984, pp. 186–187.
86. The members of the India Committee were Churchill, Attlee, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, and Cripps, Lord Privy Seal. The other members formed Churchill's support base on the committee. They were Sir John

Anderson, Lord President of the Council (he had been Governor of Bengal from 1932 to 1937 and witnessed the implementation of the 1935 India Act that granted provincial autonomy); Viscount Simon, Lord Chancellor, who was Chairman of the Indian Statutory Commission from 1927 to 1930 and strongly opposed Halifax's Dominion Status promise; and the final member, Sir Percy James Grigg, Secretary of State for War, 1942–1945, who was Finance Member of the Government of India between the wars.

87. *Amery Diaries,* March 4, 1942.
88. *Amery Diaries,* March 1, 1942. Draft Declaration, Clause (e). Amery claimed that Cripps' proposal was similar to his 1940 proposal.
89. TP (1), No. 196, Amery to Linlithgow, February 28, 1942.
90. TP (1), No. 223, Annex, Draft Instructions to the Viceroy, March 3, 1942.
91. TP (1), No. 282, War Cabinet WM (42) 31st Conclusions. Minute 1: Confidential Annex, March 9, 1942.
92. TP (1), No. 223, Annex to War Cabinet Committee on India. I (42) fifth meeting, March 3, 1942.
93. TP (1), No. 223, Annex to War Cabinet Committee on India . . . , March 3, 1942; Glendevon, 1971, p. 225.
94. Glendevon, 1971, p. 225. Hodson was Director of the Empire Division in the Ministry of Information, 1939–1941, and then Reforms Commissioner to the GoI, 1941–1942.
95. TP (1), No. 525, Linlithgow to Amery, April 5, 1942.
96. TP (1), No. 519, Cripps to Churchill, April 4, 1942.
97. Moore, 1988, p. 104.
98. TP (1), No. 519, Cripps to Churchill, April 4, 1942.
99. TP (1), No. 519, Cripps to Churchill, April 4, 1942. All communications to and from Cripps passed through the Viceroy's office.
100. TP (1), No. 252, attached to War Cabinet Committee on India. Paper I (42) 12, March 6, 1942.
101. Cripps' Offer, *Draft Declaration,* Clause (e).
102. Moore (1988, p. 3) argued that Churchill saw the Congress–League conflict as "a pillar of the Raj."
103. *Amery Diaries,* April 1, 1942.
104. TP (1), No. 275, March 8, 1942.
105. TP (1), No. 384, March 25, 1942.
106. TP (1), No. 440, Proceedings of a Press Conference held by Sir S. Cripps on March 19, 1942.
107. Moore, 1988, p. 94.
108. TP (1), No. 533, Churchill to Cripps, April 6, 1942. Nos. 534 and 536, War Cabinet, Committee on India I (42), 11th and 12th meetings, respectively, April 6, 1942.
109. TP (1), No. 519, Churchill to Cripps, April 4, 1942.
110. TP (1), No. 519, Cripps to Churchill (via the Viceroy and India Office), Clause 18, April 4, 1942.
111. Azad, 1960, pp. 61–61 and 68.
112. Azad, 1960, pp. 57–58.
113. TP (1), No. 379, Note by Sir S. Cripps. Interview with Maulana Azad and Asaf Ali, March 25, 1942.
114. TP (1), No. 379, Note by Cripps. Interview with Maulana Azad and Asaf Ali, March 25, 1942.
115. TP (1), No. 380, Cripps. Interview with Mr. Jinnah, March 25, 1942 [my emphasis].
116. TP (1), No. 536. War Cabinet Committee on India 1 (42) 12th meeting. Annex A. Sent to Cripps, April 6, 1942.

117. Coupland, 1944, Pt. 2, p. 229.
118. Coupland, 1944, Pt. 2, p. 228.
119. TP (1), No. 525, Linlithgow to Amery, April 5, 1942.
120. TP (1), No. 530, Linlithgow to Amery and Churchill, April 6, 1942.
121. TP (1), No. 532, War Cabinet Committee on India. Paper I (42) 15, April 6, 1942.
122. TP (1), No. 536, April 6, 1942. See note no. 115.
123. TP (1), No. 538, Amery to Cripps, April 6, 1942.
124. TP (1), No. 587, Azad to Cripps, Cmd 6350, April 10, 1942.
125. Coupland, 1944, Pt. 2, p. 227.
126. Moore, 1979, p. 123.
127. Moore, 1979, p. 123.
128. TP (1), No. 506, War Cabinet W.M. (42) 41st Conclusions, April 2, 1942.
129. Moore, 1979, p. 110.
130. Johnson's role in the negotiations and his responsibilities to Roosevelt are discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.
131. TP (1), No. 586, Linlithgow to Amery, April 10, 1942.
132. Clymer, 1988b, *57*, p. 269.
133. TP (1), No. 567, War Cabinet to Sir S. Cripps, April 9, 1942. The April 10 date on Linlithgow's acceptance of the proposal in No. 586 suggests that it may have been just for the record. Whitehall reined in Cripps in No. 567, transmitted the previous day via the Viceroy's office.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. See Chapter 1, p. 1.
2. Taylor, 1981, pp. 269, 273, 290.
3. Taylor, 1981, pp. 297–298. Prior to the reactivation of the Ministry of Information in September 1939 (hereafter MoI), the educative role had been a function of the Foreign Office (hereafter FO).
4. Tree, 1975, p. 95.
5. Martin, 1939, pp. 508, 511.
6. Taylor, 1981, p. 298.
7. Duff Cooper, 1953, p. 280.
8. Martin, 1939, p. 512.
9. FO 371 A 6907, No. 20240, GoI to IO & Washington Embassy, July 31, 1942.
10. FO 371 A 6907, No. 20240, July 31, 1942.
11. FRUS, Officer in Charge, New Delhi to Secretary of State, September 5, 1942.
12. Balfour, 1979, p. 53.
13. Taylor, 1981, pp. 125, 173.
14. Taylor, 1981, p. 225.
15. Taylor, 1981, p. 167.
16. Lysaght, 1979, pp. 112–115.
17. Black, 1975, pp. 6–9.
18. Kirkpatrick, 1975, p. 156.
19. Lysaght, 1979, p. 201.
20. Ivone Kirkpatrick (1979) spent his childhood in India.
21. Lysaght, 1979, p. 202.
22. Black, 1975, p. 5.
23. Sharma, n.d., p. 82. Sharma is a former Director General of All-India Radio.
24. Sharma, n.d., p. 82.

25. *Hindustan Year Book,* 1943, p. 163.
26. TP (2), No. 26, Amery to Linlithgow, May 6, 1942; No. 32, Linlithgow to Amery, May 7, 1942.
27. TP (2), No. 41, Linlithgow to Amery, May 9, 1942.
28. TP (2), No. 26, Amery to Linlithgow, May 6, 1942.
29. Churchill, 1951, Letter to Roosevelt, March 4, 1942, p. 179.
30. TP (2), No. 41, Linlithgow to Amery, May 9, 1942.
31. Taylor, 1981, pp. 222–223.
32. Taylor, 1981, p. 225.
33. Black, 1975, p. 9.
34. Balfour, 1979, p. 60.
35. Tree, 1975, p. 153.
36. C. Lysaght, *Brendan Bracken,* p. 215.
37. Tree, 1975, p. 154.
38. Tree, 1975, p. 106. Among the frustrated correspondents, Tree lists Ed Murrow of C.B.S.; Vernon Bartlett, foreign affairs writer for the *News Chronicle;* Norman Ebbut of the *Times;* and American journalists.
39. Balfour, 1979, p. 61.
40. Tree, 1975, p. 108.
41. Tree, 1975, p. 196.
42. Tree, 1975, p. 103.
43. Tree, 1975, p. 103.
44. Clark, 1957, p. 136.
45. Harold Laski was Professor of Political Science at the London School of Economics and a member of the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party during the Second World War.
46. Clark, 1957, p. 137.
47. Roberts, 1991, pp. 272–275.
48. Tree, 1975, p. 106.
49. Tree, 1975, p. 106.
50. Tree, 1975, p. 96.
51. Bridge, 1988, June, p. 4.
52. Bridge, 1988, pp. 1, 4.
53. Nicolson, 1968, p. 97, following diary entry, June 21, 1940.
54. Tree, 1975, p. 105.
55. Tree, 1975, p. 109. My thanks to Professor Stoddart for his "shades of Monty Python" remark.
56. Balfour, 1979, p. 61.
57. Duff Cooper, 1953, p. 285.
58. Nicolson, 1968, p. 97.
59. Lysaght, 1979, p. 189.
60. Tree, 1975, p. 120.
61. Nicolson, 1968, p. 17. Introduction by his son, Nigel Nicolson.
62. Viscount Camrose, 1947, p. 148.
63. Nicolson, 1968, January 23, 1942, p. 207; March 30, 1942, p. 221.
64. Tree, 1975, pp. 153–154.
65. Nicholas, 1981, p. viii.
66. Viscount Camrose, 1947, p. 13.
67. Tree, 1975, p. 156.
68. FO 371 A 1686, No. 910, Halifax to India Office, 1942, February 17.
69. Barnes, 1940, p. 413.
70. *Bombay Sentinel,* April 11, 1942.
71. Lysaght, 1979, p. 191.
72. Boyle, 1978, p. 265.

73. Boyle, 1978, pp. 7–13.
74. Boyle, 1978, p. 272.
75. Lysaght, 1979, p. 196.
76. Boyle, 1978, p. 297.
77. Balfour, 1979, p. 422.
78. See Introduction from p. 6.
79. Kraus, 1941, p. 42. Kraus explained that Halifax was known as the "Holy Fox" because he was both religious and a Master of Foxhounds. Roberts, whose 1991 biography of Halifax removes much of the protective camouflage that Kraus and Lord Birkenhead accorded him, took "*The Holy Fox*" as his title. In his autobiography, *Fullness of Days,* Halifax also glosses over the difficulties his appointment to Washington presented.
80. Roberts, 1991, p. 274.
81. Roberts, 1991, p. 274.
82. Lysaght, 1979, p. 225.
83. Birkenhead, Earl of, 1965, p. 535.
84. Bridge, 1988, p. 41.
85. Roberts, 1991, p. 275.
86. Birkenhead, Earl of, 1965, pp. 236–237.
87. Roberts, 1991, p. 277.
88. Roberts, 1991, p. 286.
89. Nicholas, 1981, pp. ix–xiv, Isaiah Berlin's Introduction.
90. Hachey, 1974, Political Review for 1942, Relations with India, pp. 65–66.
91. Tree, 1975, p. 97.
92. Tree, 1975, p. 97.
93. Hachey, 1974, Political Review for 1942, British Publicity, p. 66.
94. Tree, 1975, p. 97.
95. Tree, 1975, pp. 157, 168.
96. Hachey, 1974, Political Review for 1942, British Publicity, p. 66.
97. Tree, 1975, p. 154.
98. David Bowes-Lyon was a member of the Queen Mother's family.
99. Tree, 1975, p. 168.
100. Tree, 1975, p. 155.
101. Nicholas, 1981, p. viii.
102. Lysaght, 1979, p. 216.
103. FO 317 A 1686, No. 910, Halifax to IO, February 17, 1942.
104. FO 371 A 1687, No. 916, Halifax to IO, copied to FO and GoI, February 17, 1942.
105. Nicholas, 1981, February 26, 1942, p. 22.
106. I could find no initials for Darvell and Butler.
107. The appointment of Colonel Louis Johnson to this post is discussed in Chapter 4.
108. FO 371 A 2400, No. 1374, Halifax to IO (Joyce), March 9, 1942.
109. FO 371 A 2400, No. 1374. File note, signature indecipherable.
110. FO 371 A 1686, No. 910, Halifax to IO, (Hennessy to Joyce), February 17, 1942.
111. FO 371 A 1686, February 17, 1942.
112. FO 371 A 2400, No. 910, Halifax to IO (Hennessy to Joyce), March 9, 1942.
113. FO 371 A 2400, No. 910, March 9, 1942.
114. Louis, 1977, p. 158. Anne O'Hare McCormick was a member of the United States Foreign Policy Advisery Committee, who, along with Roosevelt and other like-minded members of the Committee, agreed that "the age of imperialism is ended."

115. Three such newsreels have been viewed: "Munitions and men," "Indian leaders and Home Rule," and "Churchill with overseas troops." Held at Film World, Artarmon, NSW, Australia.
116. FO 371 A 1686, No. 910, Halifax to IO (Hennessy to Joyce), February 17, 1942.
117. FO 371 A 1687, No. 916, Halifax to IO, February 17, 1942.
118. FO 371 A 1716 (no number), MoI to Washington, February 13, 1942.
119. FO 371 A 1716, February 13, 1942.
120. FO 371 A, 656, MoI to Washington, February 12, 1942.
121. Cantril, 1951, p. 327.
122. FO 371 A 1716 (no number), MoI to Washington, February 13, 1942.
123. FO 371 A 1892, No. 1285, FO to Washington, message from the Secretary of State (Joyce to Hennessy), February 26, 1942.
124. FO 371 A 1892, No. 1285, February 26, 1942.
125. FO 371 A 1716, (no number). File note dated March 4, 1942.
126. TP (1), No. 112, Amery to Linlithgow, February 13, 1942.
127. TP (1), No. 179, Linlithgow to Hallett (Governor of the United Provinces), February 24, 1942.
128. TP (1), No. 190, War Cabinet. Committee on India. Paper I (42) 4. Memorandum by the Secretary of State, February 27, 1942.
129. TP (1) No. 304, Amery to Linlithgow, March 10, 1942, (Paras. 2 and 7).
130. TP (1), No. 349, Amery to Linlithgow, March 19, 1942.
131. *New York Times,* March 31, 1942.
132. TP (1), No. 440, Press Conference held by Cripps, p. 549, March 29, 1942.
133. TP (1), No. 440, Press Conference held by Cripps, p. 547, March 29, 1942.
134. TP (1), Nos. 379, 380, Cripps' interviews with Azad and Jinnah respectively, March 25, 1942.
135. Venkataramani & Shrivastava, 1979, p. 132. They also quote a number of anti-Congress Party opinions in, for example, the *Chicago Daily News,* the *Los Angeles Times,* the *Philadelphia Bulletin,* and the *Washington Star.*
136. FO 371 A 2130 (no number), Halifax to MoI, April 4, 1942.
137. *Hindustan Times,* April 5, 1942.
138. White, 1979, p. 154.
139. White, 1979, p. 86.
140. Birkenhead, Earl of, 1965, p. 497.
141. Steel, 1980, p. 396.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1. Carroll, 1948, pp. 5, 7. Carroll was brought into the Office of War Information when it was set up in 1942 to head its London office.
2. Sherwood, 1950, 1948–1949.
3. The poet's name is spelled in two different ways: "McLeish" by Ronald Tree, who was his friend, and "MacLeish" by both Sorensen (1968) and Dictionaries of Biography. The latter is used.
4. Sorenson, 1968, p. 9.
5. Carroll, 1948, p. 5.
6. Clymer, 1988, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Louis Johnson, India, and Anti-colonialism: Another look, *Pacific Historical Studies,* p. 275.
7. Sorensen, 1968, p. 10.
8. Sorensen, 1968, p. 10.
9. *Time,* 12 October 1942, p. 22; Clymer, 1988, p. 275.

10. RL, Louis Fischer Papers, Conversation with Vice-President Wallace, September 24, 1942.
11. Kirkpatrick, 1959, pp. 164–166.
12. Kirkpatrick, 1959, p. 166.
13. Elder, 1968, p. 29.
14. Taylor, 1981, p. 298.
15. Taylor, 1981, p. 298.
16. Elder, 1968, p. 36.
17. For example, RL, OF 48 H, India 1942, Harry E. Beyster, American Technical Mission to India, to the Vice President, June 12, 1942.
18. FRUS, Memorandum of Conversation, Murray (Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs) and Welles, February 5, 1942. The Bardoli resolution differed from the September 1940 Bombay resolution, which postulated that in no circumstances would violence be met by violence.
19. Clymer, 1988, p. 276.
20. Clymer, 1988, p. 275.
21. Harriman & Abel, 1976, p. 3.
22. FO 317 A 2570, No. 1537, Halifax to FO & file notes, March 19, 1942.
23. FO 317 A 2916, No. 1472, IO to GoI, March 20 & 24, 1942 (copied to Halifax) and A 3060 (no number), IO to Washington, March 27, 1942. FRUS, Memorandum of Conversation, Welles and Halifax, April 1, 1942.
24. RL, PPF 2822, Johnson, Louis A., Roosevelt to Johnson, March 21, 1942.
25. FRUS, Memorandum of Conversation, Berle and Bajpai, January 28, 1942, and RL, OF 48 H, India 1942, Berle to Secretary of State, January 28, 1942. Referred to in Chapter 1.
26. RL, OF 48 H, India 1942, Berle to Secretary of State, January 28, 1942.
27. RL, OF 48 H, India 1942, Memo to Berle, February 2, 1942.
28. FRUS, Memorandum of Conversation, Berle and Bajpai, February 28, 1942.
29. FRUS, Memorandum of Conversation, Roosevelt to Churchill, March 10, 1943; Loewenheim, Langley, & Jonas, 1975, Doc. 106, March 10, 1942.
30. Churchill, 1951, pp. 182, 186.
31. TP (1), No. 350, Roosevelt to Linlithgow, March 19, 1942.
32. Moore, 1979, p. 105.
33. FRUS, Memorandum of Conversation, Shaw with Johnson, March 11, 1942.
34. FRUS, Memorandum of Conversation, Shaw with Johnson, March 11, 1942.
35. RL, PPF 2822, Johnson, Louis A., Roosevelt to Johnson, March 21, 1942. It has been noted that controversial documents in the Roosevelt Library are occasionally incomplete.
36. Hess, 1971, pp. 42, 59.
37. Brands, 1990, p. 16.
38. Palmer, 1984, p. 19.
39. Hope, 1968, p. 61.
40. Cooke, 1957, p. 291; Estorick, 1949, p. 313; Strauss, 1943, p. 185.
41. Cooke, 1957, p. 291.
42. Strauss, 1943, p. 185.
43. Coupland, 1944, Pt. 2, p. 282. Although the report as a whole was published in 1944, Part 2 was first produced in March 1943.
44. Coupland, 1942, p. 65.
45. *Hindustan Times,* April 7 and April 11, 1942.
46. Oliver, 1989, p. 121.
47. Coupland, 1942, p. 65.

48. Moore, 1979, pp. 105–106.
49. Clymer, 1988, p. 279.
50. Clymer, 1988, p. 279.
51. FRUS, Johnson to Roosevelt, April 11, 1942; Loewenheim, Langley, & Jonas, 1975, Doc. 117, April 11, 1942.
52. FRUS, Johnson to Roosevelt, April 11, 1942; TP (1), No. 611, Roosevelt to Churchill via Hopkins, April 12, 1942. This represents the date of receipt of the message.
53. TP (1), No. 617, Churchill to Roosevelt, April 12, 1942.
54. Greenwich Mean Time.
55. *Hindustan Times,* April 14, 1942. An article entitled "Johnson and Congress," submitted by Associated Press, India.
56. Indian Standard Time.
57. TP (1), No. 587, Azad to Cripps, Cmd. 6350, April 10, 1942. Extracts repeated in the *Hindustan Year Book,* 1943, Cripps' Mission in India, p. 272.
58. IOL, MSS EUR F125/11, Letters to Amery from Linlithgow, January–December 1942; April 7, 1942.
59. TP (1), No. 557, Linlithgow to Amery, April 9, 1942.
60. TP (1), No. 557, Linlithgow to Amery, April 9, 1942.
61. TP (1), No. 556, Cripps to Churchill, April 9, 1942 (received at 11.20 p.m., April 8, indicating some delay in transmission).
62. Sherwood, 1950, p. 524. Discussion held at 10 a.m. (GMT) on April 9, 1942.
63. Sherwood, 1948–1949, Vol. 2, p. 529.
64. Sherwood, 1950, p. 524; 1948–1949, p. 529.
65. TP (1), No. 564, Churchill to Cripps, April 9, 1942.
66. TP (1), No. 582, Churchill to Cripps, April 10, 1942.
67. Moore, 1988, p. 102.
68. *Indian Annual Register,* Vol. 2, July–December 1942, p. 94.
69. IOL, L/I/1/803, File No. 462/32D, American journalists and photographers in India. Preston Gover from April 1942. List runs from 1941 to 1944, but is incomplete.
70. IOL, L/I/1/733, File No. 461/18B, War Series Secret, Censorship Indian (Cases), Kirchner to Joyce, March 4, 1942.
71. IOL, L/I/1/733, File No. 461/18B, War Series Secret, Censorship Indian (Cases), Kirchner to Joyce, March 4, 1942.
72. *New York Times,* September 9, 1942. The article appeared in the *Saturday Evening Post,* September 12, 1942.
73. IOL, L/I/1 /799, File No. 462/32, American interest in the Indian situation, September 9, 1942.
74. Snow's article is discussed in Chapter 7.
75. IOL, L/I/1/799, File No. 462/32, Lt. Col. Palmer, New York, to India Office, September 9, 1942.
76. RL, PPF 2822, Johnson, Louis A., Grady to Roosevelt, confidential telegram, August 5, 1942.
77. NP, Pt. I, Vol. 37, Johnson to Nehru, April 23, 1942.
78. RL, OF 4069, Johnson, Speech to the National Convention of the American Legion, Kansas City, September 20, 1942.
79. Hachey, 1974, Political Report for 1942, p. 65.
80. Hess, 1971, p. 89.
81. Thorne, 1978, p. 247.
82. RL, PSF India 1943, Phillips to Roosevelt, February 23, 1943, and March 3, 1943.

83. Edgar Snow Papers, University Archives, University of Missouri, Kansas City.
84. Thomas, 1996, p. 3.
85. Known as the Gandhi–Irwin Pact, it envisaged dominion status for India, enraging Churchill.
86. Farnsworth, 1991, p. 21.
87. Hamilton, 1988, p. 38; Farnsworth, 1991, p. 245.
88. Snow, *New York Sun,* October 27, 1931; February 6, 1932; February 15, 1932; and April 9, 1932.
89. Snow, Gandhi strives for compact to unite factions in India, *New York Sun,* July 1, 1931.
90. Snow, How the boycott movement is killing India's foreign trade, *China Weekly Review,* July 18, 1931.
91. Thomas, 1996, p. 151.
92. Snow, The Political Battle for Asia, in *Smash Hitler's International,* pp. 60, 56–57.
93. Snow, 1941, p. 416.
94. Snow, 1941, p. 413.
95. Snow, 1941, pp. 411–419.
96. RL, PPF 7979, Edgar Snow, Snow to Early, February 21, 1942.
97. Snow, 1958, p. 254.
98. Snow, 1958, pp. 254–255.
99. For example, "How the Boycott Movement is killing India's foreign trade," in *The China Weekly Review,* July 18, 1931; and "Gandhi strives for compact to unite factions in India," in the *New York Sun,* July 1, 1931. These articles are among the Edgar Snow Papers, University of Missouri, Kansas City Campus.
100. Hamilton, 1988, p. 128.
101. Hamilton, 1988, p. 135.
102. Hamilton, 1988, p. 105.
103. Snow, 1958, p. 257.
104. NP, Pt. I, Vol. 37, Nehru to Johnson, April 13, 1942.
105. Nehru, 1960, Nehru to Roosevelt, April 12, 1942, pp. 479–480.
106. Edgar Snow Papers, Snow to Mrs. Claude Mackey, April 1, 1942.
107. RL, PPF 7979, Edgar Snow, reports.
108. Cantril, 1977, p. 327.
109. Snow, Must Britain give up India?, *Saturday Evening Post,* September 12, 1942.
110. Hamilton, 1988, p. 152.
111. Snow, 1957 (March), Fragments from FDR, Pt. 2, *Monthly Review,* p. 402. The articles are held with Edgar Snow's Papers.
112. Snow, 1957 (January), Pt. 1, p. 317.
113. Snow, 1957 (January), Pt. 1, p. 317.
114. Snow, 1957 (January), Pt. 1, p. 320.
115. Snow, 1957, Fragments from FDR, p. 320. Conversation with Roosevelt, May 26, 1944. Statement made by Churchill at the Mansion House, November 1942.
116. Snow, 1957, pp. 320–321; Snow, 1958, p. 341.
117. Snow, 1957, Pt. 1, p. 318. Conversation with Roosevelt, February 24, 1942.
118. FRUS, Long to Welles, February 25, 1942.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1. See Chapter 2 and Taylor, 1981, p. 298.

2. Viscount Templewood, 1954, p. 48.
3. Coupland, 1942, p. 18.
4. Brown, 1994, pp. 242, 256.
5. Moore, 1966, p. 115.
6. Viscount Templewood, 1954, p. 61.
7. Kimball, 1984, pp. 374–379.
8. Peele, 1975, p. 137.
9. Lord Butler, 1971, pp. 43, 45.
10. Peele, 1975, p. 137.
11. Peele, 1975, p. 138.
12. Peele, 1975, pp. 122–124.
13. Callahan, 1984, p. 35.
14. FO 371 A 1716, No. 656, American Division, MoI, file note, February 12, 1942.
15. FO 371 A (no number), FO, Minutes of meeting and file note, February 13, 1942.
16. FO 371, A 1892, No. 1285, FO (forwarded from IO) to Washington Embassy, February 26, 1942.
17. FO 371, A 2036, No. 39, Agent General to FO and GoI, February 28, 1942.
18. IOL, MSS EUR D 725, Minutes of a meeting at the British Embassy, Washington, March 19, 1942.
19. *Hindustan Times,* March 17, 1942.
20. *New York Times,* March 22, 1942.
21. *New York Times,* March 24, 1942.
22. TP (1), No. 393, War Cabinet Committee on India, (42) 9th Meeting, March 26, 1942.
23. TP (2), No. 134, Linlithgow to Amery, June 9, 1942; No. 151, Hallett (UP) to Linlithgow, June 16, 1942.
24. Karkhanis, 1982, p. 75.
25. TP (1), No. 395, Bracken to Cripps, March 26, 1942.
26. TP (1), No. 399, Cripps to Bracken, March 27, 1942.
27. TP (1), No. 400, Cripps to Bracken, March 27, 1942.
28. FO 371 A 1714 (no number), Washington Embassy to FO, March 27, 1942; TP (1), No. 409, Amery to Linlithgow, March 28, 1942.
29. TP (1). No. 421, Turnbull to Amery, March 28, 1942.
30. TP (1), No. 542, Statement by the Secretary of State, April 7, 1942.
31. TP (1), No. 422, Amery and Bracken to Halifax, March 28, 1942.
32. FRUS, Halifax to Welles, March 28, 1942.
33. TP (1), No. 610, Amery to Linlithgow, April 11, 1942.
34. TP (1), No. 428, Note by Mr. Pinnell, March 28, 1942.
35. TP (1), No. 431, Churchill to Cripps, March 29, 1942.
36. Coupland, 1942, p. 46.
37. TP (1), No. 440, Proceedings of a press conference held by Sir Stafford Cripps, March 29, 1942, Questions on Paragraph (e) of proposal, pp. 546–551.
38. TP (1), No. 440, p. 549.
39. TP (1), No. 440, p. 550.
40. TP (1), No. 440, p. 547.
41. See Chapter 2.
42. TP (1), No. 427, Halifax to Cripps, March 18, 1942.
43. TP (1), No. 524, Cripps to Halifax, April 5, 1942.
44. TP (1), No. 508, Cripps to Churchill (via Viceroy and India Office), April 2, 1942.
45. TP (1), No. 516, Amery to Churchill, April 3, 1942.

46. PD, Debate on India, April 28, 1942, cols. 844, 916.
47. Venkataramani & Shrivastava, 1979, p. 116.
48. TP (1), No. 600, Cripps to Bracken and Amery, April 11, 1942.
49. FO 371 A 2130, Halifax to MoI, April 9, 1942.
50. FO 371 A, Washington Embassy to MoI, April 4, 1942.
51. *Hindustan Times,* April 9, 1942.
52. *Hindustan Times,* April 9, 1942.
53. Barnes, 1940, p. 426.
54. *Bombay Sentinel,* April 9, 1942.
55. Steel, 1980, p. 291.
56. *New York Times,* June 15, 38.
57. Louis, 1977, p. 158. McCormick also was a member of the Foreign Policy Advisery Committee.
58. *New York Times,* April 8, 1942.
59. *The Times,* April 9, 1942.
60. *The Times,* April 9, 1942.
61. *The Times,* April 9, 1942.
62. *Manchester Guardian,* April 9, 1942.
63. *Manchester Guardian,* April 10, 1943.
64. *Manchester Guardian,* April 10, 1942.
65. *New York Times,* April 9, 1942.
66. TP (1), No. 567, War Cabinet to Cripps, April 9, 1942.
67. TP (1), No. 583, diary notes by Pinnell and Laithwaite, Private Secretaries to the Viceroy, April 10, 1942.
68. TP (1), No. 586, Linlithgow to Amery, April 10, 1942.
69. TP (1), No. 586.
70. *Washington Post,* April 11, 1942.
71. TP (1), No. 587, Azad to Cripps (Cmd. 6350), April 10, 1942.
72. *Washington Post,* April 11, 1942.
73. *New Statesman and Nation,* February 28, 1942.
74. *New Statesman,* March 14, 1942.
75. *New Statesman,* April 18, 1942.
76. TP (1), No. 542, Ministry of Information press conference, Statement by the Secretary of State, April 7, 1942.
77. TP (1), No. 542, Statement by the Secretary of State, April 7, 1942, p. 672.
78. TP (1), No. 542, pp. 673, 681.
79. TP (1), No. 546, Puckle to Joyce, April 7, 1942.
80. TP (1), No. 542, p. 678.
81. TP (1), No. 542, Statement by the Secretary of State, April 7, 1942, p. 678.
82. TP (1), No. 587, Azad to Cripps, No. 590, Cripps to Azad, April 10, 1942; No. 604, Azad to Cripps, April 11, 1942 (Cmd. 6350).
83. TP (1), No. 604, Azad to Cripps, April 11, 1942 (Cmd. 6350).
84. TP (1), No. 609, Broadcast by Cripps, April 11, 1942.
85. TP (1), No. 380, Cripps' interview with Jinnah, March 25, 1942.
86. TP (1), No. 604, Azad to Cripps, April 11, 1942.
87. TP (1), No. 587, Azad to Cripps, April 10, 1942.
88. *New York Times,* April 12, 1942.
89. *New York Times,* April 11, 1942.
90. *Washington Post,* April 11 & 13, 1942.
91. TP (1), No. 604, Azad to Cripps, April 11, 1942.
92. FRUS, Johnson to the Secretary of State (for the President), April 11, 1942.
93. FRUS, Johnson to the Secretary of State. April 11, 1942.
94. FRUS, Johnson to the Secretary of State, April 11, 1942.
95. FO 371 A 6988, Washington to FO, July 17, 1942.

96. TP (2), No. 339, War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 318, India as a factor in Anglo-American relations, Note by Amery, July 27, 1942.
97. TP (2), No. 61, Note by Spry, May 15, 1942.
98. FRUS, Memorandum of conversation by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, May 13, 1942.
99. Sherwood, 1950, p. 524.
100. TP (2), No. 69, Linlithgow to Amery, May 18, 1942.
101. TP (1), No. 667, Linlithgow to Amery, April 22, 1942.
102. FRUS, Roosevelt to Churchill (via Hopkins), April 11, 1942.
103. Churchill, 1951, p. 187.
104. Churchill, 1951, p. 186.
105. TP (1), No. 610, Amery to Linlithgow, April 11, 1942.
106. TP (1), No. 665, Ministry of Information press conference, April 22, 1942, Statement by Sir Stafford Cripps.
107. TP (1), No. 665, Ministry of Information press conference, April 22, 1942.
108. TP (1), No. 685, Linlithgow to Amery, April 25, 1942.
109. TP (1), No. 686, Linlithgow to Amery, April 25, 1942; *Hindustan Times,* April 25, 1942.
110. TP (1), No. 686 and No 693, Amery to Linlithgow, April 25, 1942.
111. TP (1), No. 706, Amery to Linlithgow, April 29, 1942.
112. Cripps Papers, Nuffield College, Draft of Speech on India for April 28, 1942, pp. 24–28.
113. PD, Debate on India, April 28, 1942, cols. 838–840.
114. PD, Debate on India, April 28, 1942, col. 855.
115. PD, Debate on India, April 28, 1942, cols. 882, 891.
116. PD, Debate on India, April 28, 1942, col. 868.
117. PD, Debate on India, April 28, 1942, cols. 906, 907.
118. PD, Debate on India, April 28, 1942, col. 911.
119. Menon, 1957, p. 137; Tendulkar, 1951, p. 74.
120. PD, Debate on India, April 28, 1942, cols. 912, 913.
121. PD, Debate on India, April 28, 1942, cols. 909, 910.
122. *The Times Literary Supplement,* October 14, 1944.
123. Coupland, 1944, pp. 226–229.
124. Coupland, 1942, p. 79. The emphasis is Coupland's.
125. TP (1), No. 536, War Cabinet, Committee on India. I (42), 12th Meeting, April 6, 1942.
126. Azad, 1960, p. 60.
127. TP (1), No. 605, Resolution of the Congress Working Committee (Cmd. 6350), April 11, 1942, p. 747.
128. *The Times Literary Supplement,* July 18, 1942.
129. Nichols, 1944, pp. 157–163.
130. Nichols, 1944, p. 90.
131. Hess, 1971, p. 116.
132. *The Times Literary Supplement,* October 14, 1944.
133. FO 371 A 1893/18/45, Note on the future of Anglo-American relations, circulated to Cabinet by S of S for FO, March 27, 1941.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

1. FRUS, Vol. 1. 1942, Memorandum of conversation between the Acting Secretary of State (Welles) and the British Ambassador, October 2, 1942.
2. The Quit India resolution and its aftermath are discussed in Chapter 8.
3. Fischer, 1946, pp. 49–50.

4. Fischer, 1946, pp. 65, 70–72.
5. Fischer, 1946, p. 70.
6. Fischer, 1946, p. 220.
7. Fischer, 1946, p. 70.
8. Fischer, 1946, pp. 70, 76–78.
9. Fischer, 1946, pp. 94–97.
10. Snow, 1941, Pt. 10, Things that could happen.
11. FRUS, The officer in charge at New Delhi (Haselton) to the Secretary of State, Hull, March 31, 1942.
12. TP) (1), No. 474, Linlithgow to Amery, March 31, 1942.
13. TP (1), No. 484, Cripps to Churchill, April 1, 1942; No. 496, Note by Cripps on interview with Azad and Nehru, April 2, 1942.
14. FRUS, Memorandum of conversation between the Acting Secretary of State (Welles) and Halifax, April 1, 1942.
15. FRUS, Memorandum of conversation between the Acting Secretary of State (Welles) and Halifax, April 1, 1942.
16. Sarkar, 1944, p. 6. The time of the interview between Welles and Halifax is not known.
17. Possibly Donovan's agency, which had put India on its list of concerns. In a conversation with David Baldwin in New Orleans in December 1995, he confirmed the presence of American intelligence agents in India in 1942.
18. FRUS, Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State, April 2, 1942.
19. FRUS, April 3, 1942.
20. FRUS, The Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson) to the President and Acting Secretary, April 4, 1942.
21. FRUS, Welles to Johnson, April 5, 1942.
22. Kimball, 1984, Roosevelt to Churchill, 10 March 42. Also cited in Loewenheim, Langley, & Jonas, 1975, and Churchill, 1951.
23. FRUS, Johnson to the President, April 7, 1942.
24. TP (1), No. 567, War Cabinet to Cripps, April 9, 1942 (4 p.m. GMT).
25. TP (1), No. 564, Churchill to Cripps, April 9, 1942 (1.20 p.m. GMT).
26. Sherwood, 1950, p. 524.
27. FRUS, The Officer in Charge in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State (Hopkins to Roosevelt), April 9, 1942.
28. FRUS, The Personal Representative of the President in India to the Secretary of State, April 9, 1942. Linlithgow informed Amery of his and Wavell's reluctant agreement to the Cripps–Johnson formula on April 10, 1942. See TP (1), No. 586.
29. FRUS, The Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson) to the Secretary of State, April 11, 1942.
30. FRUS, Memorandum of conversation by Oakes, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, May 26, 1942. [My emphasis.]
31. FRUS, President to Prime Minister via Hopkins, April 11, 1942.
32. Fischer, 1942, in *The Nation:* August 15, What Gandhi wants; August 22, Gandhi's rejected offer; September 5, India means it; Why Cripps failed, Pts. 1 & 2, September 19 & 26.
33. FO 371 A 8075 No. 4367, Halifax to Amery and FO, August 29, 1942, No. 625, MoI to Washington Embassy, August 29, 1942, FO A 8337 No. 605, Halifax to IO, September 1, 1942, and Amery to FO (no number). TP (2), No. 658, Halifax to Amery, August 30, 1942 (repeat of FO A 8075 No. 4367 above), and No. 670, Amery to Churchill, September 1, 1942.
34. Fischer, 1942, September 19, Why Cripps failed, Pt. 1, p. 230.
35. Fischer, 1942, September 26, Why Cripps failed, Pt. 2, pp. 255–256.

36. FO 371 A 8337 (no number), Secretary of State to FO, September 17, 1942.
37. TP (1), No. 567, War Cabinet to Cripps (via India Office and Viceroy), April 9, 1942.
38. FRUS, Johnson to Roosevelt, April 11, 1942.
39. Fischer, 1946, p. 104.
40. Fischer, 1942, September 19, Why Cripps failed, Pt. 1, pp. 230–235; September 26, Pt. 2, pp. 255–259.
41. Fischer, 1942, September 19, Why Cripps failed, Pt. 1, p. 230.
42. TP (1), No. 531, Wavell to Churchill; and No. 530, Linlithgow to Amery and Churchill, April 6, 1942.
43. Coupland, 1942, p. 77.
44. Fischer, 1942, September 19, Why Cripps failed, Pt. 1, p. 231.
45. Coupland, 1942, pp. 80–81.
46. Moore, 1988, Notes, p. 210.
47. Fischer, 1942, September 19, Why Cripps failed, Pt. 1, p. 233; September 26, Pt. 2, p. 258.
48. The American reaction to the Quit India movement and Britain's renewed propaganda campaign based on it are discussed below.
49. Snow, 1941, January, Things that could happen if America enters the War? If America stays out?, especially the section "Britain's weakness in India," *Asia;* 1942, September 12, Must Britain give up India?, *Saturday Evening Post;* 1943, August 21, The Japs missed the boat in India, *Saturday Evening Post;* 1943, October 16, Wooing wily India, *Saturday Evening Post;* and Snow (1944), *People on our side,* and an untitled chapter in Acharya (1942), *They speak for India.*
50. Thomas, 1996, p. 249.
51. Snow, 1957, Fragments from FDR, Pts. 1 & 2, *Monthly Review,* January & March.
52. Snow, 1942, September 12, Must Britain give up India?, *Saturday Evening Post,* p. 9.
53. Snow, 1941, p. 412.
54. Snow, 1941, The Political Battle for Asia, in E. Taylor, E. Snow, & E. Janeway, *Smash Hitler's international,* p. 69. Bajpai informed Berle that 57 battalions were used to suppress the Quit India unrest. FRUS, Memorandum, October 2, 1942.
55. Snow, 1942, September 12, Must Britain give up India?, *Saturday Evening Post,* p. 11.
56. Snow, 1942, September 12, Must Britain give up India?, *Saturday Evening Post,* p. 11.
57. See Law-Smith (now Weigold), Response and Responsibility: The Administration of the Bengal famine 1942–1943 (unpublished M.A. thesis, Flinders University, South Australia, 1984).
58. Snow, 1941, January, Britain's weakness in India, *Asia,* p. 14; *The Battle for Asia,* pp. 413–415; 1942, September 12, Must Britain give up India?, *Saturday Evening Post,* pp. 11–12; and Snow's chapter in Acharya, 1942, February, pp. 1–13.
59. Snow, 1941, January, Britain's weakness in India, *Asia,* p. 14; *The Battle for Asia,* p. 414. Snow's information on Indian production figures may have been obtained from the Government of India's March 1941 Report, "India's War resources," produced by the Chatfield mission.
60. Snow, 1942, September 12, Must Britain give up India?, *Saturday Evening Post,* p. 11.
61. FRUS, Memorandum of Conversation, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, February 3, 1942.

62. RL, 48-H India 1942, H. E. Beyster, Member, American Technical Mission to India to the Vice-President, June 12, 1942.
63. TP (2), No. 226, Linlithgow to Amery, July 6, 1942.
64. RL, 48-H India, Beyster to the Vice-President, June 12, 1942, pp. 1–5.
65. FRUS, Memorandum of conversation between Berle and Bajpai, October 2, 1942. The decision not to proceed was referred to by Berle in his notes, but not conveyed to Bajpai at that time.
66. FRUS, Hull to the Officer in Charge, New Delhi (Haselton), October 29, 1942.
67. FRUS, Officer in Charge, New Delhi (Merrell) to Hull, November 14, 1942.
68. Snow, 1941, September 12, Must Britain give up India?, *Saturday Evening Post,* p. 11.
69. Acharya, 1942, Chapter 1; Snow, 1944; see also discussion in Chapter 3.
70. Snow, 1944, p. 25.
71. Snow, 1944, p. 25. See also discussion in Chapter 3.
72. Snow, 1944, 25.
73. Snow, 1944, pp. 25–26.
74. *Time,* May 18, 1942, p. 70.
75. *Time,* May 18, 1942, p. 70.
76. FO 371 A 2895 (no number), Amery to Halifax (personal), March 23. 1942.
77. FO 371 A 2895 (no number), Amery to Halifax (personal), March 23, 1942; No. 8352, GoI to IO, (Puckle to Joyce) March 28, 1942.
78. FRUS, Haselton, New Delhi, to Secretary of State, September 5, 1942.
79. Farley, 1942, April 20, India: A political primer, *Far Eastern Survey,* pp. 94–101.
80. FO 371 A 6578, No. 471, Washington Embassy to IO, MoI and the Dominion and Colonial offices, July 6, 1942.
81. FO 371 A 6578, No. 471.
82. Venkataramani & Shrivastava, 1979, p. 293.
83. Raman, 1942, October 5, Essentials of an Indian settlement, *Far Eastern Survey, 11*(20), pp. 205–211.
84. Raman, 1942, October 5, Essentials of an Indian settlement, *Far Eastern Survey, 11*(20), p. 212.
85. Cripps must not fail, 1942, April 13, *The New Republic,* pp. 478–479.
86. Is Churchill's star setting?, 1942, May 18, *The New Republic,* pp. 656–657.
87. Brailsford, 1942, June 1, What happened at Delhi?, *The New Republic,* pp. 760–761.
88. Brailsford, 1942, June 1, What happened at Delhi?, *The New Republic,* p. 760.
89. Brailsford, 1942, June 1, What happened at Delhi?, *The New Republic,* p. 761.
90. FO 371 A 7429 No. 325, Washington Embassy to GoI & IO. Summary of press comments April 15–June 30, July 8, 1942.
91. Cantril, 1951, p. 327.
92. FO 371 A 7216 No. 6098, GoI to IO (Puckle to Joyce), August 3, 1942.
93. Snow, 1942, September 12, Must Britain give up India?, *Saturday Evening Post,* p. 12.
94. Snow, 1942, September 12, Must Britain give up India?, *Saturday Evening Post,* p. 12.
95. FO 371 A 6881 No. 3799, Washington Embassy to FO, IO, MoI & GoI, July 22, 1942.
96. Snow, 1942, September 12, Must Britain give up India?, *Saturday Evening Post,* p. 12. Snow frequently used the term *United Nations* when his reference was to the Allies.
97. India Office Library (hereafter IOL), MSS EUR D 1052, Gandhi to Linlithgow, August 14, 1942.

98. Snow, 1942, September 12, Must Britain give up India?, *Saturday Evening Post,* p. 12.
99. Sheean, 1947, p. 290.
100. Sheean, 1947, p. 290.
101. Sheean, 1947, pp. 286–295, 290. Sheean's devotion to Gandhi was restored before the Mahatma's death. Snow and Fischer never lost their faith in him. See Sheean, 1949, pp. 206–208; Hamilton, 1988, p. 185; Fischer, 1954, especially pp. 7–8, 187–189.
102. RL, Louis Fischer Papers, *Statement on India,* September 3, 1942.
103. RL, Louis Fischer Papers, *Statement on India,* p. 5. The 16 pages of the *Statement* are not numbered. The numbering is mine.
104. RL, Louis Fischer, *Statement on India,* September 3, 1942, p. 16.
105. RL, Louis Fischer, *Statement on India,* September 3, 1942, pp. 9, 15.
106. RL, Louis Fischer Papers, Fischer to Roosevelt, August 7, 1942.
107. RL, Louis Fischer Papers, Record of interview with Hull, August 27, 1942.
108. RL, Louis Fischer Papers, Record of interview with Welles, September 25, 1942.
109. RL, Louis Fischer Papers.
110. RL, Louis Fischer Papers.
111. RL, Louis Fischer Papers, Record of interview with Welles, September 25, 1942.
112. Fischer, 1942, August 15, What Gandhi wants, *The Nation,* (page number obscured).
113. Fischer, 1942, August 15, What Gandhi wants, *The Nation.*
114. Fischer, 1942, August 15, India means it, *The Nation,* p. 186.
115. Fischer, 1942, August 15, India means it, *The Nation,* p. 185.
116. FO 371 A 7216 No. 6098, Puckle to Joyce, 3 August 42.
117. A solution for India, 1942, August 17, *The New Republic,* p. 192.
118. Lin Yutang, 1942, August 24, India and the war for freedom, *The New Republic,* p. 217.
119. Lin Yutang, 1942, August 24, India and the war for Freedom, *The New Republic,* p. 218.
120. Cantril, 1951, p. 327.
121. Cantril, 1951, p. 327.
122. *The Nation,* 1942, August 20, p. 177.
123. *New York Times,* 1942, September 28
124. *New York Times,* 1942, September 29.
125. Venkataramani & Shrivastava, 1979, footnote, p. 292.
126. *New York Times,* 1942, October 1.
127. Venkataramani & Shrivastava, 1979, p. 292.
128. Venkataramani & Shrivastava, 1979, pp. 292–293.
129. FO 371 A 8666 No. 4650, Halifax to IO, September 15, 1942.
130. FRUS, Memorandum of Conversation between Hull and Halifax, September 17, 1942.
131. FRUS Memorandum of Conversation between Alling and Bajpai, September 4, 1942.
132. Haselton alternated as Officer in Charge with Merrell. Messages only days apart, to or from the State Department, arrived from or were sent to either man.
133. FRUS, Haselton to Hull, September 5, 1942.
134. FRUS, Memorandum of Conversation between Haselton and Hull, September 5, 1942.
135. *Washington Post,* 1942, September 14. Copy held at RL, 48-H India 1942.
136. TP (2), No. 749, Halifax to Eden, September 16, 1942.

137. FRUS, Memorandum of Conversation between Hull and Halifax, September 17, 1942.
138. FRUS, Memorandum of Conversation between Welles and Halifax, September 24, 1942.
139. FO 371 A 2400 No. 1374, Halifax to India Office, March 9, 1942. This was the first sign that Halifax's anxiety, expressed in March 1942, was well founded: that Bajpai was independently discussing Indian politics with members of the State Department.
140. FRUS, Memorandum of Conversation between Berle and Bajpai, October 2, 1942.
141. FRUS, Memorandum of Conversation between Berle and Bajpai, October 2, 1942.
142. FRUS, Memorandum of Conversation between Berle and Bajpai, October 2, 1942.
143. FRUS, Memorandum of Conversation between Murray and Bajpai, October 13, 1942.
144. FRUS, Memorandum of Conversation between Murray and Bajpai, October 13, 1942.
145. FRUS Hull to Phillips, November 3, 1942, and Phillips to Hull, November 4, 1942.
146. FRUS, Hull to Phillips, November 20, 1942.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

1. Brown, 1994, pp. 320–321. The ideas, which support a compromise between the Congress Party leaders in the wake of Cripps' failure, are discussed by Brown.
2. Moore, 1979, p. 128.
3. TP (2), No. 227, War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 283, L/P&J/510: ff 407–16. Report on Mission to India, Memorandum by the Lord Privy Seal, July 6, 1942.
4. TP (2), No. 227, War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 283, L/P&J/8/510: ff 407–16. Report on Mission to India, Memorandum by the Lord Privy Seal, July 6, 1942.
5. Coupland, 1945, p. 215.
6. Glendevon, 1971, p. 238.
7. Statement by Rajagopalachari to the *Bombay Chronicle,* September 15, 1942, and others, cited in Moore, 1979, pp. 127–128.
8. Moore, 1979, pp. 127–128.
9. Discussed in Chapter 3.
10. FO 371 A 7429, No. 325, MoI to GoI & IO, July 8. Following summary of press comments, April 15–June 30, 1942.
11. Cantril, 1951, p. 327. In answer to the question, "Should England give India dominion status now or after the war?," asked on March 31, 1942, 37% of the sample were in favour of Dominion Status now. On July 29 and August 13, 43% of those polled were in favour of giving India complete independence. No time was specified.
12. FO 371 A 7429, No. 325, MoI to GoI & IO, 8 July 1942. United States press comments.
13. TP (1), No. 670, Linlithgow to Amery, April 23, 1942.
14. TP (2), No. 44, Linlithgow to Amery, May 11, 1942. Gandhi's communications with the Indian population were published in the newspaper *Harijan*.
15. TP (2), No. 71, Linlithgow to Amery, May 19, 1942.
16. TP (2), No. 71, Linlithgow to Amery, May 19, 1942.
17. TP (2), No. 28, Amery to Linlithgow, May 6, 1942.

18. TP (2), No. 86, Linlithgow to Amery, May 25, 1942.
19. TP (2), No. 339, War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 318, India as a factor in Anglo-American relations. Note by the Lord Privy Seal, July 27, 1942.
20. See discussion in Chapter 3.
21. TP (2), No. 61, Note by Mr. Spry, paragraph 2, May 15, 1942.
22. TP (2), No. 61, Note by Mr. Spry, paragraph 3, May 15, 1942.
23. TP (2), No. 61, Note by Mr. Spry, paragraph 4, May 15, 1942.
24. TP (2), No. 61, Note by Mr. Spry, May 15, 1942.
25. FRUS India 1942, Memorandum of Conversation, Alling, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, May 13, 1942.
26. TP (2), No. 91, Linlithgow to Amery, May 27, 1942.
27. FRUS India 1942, Johnson to Secretary of State, April 28, 1942.
28. TP (2), No. 69, Linlithgow to Amery, May 18, 1942.
29. FRUS India 1942, Memorandum of Conversation, Oakes, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, May 26, 1942.
30. FRUS India 1942, May 26, 1942.
31. FRUS India 1942, Entries May–July 1942.
32. Broomfield, 1968, p. 305.
33. Brown (1994, pp. 322–323), includes a table setting out evidence of the regional spread of the Quit India movement and its repression, including the number of arrests made province by province up to December 31, 1943.
34. Further reading, for example, Sarkar (1983), Tendulkar (1951, Vol. 6), and Venkataramani & Shrivastava (1979).
35. Sarkar, 1983, p. 388.
36. Rajagopalachari's resignation was temporary, and he became a Government Minister post-independence.
37. Sarkar, 1983, p. 389.
38. The full text can be read in TP (2), No. 265, Resolution of the Congress Working Committee, Cmd. 6430, Wardha, July 14, 1942.
39. FO 371 A 6881, (number omitted), Campbell to FO, IO, MoI, July 22, 1942. No. 3779, Bajpai to Foreign Dept, New Delhi.
40. FO 371 A 6098, (number omitted), GoI (Puckle) to IO (Joyce), August 3, 1942. Summary of Gandhi's draft.
41. FRUS, Officer in charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State (Hull), May 21, 1942.
42. FRUS, Officer in charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State (Hull), July 14, 1942.
43. FRUS, Officer in charge at New Delhi to the Secretary of State, July 16, two telegrams, July 17, summary of Berry's interview with Nehru, July 18, Berry's further interview with Nehru.
44. FRUS. President Roosevelt to Mr. Mohandas K. Gandhi, August 1, 1942. Enclosure to Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell), August 5, 1942.
45. FRUS, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to President Roosevelt, Chunking, July 25, 1942.
46. FRUS, The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State (Hull), July 30, 1942, and TP (2), No. 367, Note by Mr. Amery. Note of an interview with Mr. Winant, July 29, 1942.
47. FRUS, The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State. Forwarding telegram from the Consulate at Bombay (Donovan), August 5, 1942.
48. FO 7429 A, No. 325, MoI to GoI & IO. United States press comments, July 8, 1942.
49. FO 7216 A. No. 6098, GoI (Puckle) to IO (Joyce), August 3, 1942.

50. FO 6881 A, No. 3799, Washington embassy to FO, IO, MoI & GoI, July 22, 1942.
51. Hess, 1971, p. 74.
52. Hess, 1971, p. 74.
53. Venkataramani & Shrivastava, 1979, p. 263.
54. FO 371 A 6881, No. 3799, Washington Embassy to FO, IO, MoI, and Bajpai to GoI (Foreign Department), July 22, 1942.
55. FO 371 A 7429, No. 325, Washington embassy to Foreign Dept, GoI & IO July 8, 1942.
56. NP, Vol. 3, Pt. 3, Statements to the Press, July 27–28, 1942.
57. FRUS, Merrell to Hull, July 18 & 21, 1942.
58. FO 371 A 6881, Washington Embassy (Campbell & Bajpai) to FO, IO, MoI and GoI, July 22, 1942.
59. TP (2), No. 462, Amery to Churchill, August 8, 1942.
60. FRUS, Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State, August 9, 1942.
61. TP (2), No. 461, Linlithgow to Amery, August 8, 1942.
62. Gandhi, 1944, pp. 114–125.
63. Gandhi, 1944, pp. 18–19.
64. Cited in Menon, 1957, p. 144.
65. The course of the rebellion is tracked and analysed in Brown (1994, Chapter 6, especially pp. 320–325).
66. Brown, 1994, cites figures in tabular form drawn form a British Home Political File (3/52/43/1), pp. 322–323.
67. Cantril, 1951, p. 327.
68. Quoted by Hess, 1971, p. 127.
69. Birkenhead, Earl of, 1966, pp. 533–545.
70. Hess, 1971, p. 118.
71. Hess, 1971, p. 128.
72. Phillips, 1952, pp. 218–255.
73. FRUS, The Secretary of State conveyed the decision to the Officer in Charge, New Delhi, on October 29, 1942. See also the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Lend-Lease Administrator (Stettinius), October 10, 1942, and the Government of India's response conveyed by the Officer in Charge, New Delhi, November 14, 1942.
74. Hess, 1971, p. 128.
75. *The New Republic,* August 23, 1942, p. 217; Hall, What to do with India?, *Current History,* November 1942, p. 205; *The Nation,* August 29, 1942, p. 180.
76. Hess, 1971, p. 185.
77. PD, cols. 302–305, September 10, 1942, and cols. 604–620, September 11, 1942.
78. TP (2), No. 762, Halifax to Eden, September 16, 1942, relayed to New Delhi.
79. *New York Times,* September 15, 1942.
80. Kirchwey, Churchill's speech, *The Nation,* September 19, 1942, p. 224.
81. Kirchwey, Churchill's speech, *The Nation,* September 19, 1942, p. 224.
82. Senator Green, Rhode Island, for example, sent Roosevelt a plan for devolution of power devised by his constituents. Liberal Senator Norris, Nebraska voiced his concern over conditions in India. There was additionally what Hope (1968, p. 44) referred to as a "chorus of congressional protest."
83. TP (2), No. 749, Halifax to Eden and GoI, September 16, 1942.
84. TP (2), No. 749, Halifax to Eden and GoI, September 16, 1942.
85. Indian Freedom and the American Press, Editorial, *The Christian Century,* September 2, 1942, p. 1043.

86. Indian Freedom and the American Press, Editorial, *The Christian Century,* September 2, 1942, p. 1043.
87. An Observer, Ostrich into Eagle? Public Opinion in the United States on International Collaboration, with special reference to the Far East, *Far Eastern Survey,* November 30, 1942, pp. 241–244.
88. RL, PSF India 1942, Copy of letter from Amery to Eden, September 1, 1942.
89. FRUS, Memorandum of Conversation between Halifax and Hull, September 17, 1942.
90. TP (2), No. 764, Halifax to Eden, September 18, 1942.
91. Hall, What to do with India?, *Current History,* November 1942, pp. 205–210.
92. Roosevelt, 1946, Chapter 2.
93. Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986, p. 157.
94. It is significant that the Washington Embassy was part of the information loop that linked the Government organisations concerned with propaganda (including the Foreign Office and the India Committee of Cabinet), but it took no independent action.
95. Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986, p. 164.
96. FRUS, Personal Representative to the President, May 4, 1942.
97. FRUS, Officer in Charge at New Delhi to Secretary of State, July 18, 1942.
98. There is no indication in public documents or in published letters between President and Prime Minister that the British were made aware of the May and July proposals.
99. NP, Pt. 1, Vol. 37, Nehru to Johnson, April 13, 1942, repeated in Nehru (1960, pp. 479–480), and RL, PSF India 1942, Gandhi to Roosevelt, July 1, 1942.
100. FRUS, Memorandum of Conversation with Bajpai by Assistant Secretary of State Berle, August 12, 1942.
101. *The New Statesman,* August 22, 1942, p. 120.
102. FO 371 A 7429, No. 325, MoI to IO & GoI, July 8, 1942.

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In January 2004 Auriol Weigold was appointed Course Convenor and Foundation Lecturer for the University of Canberra's new BA in International Studies, a position she still holds.

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